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Abstract 
Victoria Dimitri Araj 
The Turkish Model, the Double-Security Dilemma, and the Political 
Reproduction of State Polities in the Middle East 
Keywords: alliance-building, Turkish foreign policy, Islamic neoliberalism, 
Justice and Development Party, Turkish domestic politics  
Conceptually the aims of this thesis are to show the salient features of the 
political reproduction of states as a necessity for their survival as they 
continually face a double-security dilemma in the neoliberal era. Empirically 
this thesis examines Turkey’s ruling party from 2002 to 2015. The Justice 
and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) maintained 
authority by mitigating the polities and actors that posed vertical and 
horizontal competition to their power (the double-security dilemma of 
domestic and international threats faced by state rulers).  
To outcompete and absorb its rivals, the AKP maintained a post-Islamist 
alliance-building model of political reproduction through a globalized Islamic 
neoliberal authority pattern until 2011. This became popularized as the 
‘Turkish Model’, a model of political reproduction framed as suitable for other 
Muslim-majority states. The findings from data analysis show that to maintain 
the constitutive sovereignty of the Turkish state, the AKP built a post-Islamist 
hegemony.   
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Furthermore, this thesis explores how the AKP horizontally built a pluralist 
vision of neo-ottomanism enabling their navigation of the international 
political system. Their ‘zero-problems’ foreign policy was the cornerstone of 
building regional liberal peace. This policy was the basis of the AKP’s 
maintenance of functional sovereignty until the ‘Arab Spring’. Yet, the new 
double-security dilemma that emerged through the ‘Arab Spring’ not only 
threatened the existence of post-Islamism within Turkey, but the existence of 
the ‘Turkish Model’ itself. The AKP then moved towards a fortifying pattern of 
authority to shield both themselves and the Republic from emergent threats.   
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Chapter One: Introduction to the ‘Turkish Model’ and 
the Political Reproduction of State Polities 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP)1 
administration has been one of the most successful authorities at maintaining 
the power and stability of a majority Muslim state in the post 9.11 world. 
Under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan the administration has 
facilitated a threefold increase of Turkey’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
heavily invested in the development and renewal of infrastructure throughout 
the country and elevated Turkey’s regional standing to a point not seen since 
the Ottoman period; culminating in policy-makers framing Turkey as a model 
state for other majority Muslim nations to follow. It must be noted that this 
‘success’ has not been without its challenges, as the AKP faced both 
traditional and new threats to their power. These threats came both from 
inside and outside Turkey and took on many different configurations.  
The intention of this thesis is to investigate the political reproduction of states 
in the face of the double-security dilemma (internal and external threats to 
the state). The thesis achieves this with a case study of the ‘Turkish Model’ 
                                                     
1 The AKP is a moderate Islamist conservative party established in 2001 and has held 
governing incumbency in Turkey from 2002-2016. It has held a majority in parliament for 
over 13 years (Keyman and Gumuscu 2014).  
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by collecting data on Turkey; and analysing how the AKP as a power bloc 
maintained their authority and the sovereignty of the Turkish state through 
both absorbing and challenging evolving threats to their power. Thus, the 
unique findings of this thesis dispel the notion of the ‘failure’ of the ‘Turkish 
Model’ domestically and internationally- rather, it displays how the AKP 
simply altered their mode of political reproduction. Furthermore, the 
theoretical findings of this thesis, that contribute to the existing literature on 
the double-security dilemma, exhibit both causal and constitutive factors in 
the vertical and horizontal political reproduction of the state, noting the 
centrality of geopolitics, identity and loyalty to a state’s survival2.  
Political reproduction is the process by which a state maintains a pattern of 
authority through its actions, bargaining and institutionalization (Hall 1999). It 
is through political reproduction that a state’s relationship to its environment 
is constituted and reconstituted. The double-security dilemma that a state 
faces can either motivate a fortifying or an alliance-building mode of political 
reproduction (Hall 1999). A fortifying mode is one in which the state insulates 
itself from society and other polities. An alliance-building mode is one in 
which it builds co-operation with society and other polities. Failure to respond 
                                                     
2 This thesis demonstrates the institutional and sovereign vulnerability of state polities due to 
the double-security dilemma, particularly as a state horizontally expands its influence. Yet, 
the transition of the ‘Turkish Model’ is evidence of how a state can survive if it can politically 
reproduce effectively.  
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to the ‘double-security dilemma’ will lead to the collapse of the state (Hall 
1999)3.  
The ‘Turkish Model’ of 2002-2011 represents the process by which the AKP 
maintained authority of the Turkish state through an alliance-building mode of 
actions, bargaining and institutionalization both domestically and 
internationally. The maintenance of this pattern of authority within Turkey, 
that of ‘Islamic neoliberalism4’ was marketed to the ‘region’s downtrodden as 
‘justice’ (Tuğal 2016: 149). The dominant policy consideration was that if AKP 
could simultaneously ensure Turkey's domestic stability and elevation to 
hegemony on the international stage; the Turkish state would have the 
capacity to spread normative ties of democracy, human rights, and the rule of 
law between Europe and the Middle East, "fostering 'positive peace' and 
stability in the penetrated region as regional hegemon." (İşeri and Dilek 2012 
119) 
Until 2012 the ‘Turkish Model’ was a dominant point of reference for nations 
undergoing regime change such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen 
                                                     
3 The strategy of pursuing a fortifying mode of political reproduction is to prevent rivals from 
gaining strength. Pursuing an alliance-building mode of political reproduction leads to co-
opting or co-operating with rivals and making them allies. It is important to note that that a 
state is never alliance-building or fortifying, rather it is in the process of becoming either (Hall 
1999). 
4 Sometimes Tuğal (2016: 4) refers to ‘Islamic neoliberalism’ and sometimes to ‘Islamic 
liberalism’ which he explains is “the marriage of formal democracy, free market capitalism 
and (a toned down) conservative Islam.” 
 4 
 
(Natil 2016). The ‘Turkish Model’ was marketed as a political solution to 
emerging power gaps by both foreign and domestic actors. Nevertheless, the 
marketing of the ‘Turkish Model’ was an ineffective tool of political 
entrepreneurship and ‘Islamic neoliberalism’ did not successfully inseminate 
the region (Natil 2016).  
Since 2013, concerns have been raised about the AKP’s monopolization of 
political power and creeping authoritarianism (Tuğal 2013; Samaan 2013; 
Keyman and Gumuscu 2014). Regional shifts in power and the increased 
threat from pseudo-Islamic and Kurdish terrorism reverberating from 
miscalculated policy decisions during the Arab ‘so called5’ Spring have 
altered the structure of Turkish political society and in turn, how it relates to 
world society. The recent consensus of analysts, policy-makers and civil 
society is that the ‘Turkish Model’ has lost the capacity to spread normative 
ties. The AKP have had to revise their mode of political reproduction to grip 
onto the Turkish state as they shifted their alliances on both the international 
and domestic front (Waldman and Caliskan 2017; Çagaptay 2017).      
Research into the failure of the ‘Turkish Model’ in the Arab region has largely 
focused on the structure of Turkish political society. These studies (Tuğal 
2013, 2016; Keyman and Gumuscu 2014; Haynes 2010) have explained how 
                                                     
5 The ‘Arab Spring’ refers to the democratic uprisings that arose in Tunisia and spread 
across the Arab world from 2010. However, scholars began to question the use of the word 
‘Spring’ due to the negative outcomes of the uprisings. 
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the AKP’s monopolization of political power has polarized Turkish society into 
those with a stake in Islamic neoliberalism and those without. Scholars have 
also examined Turkey’s misconstrued foreign policy which diminished 
Turkey’s bargaining power and potential as a mediator to facilitate political 
change in the region (Natil 2013; Kösebalaban 2011; Dede 2013; Öniş 2012). 
Further studies have focused on the idea of ‘exceptionalism’, and that either 
Turkey or the Arab states are unique, with their own cultures and histories 
(Harik 2006). Turkish ‘exceptionalism’ conceptualizes Turkey as uniquely 
European in the Middle East and as a bridge between civilizations. Arab 
‘exceptionalism’, on the contrary, conceptualizes the Arab states as not 
culturally permeable to democracy, human rights or the rule of law, therefore 
lending to the idea that the ‘Turkish Model’ is not an appropriate model for 
Arab state polities (Harik 2006).   
Research both on the rise and the fall of the ‘Turkish Model’ has rarely 
touched upon the role of identity, ideology, loyalty and rhetoric. The role that 
these factors play in political reproduction as state actors navigate through 
the changing political environment has become counterhegemonic 
scholarship within International Relations (IR) (Ferguson et al. 2000; Hopf 
1998; Bozdaglioglu 2003).  IR has touched upon the ‘Turkish Model’ as a soft 
power tool (Al-Ghazzi and Kraidy 2013) or a factor for consideration within 
Foreign Policy Analysis (Natil 2013; Park 2012); yet has not deconstructed 
the model as a form of political reproduction or examined a behavioural 
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connection to the state-system. Researching the ‘Turkish Model’ through this 
perspective is important because systemic analysis of politics offers a deep 
understanding of the way state actors relate to both their populations and to 
instability on an international level. It can provide insight into how the 
interaction between the domestic and international can impact on the 
decision-making of policy-makers. This has become an increasingly 
important political dynamic as the world becomes more digitized and 
globalized. 
Scholars have examined the impact of the ‘Turkish Model’ on either domestic 
politics or international politics but have rarely combined the two. Therefore, 
this research aims to fill in this gap by studying the impact of the ‘Turkish 
Model’ alliance-building mode of political reproduction in both Turkey and the 
Middle East region. Identities, ideologies and loyalty are borderless, and it is 
only through a ‘second-image reversed’6 approach (Gourevitch 1978) that a 
full picture of political change in the region can be offered. Investigating why 
the ‘Turkish Model’ failed through constructivist IR is germane and it is 
through the political grammar of constructivist IR that this research enquiry is 
framed. 
.  
                                                     
6 A ‘second image reversed’ approach to research in the social sciences is that which frames 
the international system not just as an expression of domestic structures, but a cause of 
them (Gourevitch 1978). 
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1.2 The ‘Turkish Model’ 
The emergence of the ‘Turkish Model’ has been well documented by 
scholars, policy-makers, and the media. The AKP’s ability to combine 
democracy, modernism and neoliberalism with Islamic values and traditions 
was proposed as a viable model for Arab nations in political transition. 
However, in 2011 both the regional and domestic political dynamics altered. 
Since 2012, the political debate has shifted to frame the ‘Turkish Model’ as 
having failed as instability took hold both in the Arab region and Turkey. 
Literature around the failure of the ‘Turkish Model’ has largely focused on the 
‘democratization’ aspect of the model. Many have argued that the ‘Turkish 
Model’ cannot be an effective example for emerging democracies with 
Muslim majority populations as since 2011 the state apparatus has become 
increasingly authoritarian under the AKP (Bâli 2011). Studies have 
highlighted the flaws of Turkey’s democratic institutions (Czajka and Isyar 
2011). Czajika and Isyar (2011) explain that Turkey has the most 
unrepresentative electoral system in Europe where minorities such as Kurds 
are grossly underrepresented. Other flaws include failure to consult the 
opposition and civil society in the formulation of the new constitution, a poor 
civil and human rights record and crack downs on media and internet 
freedom (Czajka and Isyar 2011). In their seminal (2014) work, E. Fuat 
Keyman and Sebnem Gumuscu expound that the ‘Turkish Model’ is having a 
negative demonstrative effect in the Arab region. The ‘Turkish Model’ is 
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promoting the view that greater ‘power fusion’ provides better and stronger 
governance. ‘Power Fusion’ is defined by Keyman and Gumuscu (2014) as 
the presence of a strong executive that rules with a majoritarian impulse and 
relies extensively on an electoral, rather than pluralist understanding of 
democracy. Through this process the separation of power is gradually 
eroded.  
Another school of thought refers to the uniqueness of both the structure of 
society and the historic experiences of the Turkish Republic and the Arab 
region which lends to the failure of ‘one size fits all’ policy prescriptions. 
Turkey has long established secular and European traditions that some 
scholars argue are not present in Arab society (Harik 2006). There is a notion 
of ‘Arab exceptionalism’. This refers to a “widespread and longstanding view 
in Western intellectual circles that maintains that somehow the Arab-Islamic 
world is civilizationally and culturally different from the rest of the world 
(especially the West) and that this explains why democracy has been absent, 
turmoil persists, and authoritarianism has prevailed.” (Hashemi 2013: 210) 
A departure from both Arab exceptionalism and democratization theory, 
Cihan Tuğal's (2016) study of the fall of the ‘Turkish Model’ is centred around 
how the politics of mobilization reconstructed state-society relations in 
Turkey. Within this reconstruction the ‘Turkish Model’ was a political tool 
brought in by the political establishment to combat the threats to the political 
status quo in Turkey. Tuğal's main argument is that the ‘Turkish Model’ has 
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failed as the historic Anatolian subaltern7 have become the new political 
establishment who have monopolized power. Thus, the political mobilization 
of this class of society and their absorption into state institutions has itself 
created more threats to the continuity and stability of the Turkish Republic 
and its “democracy”. Tuğal's (2016: 27) core argument is that, “The ‘Turkish 
Model’ puts activists with revolutionary rhetoric at the helm of a 
counterrevolutionary state and mobilizes parts of the population to demobilize 
the rest.”   
The literature on the failure of the ‘Turkish Model’ has examined structural 
factors but has rarely taken account of how identity politics and regional 
security threats have affected the structure of Turkish political society8. Social 
cohesion and sovereign territoriality are weaker than ever in the Middle East. 
Turkey managed to mitigate these issues during the early years of the AKP 
incumbency through alliance-building with civil society and ethnic and 
religious minorities. Nonetheless, as the double-security dilemma shifted, this 
alliance-building model of political reproduction failed to spread Islamic 
neoliberalism to the Arab region and has shifted within Turkey itself.  
                                                     
7 The Anatolian subaltern were the Turkish rural traditional majority who were marginalized 
by the Kemalist process due to their religious views and traditional practices. Nonetheless, 
they became socially mobile during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s as Islamic neoliberalism 
extricated them out of the periphery.  
8 Natil (2017) has analysed how the regional embeddedness of Turkey’s INGO’s have, 
despite increasing Turkey’s soft power, made the state vulnerable to transborder security 
threats.  
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1.3 Constructivist Polity Approaches to Historical Realism 
This research project answers the call of Martin Hall (1999) to further develop 
historical realism theory through contemporary constructivist case studies on 
the political reproduction of states. The political reproduction of states is a 
necessity for their survival as they continually face a double-security dilemma 
in the anarchic post-international system. Historical realism theory (as 
produced by Hall (1999), explains that states can undertake one of two 
modes of political reproduction. A state can undertake an ‘alliance-building’ 
mode of political reproduction or a ‘fortifying’ mode of political reproduction9. 
If a state fails to politically reproduce it will collapse entirely. The ‘Turkish 
Model’ of 2001-2011 was an ‘alliance-building’ mode of political reproduction. 
Polity theory as developed by Ferguson and Mansbach (1996) states the 
double-security dilemma10 is based around the threat posed to the authority 
                                                     
9 These two options are at times in this thesis presented as dichotomous for simplicity. 
However, it is important to understand that in reality polities can be simultaneously alliance-
building as well as fortifying. Thus, a continuum exists with polities either becoming more 
alliance-building or more fortifying at any given time. It is also important to note that 
becoming more fortifying does not detract from a polity still using a certain level of alliance-
building behaviour nor does it prevent a more alliance-building polity from engaging in 
fortifying behaviour. 
10 The ‘double-security dilemma’ refers to the external and domestic security threats a state 
faces and the predicament it faces in mitigating the two simultaneously. Responding to 
external security threats may have an impact on the nature of domestic security threats. 
There are differing perspectives amongst scholars around the nature of the ‘double-security 
dilemma’. This research project will employ the ‘double-security dilemma’ as referred to by 
Ferguson and Mansbach in their work on polities.  
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of the state polity11 by two differing groups. The first is those groups who 
threaten the sovereignty of the state polity, and the second is those who 
would threaten the institutional foundations of the state polity.  
When mitigating the double-security dilemma, if a state polity succeeds in 
providing value satisfaction for those who identify with it, it may prevent new 
loyalties from forming amongst those in which it is able to have some 
influence. Failure to provide satisfaction may provoke shifts in loyalties. 
Nevertheless, the capacity of a state polity authority to mitigate the double-
security dilemma and effectively politically reproduce to either becoming 
‘fortifying’ or becoming ‘alliance-building’ is dependent on its constitutive 
environment. The constitutive environment of the state-polity includes: the 
level of competition for loyalty with other polities, whether the discursive 
social environment is open or closed to critical opinion, the level of 
segmentary differentiation in society, and the level of stratifactory 
differentiation.  
1.4 Research Summary 
Thus, this thesis uses a case study to examine an example of how a state 
polity reproduces dependent on both its constitutive environment and 
capacity to mitigate the double-security dilemma. Therefore, this project 
                                                     
11  Ferguson and Mansbach (1996) note that polities are hierarchal group structures such as 
the state that are led by authorities who command and compete over the loyalties of global 
citizens. 
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answers the research question, “How does a state polity politically reproduce 
to mitigate the double-security dilemma?” 
This is achieved through the case study of the ‘Turkish Model’ of alliance-
building political reproduction undertaken by the AKP. The following research 
summary explains how the research question is answered. Firstly, Chapter 
Two: Political Reproduction and the Double-Security Dilemma of State 
Polities and Chapter Three: Researching the ‘Turkish Model’: An Alliance-
building Case of Political Reproduction outline the methodology and 
theoretical framework of this research project. The gaps in both the 
methodological and theoretical literature are combined to note that a 
constructivist polity-based historically realist approach, framing the ‘Turkish 
Model’ as a form of alliance-building political reproduction, is the most 
appropriate for this case study. Then a heurist theoretical framework is 
designed for this thesis combining the above with some taxonomy from 
comparative politics and IR.   
Next, Chapter Four: Arrows of Change: Kemalism and the Roots of the 
‘Turkish Model’ explains the creation of the Turkish state polity and how it 
became embedded into the international system and grew to be an important 
regional actor. Many of Turkey’s security problems are permanent such as its 
geopolitics, its history of Islam and being part of Europe and the polarized 
identities that has created. It is as important to examine these fixed security 
dilemmas that all Turkish rulers have had to deal with, as it is important to 
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understand the 21st century dilemmas that were solely unique to the AKP.  In 
fact, the ‘Turkish Model’ emerged as a response to binaries such as 
modernity and tradition, Westphalia and Islam. Therefore, it is vital to 
understand the historical inception of these ideas and their absorption into 
the loyalties of Turks.  
Following that, Chapter Five: Vertical Alliance-Building Political Reproduction 
in Turkey: The Turkish State Polity under the AKP’s Mounting Authority 
focuses on the structures and functions of the political system that posed 
vertical obstacles to the AKP’s rise to power and consolidation of control. To 
overcome these obstacles and outcompete rivals for, they used an alliance-
building neoliberal pattern of authority to penetrate society and consolidate 
their rule. They did this through expanding their power base and creating 
vested interests amongst a wide range of stakeholders. Thus, chapter five 
builds a full representation of the evolution of Turkish politics under the 
control of the AKP which culminated in the ‘Turkish Model’.   
The next analytical chapter, Chapter Six: Neo-ottomanism and Zero-
problems: The AKP’s Horizontal Alliance-building Political Reproduction of 
Post-Islamist Turkey’s Functional Sovereignty, will explain how the AKP not 
only maintained the sovereignty of the Turkish state through its friendly 
neighbourhood policy, but also elevated Turkey to regional power status. The 
AKP used its shared history and Islamic ideology with the Arab world to 
reignite the ties that had been lost by the Kemalists. The chapter explains 
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that as Turkey became more entrenched in the Arab region and Africa, its 
popularity grew amongst the Arab and Muslim public, leading to it becoming 
a ‘model’ state for other Muslim-majority nations to aspire to. Yet, despite 
this, cracks in the alliance-building project emerged firstly as Turkey was 
dependent on its hard power alliances with the United States of America 
(USA), Israel and the West to mitigate its security dilemma and secondly; as 
the AKP began to use more authoritarian behaviour to nullify domestic 
dissent.   
The final analytical chapter, Chapter Seven: The Unravelling of The ‘Turkish 
Model’: The ‘Arab Spring’, The AKP’s Evolving Double-Security Dilemma and 
their Transition from Alliance-Building to Fortifying Political Reproduction 
examines how Turkey’s commercial, religious and social embeddedness in 
the Middle East region that had become entrenched during the alliance-
building period caused a new double-security dilemma for the AKP from 2011 
onwards. This was largely due to Turkish diplomatic failure during the Arab 
‘Spring’. The security situation was also exacerbated by the environmental 
and social costs of Islamic neoliberalism. This chapter explains how the AKP 
reacted to this change in the double-security dilemma by moving towards a 
more fortifying mode of political reproduction domestically and internationally 
from 2013 onwards. As it was clear liberal peace within society or within the 
region could not endure, the ‘Turkish Model’ idea was put to rest. Instead, 
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growing authoritarianism and militarism with President Erdoğan at the helm 
was viewed as the only way to secure the Turkish state polity. 
 
Lastly, Chapter Eight: Thesis Conclusions will discuss the findings of this 
enquiry into the ‘Turkish Model’. It will explain how this thesis has illuminated 
significant methodological and ontological considerations on state ruler’s 
behaviour and their inverse relationship to both the international political 
system and the societies with which they command loyalty. Then, the 
conclusion will examine the benefits of the study to both academics and 
those within the policy field.  
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Chapter Two: Political Reproduction and the Double-
Security Dilemma of State Polities 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will review the ontological and theoretical literature of this thesis. 
The first part of this chapter, 2.2 Constructivist Ontologies for Middle Eastern 
Studies, deals with the failure of some sections of academia in analysing the 
socio-political changes within Turkey and the Middle East and their 
miscalculations over the permeability of the ‘Turkish Model’ in the Islamic 
world. It then outlines the ontological merit of constructivism for research on 
the Middle East. The next part of this chapter, 2.3 The Genesis of the 
Theoretical Framework of this Study: Reviewing Constructivist Historical 
Realism, explains a polity approach to research followed by an explanation of 
the historical realist approach. Based on a constructivist ontology, an outline 
of the merger of the two above theories will then provide the theoretical 
framework to be used within this research project.  
A successful alliance-building mode of political reproduction will naturally 
form a ‘demonstrative effect’ as the state co-operates with and co-opts allies 
domestically and internationally thereby fostering ‘positive peace’ (İşeri and 
Dilek 2012: 119). A state’s response to a domestic or international event may 
also politically reproduce its identity or reinforce it, it is thus that the study of 
the ‘Turkish model’ and other state-polity models becomes important. A 
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constructivist ontology is therefore the approach that will be taken in this 
study. A constructivist theoretical framework centres social forces, social 
relations and identity politics. This is necessary when examining a region as 
complex as the Middle East where territoriality is constantly under threat by 
heightened religious, cultural and ethnic tension.  
In this theoretical framework the logical frame of analysis sets the ‘Turkish 
Model’ as the Turkish alliance-building model of the 2002-2011 period. Hall’s 
(1999) work12 on political reproduction will be combined with the polity 
framework of Ferguson and Mansbach (1996) which has identity and loyalty 
at its nucleus. A polity is a political authority with a unique identity and an 
institutional and hierarchical structure. Polities have the capability to 
politically mobilize individuals who identify with them regardless of 
territoriality. The mode in which state polities politically reproduce dependent 
on Ferguson and Mansbach’s double-security dilemma (threats to both their 
                                                     
12 The concept of an ‘alliance-building model’ is based upon Hall’s theory of political 
reproduction (Hall 1999). As stated in the introductory chapter, political reproduction is the 
process in which a state maintains a particular pattern of authority through its actions, 
bargaining and institutionalization (Hall 1999). The provocation for an alliance-building mode 
of political reproduction is changes in the double-security dilemma that a state faces. An 
alliance-building mode of political reproduction is one in which the state builds co-operation 
with society and other polities. The double-security dilemma can also provoke fortifying 
reproduction in which a state insulates itself from society and other polities to prevent rivals 
from gaining strength. Failure to respond to the ‘double-security dilemma’ will lead to the 
collapse of the state (Hall 1999). It is important to note that that a state is never alliance-
building or fortifying, rather it is in the process of becoming either (Hall 1999).  
The double-security dilemma of each state is unique and depends on its domestic and 
international environment. This theoretical framework examines the ‘Turkish Model’ as in 
transition.  
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institutional and sovereign integrity) they face is the basis of the theoretical 
framework of this thesis. Turkey’s political reproduction will be framed with 
regards to the security dilemmas and threats from rival polities that it faced. It 
will become evident how every state polity’s experiences are unique. Any 
single model-based solution to enable their democratization and stability will 
fail. This is because a state polity’s survival is dependent on its ability to 
politically reproduce within its OWN constitutive environment and unique 
double-security dilemma (Hall 1999).  
 
2.2 Constructivist Ontologies for Middle Eastern Studies 
Social science scholars are currently experiencing a post ‘Arab spring’ 
hangover. Whether or not the discipline is in complete turmoil has become a 
moot point for discussion. A kinder description would characterize the current 
intellectual period as a period of introspection, but it is clear this self-
reflection has been too long in the waiting. The argument for a complete 
ontological shift of the discipline has become one of the leading 
interrogations within the academy (Ergul 2010; Hartmann 2013; Al-Ghazzi 
and Kraidy 2013). 
In fact, academics across the social sciences failed to predict the ‘Arab 
Spring’, did not predict and misanalysed its collapse and the consequences 
of the collapse in Turkey and beyond. Nevertheless, some scholars assert 
that predicting the time of, or even occurrence of revolution is beyond the 
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scope of social science (Goodwin 2011; Gregory et al. 2014; Kuran 1995). 
Rather, social science is limited to analysing where revolt is more likely to 
occur and the reasons for said revolt (Goodwin 2011). Due to the increasing 
popularity of the liberal internationalist paradigm there has been a fixation 
within the academy on regime types, democratization and institutional reform 
in which other indicators of political, social and economic change were 
ignored (Howard and Walters 2014). These critics argue that for researchers 
to redeem themselves, future projects should employ broader research 
agendas (Howard and Walters 2014).  
This thesis takes the approach that rather than stating the presence of 
scientific barriers to the realm of social science, there needs to be an 
ontological shift in the method of enquiry. The ontological basis of both realist 
and liberal internationalist approaches has been under growing criticism as 
constructivist approaches grow more popular (Howard and Walters 2014). 
The realist approach in IR research has led to a failure of the integration of 
domestic politics in the study of how states interact. The Washington 
Consensus liberal internationalist approach of those close to the policy-
making community has been prevalent in political science. As such, it has 
failed to take into consideration local and regional power dynamics. Others 
argue that the tensions between the above two schools of thought are what 
has shaped the failure (Shelley 2011). Thus, the approach of this thesis is 
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that an ontological shift to constructivism has the potential to redeem the 
discipline and truly analyse inter and intra state dynamics.  
The influence that ideas, norms and rules have over states’ identities and 
interests can provide a wider picture of current global affairs than traditional 
realist IR’s realpolitik (Hartmann 2013). Realism does not consider the role of 
non-state actors or determining factors other than self-interest in analysing 
the outcomes and trajectory of international politics13. Constructivism 
presents a way of understanding IR that incorporates social forces into the 
study of global politics; offers a fresh perspective on anarchy, change and 
power in the international system, and situates state identity at the forefront 
of studies (Hopf 1998). Political reproduction is key to the constructivist 
approach; a state’s response to an international event may reproduce its 
identity or reinforce it (Hopf 1998).  Hopf (1998: 173) explains how the study 
of behaviour is possible only within an intersubjective social context:  
“Actors develop their relations with, and understandings of, others 
through the media of norms and practices. In the absence of norms, 
exercises of power, or actions, would be devoid of meaning. 
Constitutive norms define an identity by specifying the actions that will 
cause others to recognize that identity and respond to it appropriately. 
                                                     
13 A realist approach downplays the role of religion, culture and identity in foreign policy, 
“States, no matter their culture or religious heritage, face the same security dilemma in the 
form of threats because of power and geography... Religion in any form has little impact on 
the security dilemma and states responses to that dilemma.”(Sadik, 2012: 297) Neorealists 
elaborate this argument, “States consider themselves secure not necessarily when they 
have improved relations with their neighbours with religious affinity, but “when they have 
enough relative power to deter, pre-empt, or defend against threats to their survival or 
relative power position.” (Sadik, 2012: 297)  
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Since structure is meaningless without some intersubjective set of 
norms and practices, anarchy, mainstream international relations 
theory’s most crucial structural component, is meaningless.” 
This explains how norms and practices dictate the character of anarchy 
within the international system.  
Constructivism therefore treats the identities of states as changeable and 
reliant on sociohistorical and cultural factors. This offers much more context 
than a realist approach that defines states as simply self-interested, and 
nothing more (Hopf 1998).  Identities create a sense of normality and 
predictability within the international system due to the preferences that they 
imply according to the characteristics an actor purposes to identify with. 
Thereby, daily social exchange reproduces identity within an intersubjective 
system (Hopf 1998). Although, an actor’s agency only goes so far, as they 
are not able to manage how their identity is perceived by other actors. A 
constructivist approach does not deny the realist tenets of the anarchic 
nature of the international system, nor the structural qualities of the 
international system that neo-realists purport. Constructivism in fact expands 
these concepts to provide a framework for understanding that is relevant to 
today’s globalized geopolitics. A constructivist paradigm, therefore, can open 
a wide variety of decisions and actions for analysis (Hopf 1998).   
An important point of deliberation for scholars of both IR and Middle Eastern 
studies is how the revolutionary wave of action during the Arab ‘spring’ 
dominoed from one country to the next. Weyland (2012) explains that a 
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constructivist ontology using norms and values can clarify how the success of 
one uprising, and the ideals that came about from it such as anti-
authoritarianism and the empowerment of the masses, spread from one 
setting to another. Yet, this approach does not explain the temporal issues 
regarding the speed of the spread of the protests. Also, the predating value 
systems within the various states that experienced uprisings were far from 
homogeneous to start with which creates further problems for analysis. 
Weyland (2012) explains how in laic more progressive countries such as 
Tunisia, the population was more predisposed to democracy and liberalism 
than in more conservative countries such as Yemen. Here, constructivism 
fails to explain ‘the tight clustering of protests and uprisings’ and the 
applicability of value change to enact political change in such a short amount 
of time across the Arab region (Weyland 2012).  
A constructivist study needs to be supplemented with additional ontological 
approaches to explain complex dynamics. At the interchange of domestic 
and international politics, domestic politics has continued to play a less 
significant role in IR which has been dominated by foreign policy analysis, 
diplomacy and realpolitik. A discipline superior in the comprehension of the 
importance of domestic politics in global contexts is historical sociology, 
which when accompanied by constructivism can lead to radical analysis and 
begin to fill the gaps that constructivism leaves behind (Hall 1999).  
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Historical sociology studies social relations as both causal and parallel 
phenomena to IR. This means that the domestic and international political 
realms are merged, which can offer depth to constructivist studies (Shaw 
2013). Historical sociology emphasizes institutions and social order as clear 
pillars and flags for scholars to follow in the historical analysis of agency and 
change.  Lawson, (2006: 39) emphasizes that this will only be successful if 
these institutions are, “understood beyond the straightjacket afforded to them 
by mainstream IR theory.”  
Historical sociology's multilinear and dynamic ontology of change lends a 
weightier role to the agency of actors (Lawson 2006). Allowing for a greater 
awareness of the unexpected as the norm, this focus can remove the bias of 
ideological predictions that have dominated IR in the last fifty years. Lawson 
(2006: 38) explains that this broader research agenda can examine,  
“the production, reproduction, reform, and recasting of primary and 
derivative institutions which flow out of, and which form, particular 
structural conjunctures; the relationship between initial choices, 
developmental paths, critical junctures, and transformation in issues 
as varied as state formation and systems change; and investigation of 
the forces that act as principia media in driving macro-level processes 
of social change.”  
This breakdown of social processes of change is valuable for a constructivist 
approach which is based on an intersubjective social context.  
Scholars and practitioners of IR have failed to provide thorough or sound 
analysis of the geopolitics of the Middle East in the past few years, especially 
regarding the Arab ‘Spring’. Realism and liberal internationalism have not 
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offered a viable logic of analysis for a region with such diverse and trans-
border identities and interests. A constructivist approach that can incorporate 
the role of domestic politics and the institutionalization of domestic identities 
(as offered by historical sociology), in turn with their transnational character, 
may have the potential to redeem IR. 
 
2.3 The Genesis of the Theoretical Framework of this Study: 
Reviewing Constructivist Historical Realism 
In the previous section it was explained how merging both domestic and 
international politics through the lens of political reproduction and identity 
formation is central to understanding political change regarding the ‘Turkish 
Model’. In this section, the merger of polity literature with that of historical 
realism (Hall’s thesis on political reproduction) will set out a radical theoretical 
framework to be used in this study. First, the strengths of both studies will be 
explored. 
Polities and Political Change 
 
Ferguson and Mansbach (1996) lay down the foundations of the political 
grammar of the study of the international system through 'polities':  
“A polity (or political authority) has a distinct identity; a capacity to 
mobilize persons and their resources for political purposes, that is for 
value satisfaction; and a degree of institutionalization and hierarchy 
(leaders and constituents) …Leaders must be able to call upon the 
support and resources of those for whose identity(ties) they are 
surrogates. A polity’s domain includes the persons who identify with it 
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and their resources, the space those persons occupy, and the issue(s) 
over which the polity exercises influence.” 
 (Ferguson & Mansbach 1996: 34-35) 
In the postinternationalist modern international system polities can compete 
for influence over issues across borders, within borders, through the internet, 
and within a variety of different spaces.  
Definitions of what is foreign and what is domestic have merged, and issues 
themselves, rather than sovereign borders become the defining frame for 
what and who is spatially and temporally an 'other' or an active participant. 
The authorities that command and compete over the loyalties of global 
citizens are 'polities':  
"Polities decay from within and are challenged from without... (during) 
transitional epochs.. the hegemony of previously dominant authorities 
is contested, and loyalties are seduced to new authorities through the 
critical issues of the day.” 
(Ferguson and Mansbach 1996: 58).  
They compete through the strength of their leadership and institutions, the 
persuasiveness of their ideology, and their capacity to mobilize individuals 
into loyal groups. Therefore, the polity 'economy' consists of individuals and 
resources (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996). 
It is important to note that polities differ in size, their scope to mobilize, 
institutional efficiency, and cultural norms. Ferguson and Mansbach explain 
that the main intention of their theory is to,  
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"illustrate how world politics has always involved a crazy quilt of 
polities- foci of authority of varying domain and influence; distinctive in 
some respects overlapping, layered and nested and linked in others, 
competing and cooperating across space and issues trying to attract 
and hold the allegiance and resources of individuals and seeking to 
allocate values that have usually been in inadequate supply to meet 
demands."  
(1996: 60) 
Polities simultaneously exist side-by-side, coordinate on issues, and 
compete. Polity formation and disintegration is an organic historical process, 
and the intricate international system of domestic, regional and international 
authority formations are constantly 'becoming' and changing (Yale H. 
Ferguson and Mansbach 1996).  When polities disintegrate, they seldom 
vanish entirely; rather they endure as an exhibition in the worlds 'living 
museum'. Therefore, they always have the potential to re-emerge in the 
future. These may re-emerge due to old loyalties being sparked by 
unexpected events. Polities only apply leverage within limited domains. The 
domains to which they apply leverage will be defined by the issues which 
command their loyalty, where they compete with other polities for political 
space (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996).  
On the micro-level, individuals can have several different and often conflicting 
identities and loyalties such as family, class, religion, ethnicity, tribe, and 
gender. The decision-making process that individuals undergo over polity 
loyalty is complex, for example,  
"In Medieval Europe how did the Bishop-Barons choose between and 
among pope and emperor, extended family and local secular and or 
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religious authorities, and why did they make the choices they did? 
These questions probe the changing cognitions, perceptions and skills 
of individuals- they enquire into individual hopes and fears and try to 
determine which symbols were most persuasive and why.”  
(Ferguson and Manbach 1996: 47)  
The polity hoping to command loyalty needs to offer both cognitive fulfilment 
and physical perks to those individuals it wishes to attract, control and 
coerce. Predominantly, IR research tends to simply offer state-based 
analysis, sweeping away "layering or overlap among polities as domestic or 
internal politics thereby overlooking multiple loyalties." (Ferguson and 
Mansbach 1996: 48) Yet, the polities framework, rather than denying the 
importance of horizontal analysis, supplements it with a vertical analysis. An 
example of polity theory applied to the expansion of early Islam will illuminate 
how a merged horizontal and vertical polity analysis can be applied to 
empirical data. 
Ferguson and Mansbach's (1996) analytical framework for accounting for 
political change is divided into the horizontal dimension of politics 
(relationships among polities across political space) and the vertical 
dimension of politics (relationships of polities within space). The environment 
in which a polity expands and contracts horizontally is formed of the following 
factors: how much power external forces have to influence changes in the 
international system; the distribution of capabilities amongst the polities in the 
international system; the geophysical setting of a polity; production; trade; 
warfare; demographics, and diplomacy. The environment in which a polity 
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expands and contracts vertically is moulded by the strength of loyalty to 
specific identities within society, the structure of the institutions and hierarchy 
within political society, and the scope of governmental control (Ferguson and 
Mansbach 1996). 
Ferguson and Mansbach (1996) use the above analytical framework to 
explain the expansion of the Islamic polity from its birth in 622 A.D. to the 
early 13th century. They explain that key to the rise and expansion of the 
Islamic polity was a mix of favourable vertical and horizontal factors. Firstly, 
the charismatic qualities of the Prophet(pbuh) were a key factor, and his ability 
and capacity to spread his message horizontally was aided by the 
weaknesses of rival groups across the Mediterranean region. The region had 
been plagued with barbarian invasions, illness, poor harvests, and intra-polity 
conflict between the Persians and Byzantines. This freed the political space 
for the Arabs who were mobile and able to negotiate the vast terrain with 
camels. Economic factors also contributed, as the Arab nomads were forced 
to look outside the Gulf region due to the aridness of their localities, thereby 
spreading their ideology westward. The legitimacy of the Islamic polity, which 
grew into a Caliphate, was based on divine right (Ferguson and Mansbach 
1996).  
Nevertheless, the factors that had led to the expansion of the Islamic polity 
also were the route of its weaknesses and led to its downfall. Firstly, control 
of such expansive geographies was hampered by a lack of military 
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technology. Governing from one centre proved problematic due to the 
number of geographically isolated regions. As the centre was unable to 
control these areas, increasingly power was transposed to the military 
(Ferguson and Mansbach 1996). This was to prove a key factor in imperial 
decline, as various military factions became independent and commanded 
their own loyal power bases. Particularly, soldiers of Turkic ethnicity who had 
once been enslaved posed a problem as they were disloyal to their Arab 
leaders (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996). 
Aside from divisions between the government and military; tribal, clan and 
ethnic differences caused conflict within the polity (Ferguson and Mansbach 
1996). The caliphs themselves had previously been Arab chieftains, and the 
polity continued to be shaped by tribal culture. This posed problematic as the 
loyalty of Muslim subjects was divided between three polities- tribe, Ummah, 
and the Caliphate. Within each of these polities, divisions based on clan, 
sectarian and dynastic lines all made it impossible for the Islamic empire to 
survive. In fact, Ferguson and Mansbach (1996) argue that contrary to 
popular historical opinion, which deems the fall of the Islamic Empire to be 
due to external challenges such as those from the Mongol invasions, it was 
the rapid expansion of the Islamic polity that caused its downfall. The rapid 
expansion of the Islamic caliphate could not negotiate the competing loyalties 
in its geography that were already heavily entrenched. Islam provided a 
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semblance of unity, but it was not enough to unite those with cultural and 
ethnic differences (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996).  
Class and urban/rural divides also further drove divisions within the 
Caliphate, and when Abu Bakr(RA) became Caliph after the Prophet(pbuh) 
various sections of society could not unite behind a leader they saw as not 
having been appointed by God (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996). The 
legitimacy of the Caliph came into question, leading to revolts against tax 
payments, and the inability of the centre to control the local dynasties. The 
Islamic Empire could not survive these internal challenges and disbanded in 
the 13th century (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996).  
The raptures of the time continue to influence polity formation and 
competition in the Middle East to this day. The identities that were formed 
during the Empire have become nested14 memories within the modern day 
Ummah and the loyalties they transpose continue to influence events in the 
region. These identities are particularly strong in eras where many socio-
political changes are taking place (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996).  
                                                     
14 Nesting is the term used for the process of ingestion of one polity by another, without 
either vanishing. Through this process polities partially of fully embed in each other forming 
emergent symbols and new identities. Large polities consisting of a number of nested polities 
are harder to control and can pose problems for organizational management. A more 
modestly-sized polity may be easier to supervise and coerce, despite having less man-power 
and resources (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996) 
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Islamic nested identities continue to pose a problem for secular governance 
in the region, and command loyalties across and beyond the borders formed 
by Sykes-Picot. Nationalism has not managed to compete with religious 
identity in the Middle East, proving the lines between internal politics and 
external politics obsolete. The ‘Turkish Model’ is one that tries to unite 
loyalties through nationalism, all the while respecting religious freedoms. 
Nonetheless, within Turkey itself age-old conflicts between Islamic and non-
Islamic sects along with ethnic and class divides continue to pose a dilemma 
for state polity sovereignty.  
Polity theory can provide a useful framework for studying the politics of the 
Middle East beyond the rigidity of state relations. It allows the researcher to 
delve into notions that are determining the transition of political power in the 
Middle East such as identity and loyalty. To answer the question as to why 
the ‘Turkish Model’ failed to reproduce in the Arab region the polity 
framework provides a dynamic and radical base for research but lacks a 
distinct outline for analysing what factors are maintaining the pattern of 
authority within the ‘Turkish’ case and how the ‘Turkish Model’ is constituted 
and reconstituted in relation to its internal and external environment15.  
Nonetheless, there are key assumptions stemming from the polity framework 
that can provide a basis of the theoretical framework for the research agenda 
                                                     
15 The ‘historical realism’ theoretical framework (Hall 1999) provides some providence to 
these issues and will be discussed further on in the chapter. 
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of this thesis. The first assumption will of course be that the Turkish Republic 
and Arab states are state polities. Secondly, that rival polities compete over 
revenue, identity, loyalty and ideology within a post-internationalist 
international system. Lastly, that Turkey and thus, the ‘Turkish model’ is a 
mix/fusion of several nested polities and identities. The main ones include 
Ottoman, European, Turkic and Kemalist (Hale 2012). Nonetheless, this 
thesis will show that the way in which these identities have monopolized 
Turkish state discourse has misrepresented many in Turkey, including those 
from the Kurdish and Armenian ethnic minorities. This monopolization of 
state identity has caused dissent and conflict (Waldman and Caliskan 2017).  
 
Historical Realism   
 
Hall’s (1999) thesis is a historical sociological and IR approach to the political 
reproduction of states. Hall (1999) bases much of his theory of historical 
realism on the polity framework but takes it a step further through a “higher 
degree of deductive reasoning” (Hall 35). Hall does this through an approach 
which emphasises competition between different groups over revenue, rather 
than loyalty and ideology like the polity approach. He argues that his 
historical realism approach allows for systematic comparisons across cases, 
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something that the polity approach lacks. Political reproduction is the key 
dependent variable in Hall’s (1999) historical realism theory16.  
Within the polity literature the double-security dilemma is based around the 
threat posed to the authority of the polity by two differing groups. The first is 
those groups who threaten the sovereignty of the state polity, and the second 
is those who would threaten the institutional foundations of the state polity.  
In the double-security dilemma according to Hall’s theory of political 
reproduction (historical realism) the threat against the states revenues are 
equated with a threat to its security. Hall (1999: 22) states  
“there are two sorts of groups which threaten a state in this way: 
members of the society which the state directly extract revenue from 
(that is, in effect, tax); and those that either (potentially) extract 
resources from the state in turn (such as suzerain states extracting 
tribute, for instance) or, by way of the structure of the system-wide 
economy, get ‘unfair’ terms of trade, broadly understood. Herein lies 
the ‘double’ of my double security dilemma: its two referents are not 
territorially, or even geographically, defined groups, although there is 
an inside/outside dimension present. Rather, they are defined by 
which kind of threat they pose to the state.”  
  
Therefore, the double security dilemma implies how the state reacts or does 
not react to threats from those it can tax will have consequences for the 
outcomes with those it cannot tax. If the state cannot devise one plan to deal 
                                                     
16 As stated in the thesis introduction, political reproduction can be defined as the process in 
which a state maintains a particular pattern of authority through its actions, bargaining and 
institutionalization. It is through political reproduction that a state’s relationship to its 
environment is constituted and reconstituted. 
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with both at the same time, it could forsake political reproduction and 
collapse. Thus, within Hall’s (1999) theory, political reproduction is the 
dependent variable and the double-security dilemma is the independent 
variable or structural variable that is based on four constitutive dimensions.  
These four dimensions set the foundations of a state’s double-security 
dilemma and influence the ability of the state ruler’s capacity to act. 
Combined with the shape of the emerging threats to the state, they motivate 
either an alliance-building or fortifying mode of political reproduction: 
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Table 2.1: Constitutive Dimensions of the Double-Security Dilemma in 
Historical Realism 
Constitutive Dimensions of a state’s 
Double-Security Dilemma in Historical 
Realism 
Dimension Details 
Functionally differentiated or functionally 
undifferentiated 
International systems can be either 
functionally differentiated or not. A 
functionally differentiated international 
political system is one that is characterized 
by a multiplication of governance structures. 
A functionally undifferentiated international 
political system is dominated by one 
governance structure. The state can be 
either part of a functionally differentiated or 
functionally undifferentiated inter-state 
system. 
Embedded or disembedded into the state 
system 
A disembedded inter-state system is one in 
which the dealings among polities are not 
instituted by the economic structure. An 
embedded inter-state system is that which 
dealings among states are constituted from 
an economic structure. A state can be either 
part of an embedded or disembedded inter-
state system. 
Competitive or non-competitive system A competitive environment in which the state 
extracts revenue is one in which 
producers/other states or polities can 
compete with the state for revenue, these 
producers can be both from within elements 
of domestic society or abroad. A non-
competitive society is one where the state 
monopolizes production and revenue 
extraction. 
 
Open or closed environment An open environment is one that is 
logistically open and easy to access for rival 
groups/producers/polities to extract revenue. 
A closed society is difficult to access. This 
means that an open environment is costlier 
to supervise than a closed environment in 
which it is relatively cheap to regulate 
comings and goings. 
(Hall 1999; Buzan and Albert 2010) 
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Each of the dimensions explained above integrates politics, sociology and 
economics. The strategy of pursuing a fortifying mode of political 
reproduction is to prevent rivals from gaining strength. Pursuing an alliance-
building mode of political reproduction leads to co-opting or co-operating with 
rivals and making them allies17. Hall (1999) used his theory to come up with a 
constitutive map and to build a tool for the researcher to explain which 
elements in the double-security dilemma cause which modes of political 
reproduction. For example, in embedded and functionally similar systems it is 
difficult for a fortifying state to remain fortifying, unless competition is weak 
and the cost of closedness is low. 
Hall (1999) uses the example of Japan to explain his theory. From the early 
1600’s until the 1850’s Japan had a fortifying mode of political reproduction. 
The Japanese state utilized blocking and insulating methods towards society 
to prevent it from upsetting the stability of the Emperor’s rule. During this 
time, production was monopolized by the landed aristocracy and 
predominantly agricultural. Production was aimed at domestic rather than 
international consumption. Nevertheless, in the 1800’s state economies 
became embedded in the international economic system. Japan intensified 
its foreign contacts and moved towards becoming an exporting country. In 
the 1850’s Japan built alliances with society domestically and horizontally 
                                                     
17 It is important to note that that a state is never alliance-building or fortifying, rather it is in 
the process of becoming either. 
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across the world. The survival of the state then became dependent on its 
capacity to move towards an alliance-building mode of political reproduction. 
The transition between alliance-building and fortifying dependent on the 
constitutive and causal elements of the double-security dilemma such as that 
which occurred with Japan can be viewed below: 
 
Figure 2.1 A Heuristic Map of Historical Realism  
(Hall 1999: 37) 
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Key assumptions stemming from the historical realism framework that will 
provide a theoretical framework for the research agenda of this thesis is 
firstly that states do not continue to exist by default. Secondly, political 
formations must structure themselves in the most efficient form available to 
survive in a world rife with war, hostility or mere competition (Hall 1999: 1). 
This can be achieved by either becoming more alliance-building or becoming 
more fortifying. Lastly, constitutive and causal observations can be attained 
through the application of the historical realism approach (Hall 1999). 
 
 
A Constructivist Polity based Approach to Historical Realism  
 
In Hall’s (1999) doctrine on historical realism, he makes the point of 
welcoming doctoral empirical research based on his theory and encourages 
constructivist approaches with modern geopolitical case studies. For 
example, Hall explains that his theoretical framework lacks conceptual 
considerations regarding the construction of identities and its role in political 
reproduction.  Hall (1999: 116) explains that further research needs to be 
done on whether,  
“modes of political reproduction affect or are they affected by, ideology 
and identities? It would seem difficult or prohibitively costly for a state 
to be alliance-building if there is a discrepancy in the ideological 
convictions permeating the society and the state, as in Visigothic 
Spain. Conversely, a state might actively create myths for instance in 
attempting to become alliance-building, as in free Germany during the 
Roman Empire. Ideology and identities covering large areas of an 
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inter-state system might also be expected to have consequences that 
are not explainable by functional differentiation or embeddedness. 
Conversely, whether an interstate system is functionally differentiated 
or not might be expected to have consequences for identity formation.” 
When analysing the question of why the ‘Turkish Model’ did not proliferate, it 
becomes clear that both ideological convictions and nested identities within 
the Middle East have played a strong determining role. Turkey created myths 
of neo-ottomanism18 and a shared history with the Arab states to build 
alliances, which gained popularity in the early 2000’s (Samaan 2013). 
Nonetheless, these failed to permeate as the geopolitics of the region shifted 
and identity politics, polarization and sectarianism seethed. It is important to 
also note that some scholars believed the ‘Turkish  
Model’ failed to spread across the Arab region solely because of its US-
sympathetic neoliberal and oppressive nature that was evident to the Arab 
region by 2007 through Turkey’s domestic inequality and privatization and 
West-sympathetic foreign policy (Tuğal 2007).  
Hall (1999) makes the case for a more modern case study of historical 
realism and examining the transition of the ‘Turkish Model’ in the region 
which can provide further development of the theory of political reproduction 
and its application to present day geopolitics. Yet, in acknowledgement of the 
realism of those such as (Tuğal 2007), in the current climate of political 
change in the Middle East identity politics is playing a central role (Shahi 
                                                     
18 Neo-ottomanism is an ideology which advocates for Turkish penetration into the states 
and societies of countries that were once part of the Ottoman Empire.  
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2016). Therefore, identity and constructivism should play a vital role in any 
research agenda.  
The theoretical framework of this thesis will move beyond the double-security 
dilemma purported by historical realism. A constructivist approach 
necessitates a theoretical framework which allows for identity and loyalty. 
Therefore, the polity image’s double-security dilemma will be applied to this 
work. As referred to previously in the chapter,   
“Within the polity literature the double-security dilemma is based 
around the threat posed to the authority of the polity by two differing 
groups. The first is those groups who threaten the sovereignty of the 
state polity, and the second is those who would threaten the 
institutional foundations of the state polity.” 
(Hall 1999: 19) 
Hall (1999) makes two vital assumptions regarding modern day geopolitical 
studies that will also be applied here. The first is that the inter-state system is 
becoming deeper embedded in the economy. The second is that the level of 
functional differentiation is growing. Therefore, these two elements of the 
constitutive dimension of state polities will be taken for granted. Hall (1999) 
concludes his suggestions for further empirical research with some revealing 
arguments with regards to contemporary IR. He dispels the myth of liberal 
peace and the idea that the current order can produce peace and stability.  
Rather, in the globalized modern age of high-level functional differentiation 
and embeddedness, the increased competition between polities are likely to 
both increase the level of competition and violence. This chapter has already 
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explicated the ontological point that we live in a post-internationalist world, 
and Hall (1999) takes this one step further. He explains that although it may 
seem that the ‘state’ as a polity is disappearing, contrary to this, the modern 
state based on the alliance-building mode of political reproduction is 
disappearing. Rather than states becoming increasingly irrelevant within IR, 
they are simply changing their mode of political reproduction and becoming 
more fortifying and insulated (Hall 1999).  
Stemming from this another assumption for this theoretical framework can be 
made. That is, political reproduction is an organic process, polities do not 
disappear, and states only move into the worlds ‘living museum’ when their 
political reproduction fails. Rather than the ‘Turkish Model’ falling, it merely 
shifted. The alliance-building mode of political reproduction that became 
popular up until 2011 has shifted to a fortifying mode of political reproduction 
based on a combination of its constitutive environment and the changing 
causative double-security dilemma it faces.  
This theoretical framework will re-examine the constitutive elements of state 
polities that have been provided by historical realism. State polities try and 
negotiate their way to suppressing rivalry to their institutional and sovereign 
authority (the double-security dilemma) through political entrepreneurship 
and political reproduction. Therefore, the individual’s identification with 
polities is key to the maintenance of state polity authority (Ferguson and 
Mansbach 1996). The way individuals have directed and redirected their 
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loyalties has strengthened or weakened the polities that were competing for 
their loyalties. Loyalties and identities will be applied to the study of the 
constitutive environment of polities within the constructivist historical realist 
framework of this thesis. 
When mitigating the double-security dilemma, if a polity succeeds in 
providing satisfaction for those who identify with it, it may prevent new 
loyalties from forming amongst those in which it is able to have some 
influence (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996). Conversely, failure to provide 
satisfaction may provoke shifts in loyalties. The ability of a state polity to 
mitigate the polity-defined double-security dilemma by becoming more 
alliance-building or fortifying depends on the following constitutive 
environmental factors (these are both based on and depart from historical 
realism): 
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Table 2.2 The Constitutive Dimensions of a State’s Double-Security Dilemma 
in Constructivist (polity-based) Historical Realism 
Constitutive Dimensions of a State’s 
Double-Security Dilemma in 
Constructivist Historical Realism 
Dimension Details 
Competitive or non-competitive environment A competitive environment is one in which 
polities can compete with the state polity for 
revenue, loyalty, and political membership 
with ease. A non-competitive society is one 
where the state monopolizes political 
membership and loyalty.   
Open or closed environment  This will be largely unchanged regarding the 
historical realism definition, nonetheless 
there is a slight dialectical shift with the new 
framework. An open environment is one that 
is logistically open and easy to access for 
rival polities. A closed society is difficult to 
access. This theoretical framework will 
however, emphasize the ease of controlling 
the means of discourse and social capital. 
Within an open environment the polity has a 
lack of control over the discourse and social 
capital within society. Within a closed 
environment the polity can have full control 
over the dissemination of discourse. 
 
 
 
Research Framework and Analysis  
 
The case study utilized within this study is that of the rulers of Turkey 
between 2001 and 2015, the AKP. The research investigation of the study is 
divided into three analytical chapters below, Chapter Four on the AKP’s 
vertical alliance-building, Chapter Five on the AKP’s horizontal alliance-
building, and Chapter Six on Turkey’s post-2011 double-security dilemma 
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which then represents the transition of the alliance-building mode of political 
reproduction. The study considers the following constitutive elements listed in 
Table 2.2: openness/closedness of the polity economy and 
competitiveness/non-competitiveness of the polity economy. As the double-
security dilemma in this study is based around groups that threaten the 
institutional and sovereign foundations of the state polity as referred to in 
Ferguson and Mansbach (1996), rather than threats from the groups that the 
state either extracts resources from or competes for resources as theorized 
by Hall (1999), some supplementary literature is needed to build a fully in-
depth analysis of state polity political reproduction.  
Almond and G Bingham Powell (1996) offer a clear taxonomy of the political 
system in which states and governments operate. A political system is 
composed of both structures and functions. The structures are political 
institutions and organizations that perform various functions within political 
processes (Almond and G Bingham Powell 1996).  Therefore, in this case 
study the structures that will be analysed that made up the Turkish political 
system during AKP tenure include social institutions, social movements, 
organized interest groups, independent political parties, the AKP, Parliament, 
the bureaucracy, the President and the military. Some of the above 
structures are hierarchical polities, and others are not. The inclusion of non-
polities is important as they also pose a threat to the governing authority. 
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Almond and G. Bingham Powell’s (1996) conceptual framework is vertically 
focused on the institutional side of the double-security dilemma.  
On analysing the horizontal dimension of the double-security dilemma which 
can also threaten the state’s institutional foundations, but seemingly has a 
direct effect on the level of sovereignty of the state, the case study will refer 
to Ferguson and Mansbach taxonomy (1996). They describe the workings of 
the international political system as including diplomacy, mediation, 
development and aid, trade, defence, warfare and the mass media. When a 
polity politically reproduces to maintain its sovereignty and political authority it 
either competes and coerces with or co-opts rival polities for loyalty and 
value satisfaction (or relief from value deprivation) for the ease of resource 
extraction and capital expansion. The ability of the polity to do this is 
dependent on the horizontal dimensions of politics including system 
discreteness19, the distribution of capabilities, the polity’s geophysical setting, 
the terms of production and trade, demographics, and the threat of warfare 
and risks of diplomacy. The above factors make it harder or easier for the 
polity to extract resources internationally (through either bargaining or 
coercion) and maintain its international stature and mitigate the double-
security dilemma (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996). Thus, based on the above 
                                                     
19 System discreteness refers to how isolated or open a polity is to outside 
influence/interference (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996: 382-383)  
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taxonomies, the data collected for analysis within this thesis is framed on the 
vertical and horizontal environment mapped:  
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Figure 2.2 A Heuristic Map of a Constructivist Polity-based Approach to 
Political Reproduction 
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Some Further Remarks on Identity, Loyalty, Political Membership and 
Ideology 
 
As stated earlier, a key assumption of this theoretical framework is: 
• Rival polities compete over revenue, identity, loyalty and ideology within a 
post-internationalist international system 
 
The following section will provide some clarity on the definitions of ideology 
and loyalty and elucidate on their practical applications within political 
science. Carlsnaes (1987) provides a definition for the concept of ideology:  
“X is ideological when X is a political doctrine which purports to 
motivate an actor P to do Y (or not to do Z) for the collective interest of 
Q” 
 (Carlsnaes 1987: 150) 
Ideational entities have ideologies, but actors and agents cannot. Within this 
theoretical framework, polities will be defined as only those entities which 
hold ideologies.   
The state polity encapsulates a political community. The identities of 
individuals are based on their membership within the political community and 
defined by their entrance and continued adherence to it. Their entrance to the 
political community is based upon a common history and common norms 
with other members of said community. Kvistad (1999: 4) states that "the 
determinants of what "just is" and "just isn't" done in a political community are 
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embedded in historical traditions of discourse that, if deciphered, help make 
clear who is a member in a political community." This is also known as logics 
of appropriateness. These determinants, nevertheless, are uncodified and 
based upon tradition.  
When an agent adheres with loyalty to a political community, it 
simultaneously forms 'othering' and defines those who are outside and inside 
a political community. These can be modified by political and social 
interaction. Kvistad (1999: 20) explains that, "Loyalty is a bottom up attribute 
embodied by individuals forming a relationship with the object of loyalty. 
Socialization agents play a central role in developing that relationship, but 
loyalties are nonetheless developed by individuals interacting with those 
agents. " 
Within this theoretical framework, some outsiders will always be deemed as 
potential insiders to an alliance-building state polity and the polity authority 
will actively try and cultivate their political membership. Nonetheless, a more 
fortifying state polity will be more interested in keeping others on the outside 
of the margins of the political system rather than aiming for their consent. 
Kvistad (1999) explains, however, that loyalty is hard to empirically test but 
suggests that conformism and defiance can be used as conceptual 
measures. 
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The State, the Regime, the Government, the Governing Party and the Polity 
in Constructivist Historical Realism  
 
It is helpful to address a few of the concepts and terms that are referred to 
regularly in this thesis as key variables. Almond and G Bingham Powell 
(1996: 3) define the state, as an “independent legal authority over a 
population” in a territory and define the institutions of the state as the 
government. Sovereignty is also an important concept within this thesis, 
particularly regarding the polity-based double-security dilemma. 
Janice Thomson (2001) explains that when including sovereignty20 into the 
definition of the state, the concept is expanded to mean far more than simply 
a monopoly of violence over a given territory. She explains that the two 
dimensions of sovereignty are what denote the true meaning of the state. 
The first dimension, constitutive sovereignty, “establishes a boundary 
between the domestic and international realms of politics (Thomson 2001: 
15-16)”; she continues by explaining that this constitutes  
“the state as the main actor in international politics by designating the 
state, rather than a religious or economic organization as the 
repository of ultimate authority within a political space that is defined 
territorially.” 
The second dimension, the functional dimension, is the explicit authority 
assertions claimed by the state establishing “the boundary between the 
                                                     
20 Janice Thompson (2001: 15) expands on Ruggie’s definition of ‘sovereignty’ which 
“differentiates units in terms of juridically mutually exclusive and morally self-entailed 
domains based on single-titled or exclusive, fixed territoriality.”  
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political and economic and the state and nonstate realms of authority 
(Thomson 2001: 16).” It is then statesmen21, the leaders of the government, 
who actively consolidate a state’s sovereignty through accepting the role of 
the state. It is this acceptance of both dimensions of state sovereignty, from 
within and without, that make the state the predominant polity in the 
international system. States and governments therefore both exercise 
authoritative and coercive control, mutually engaging in the sustenance of the 
status quo of the international political system and politically reproducing its 
power. As indicated that can be done for research purposes in Almond and G 
Bingham Powell, the terms state and government are used interchangeably 
within this thesis (Almond and G Bingham Powell 1996: 28)22.  
Nonetheless, this over-simplification can be problematic. Robinson (2013) 
explains how the prime example of this over-simplification causing confusion 
is if a government is removed and the state survives through revolution. To 
be able to analyse and develop theory, Robinson (2013) argues 
terminological specifity of the state and the government is necessary. 
Robinson (2013: 556) thus explains the differences,  
“States are nonphysical juridical entities of the international legal 
system, whereas governments are organizations with certain coercive 
                                                     
21 Also stateswomen.  
22 Almond and G Bingham Powell (1996: 28) state that both the concept of the state and the 
concept of the government denote that legally empowered agencies have the predominant 
authoritative and coercive powers with the international political system. 
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powers. The relationship between a government and its state is one of 
representation and authorized agency.” 
However, Lindberg (2001), explains that the state, the government and the 
regime all rearticulate, adapt and restructure for survival. Thus, “these 
processes are intrinsically linked and perhaps cannot always be 
distinguished from each other.” (Lindberg 2001: 185) As the focus here is the 
political reproduction of state polities, the heuristic interchangeable use of 
state, government and regime is sufficient for studying polity survival. As 
Lindberg (2001: 185) also alludes, the compatibility of the state, government 
and regime’s method of politically reproduction is necessary for all of them to 
survive: “That is, the methods of extraction and use of resources that are 
employed must basically be the same.” 
Thus, the government, in this case the AKP government, is often referred to 
interchangeably as the government or state. The term regime, which denotes 
the shape of state institutions at any given historical period, is also used 
interchangeably within the thesis.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The constructivist theoretical framework of political reproduction outlines that 
rival polities compete over revenue, identity, loyalty and ideology within a 
post-internationalist international system. Within this theoretical framework 
the double-security dilemma is based around the threat posed to the 
authority of the state polity by two differing groups. The first is those groups 
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who threaten the sovereignty of the state polity, and the second is those who 
would threaten the institutional foundations of the state polity.  
It has been explained how political reproduction, an organic process, is 
based on loyalty. Therefore, a one size fits all cannot be applied to states 
where the double-security dilemma is different to others. Navigating the 
loyalties of individuals is the basis of continuity in the international system for 
polities. A state polity may create myths to become alliance-building- this is 
because it may become difficult for a state to become alliance-building if 
there is a large discrepancy in the ideological convictions permeating society. 
Polities can politically reproduce in two ways, through becoming alliance-
building- connecting to groups to increase their own resources, or through 
becoming fortifying- by blocking other would be rulers from building up power 
bases. A fortifying state is a state whose power is being reconstituted through 
processes of insulation from society. These two options are at times in this 
thesis presented as dichotomous for simplicity. However, it is important to 
understand that in reality polities can be simultaneously alliance-building as 
well as fortifying. Thus, a continuum exists with polities either becoming more 
alliance-building or more fortifying at any given time. It is also important to 
note that becoming more fortifying does not detract from a polity still using a 
certain level of alliance-building behaviour nor does it prevent a more 
alliance-building polity from engaging in fortifying behaviour. 
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The ‘Turkish Model’ was a contradictory ensemble- a potentially explosive 
effort to regulate, control and contain revolt at home and abroad (Tuğal 
2016). The contradictory nature of the ‘Turkish Model’ can be explained 
through the lens of its expression of nested polities, each with their own 
unique identities and pull/push factors to polity loyalty. The ‘Turkish Model’ 
has been used as a form of political entrepreneurship by several actors from 
different polities to gain loyalty to Turkey and its horizontal polity allies. This 
alliance-building mode of political reproduction was based on a very specific 
double-security dilemma with a unique constitutive environment. Therefore, 
its application to state polities with a different double-security dilemma and 
constitutive environment was bound to fail. Lastly, as stated above, functional 
differentiation and embeddedness will be taken for granted as this is a 
modern geopolitical study. However, revenue collection will still be factored 
into all explanations within the analytical chapters. 
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Chapter Three: Researching the ‘Turkish Model’: An 
Alliance-building Case of Political Reproduction? 
 
 
 3.1 Introduction  
This chapter explains the method in which this thesis collates and examines 
the data on the social forces, social relations and identity politics that affected 
and motivated the AKP’s alliance-building mode of political reproduction of 
Islamic neoliberalism. The empirical data collected will also explain how the 
Turkish state shifted away from an alliance-building mode of political 
reproduction after the Arab ‘Spring’, nullifying the ‘Turkish Model’ as a 
promotion of liberal norms within the Middle East. The data collected will be 
analyzed to offer theoretical insight into the political reproduction of states 
and their relationship to both the external and domestic environment. It will 
do this by supplementing the current literature on political reproduction with a 
constructivist approach that utilizes contemporary evidence from a region 
that has been failed by policy-makers.  
The first section of this chapter, 3.2 The Significance of this Study, explains 
the originality and contribution of this thesis to the existing literature. The next 
section, 3.3 Methodology, examines how a constructivist post-internationalist 
methodology is the most effective in collating and analyzing the mitigation of 
the double-security dilemma by Turkey’s rulers. After this, segment 3.4 on 
Data Collection and Research Method and 3.5 Research Limitations deal 
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with the empirical issues of this research project. Segment 3.6 on Ethical 
Considerations and 3.7 on Author’s Reflections contain some reflexivity 
about the impact and purpose of the study. Finally, the research questions 
and objectives of this thesis are set out in section 3.8 Research Questions.  
 
3.2 The Significance of this Study  
This research project makes both theoretical and empirical contributions to 
the existing literature on the political reproduction of state polities, the double-
security dilemma, the AKP and the ‘Turkish Model’ between 2002 and 2015. 
5during much of the period in question 2011-2015 and thorough data 
collection in English, Arabic and Turkish. 
The author is aware of the importance of reflective critical enquiry regarding 
personal experiences and has been guided by resources on reflexivity 
(Bolton and Delderfield 2018; Steier 1991; May 2011).  As Bolton and 
Delderfield (2018: Online) state: 
“Reflective practice concerns our work, and areas of our experience 
which impinge upon it. Reflection involving reflexivity is critical 
questioning which can be initiated and supported by creative reflective 
processes. These can help us to observe ourselves and our practice 
from points of view outside of ourselves.  Gaining some distance from 
our habitual certainty about what we do, think, and believe, and 
beginning to perceive a different focus upon it, can open up seemingly 
immutable areas to critical enquiry.” 
This was applied at every stage of the research project through extensive 
data collection from a wide range of sources on events attended by the 
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author such as the Gezi Park protests. Also, three years were spent after the 
time in Turkey, outside of the country, to reflect, read and write on the 
experience of being a researcher there.  
The theoretical and methodological framework of this study is a radical new 
take on the existing literature. Through exploring the constitutive elements of 
political society in Turkey and the Middle East, and examining the nexus 
between international and domestic politics, ideas around the causality of the 
political reproduction of state polities will be established. This original 
theoretical contribution also examines the double-security dilemma of state 
polities in recent times, contributing to the existing largely historical data on 
the political reproduction of states.  
Empirically, and through using a wide range of different sources on several 
different elements of Turkish and international political society, this case 
study departs from the current literature on the ‘Turkish Model’ through a 
unique constructivist framework that centres on identity politics, discourse, 
perceptions of security and social cohesion. A further departure from the 
current literature on the ‘Turkish Model’ is that this research project frames 
the ‘Turkish Model’ as a mode of alliance-building political reproduction that 
became popularized by political entrepreneurs in the early 2000’s. This 
project investigates whether the ‘Turkish Model’ rather than having fallen, is 
in fact in transition and shifting into a new form of political reproduction. This 
research also explores another gap in the literature, the transitioning of the 
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‘Turkish Model in the Middle East as a ‘whole’. Therefore, making both 
theoretical and empirical nuances to our current understanding of the politics 
of the Middle East and the behaviour of state polities.    
 
3.3 Methodology  
Constructivist methodologies which scrutinize the influence of ideas, norms 
and rules in how states identify themselves and relate to each other provide a 
wider picture of current global affairs than traditional realist IR (Hartmann 
2013). Constructivism offers an effective tool-box for understanding political 
reproduction. A state polity’s response to an event may reproduce its identity 
or reinforce it (Hopf 1998).   
A constructivist research program enables, without denying the importance of 
material factors in the formation of a state’s behaviour, the exploration of 
intersubjective factors such as norms, culture, ideas and identity 
(Bozdaglioglu 2003). This broadened research agenda is necessary when 
revitalizing the study of power in world politics beyond material resources 
such as military and economic capacity. 
When explaining how the revolutionary wave of action dominoed from one 
country to the next during the ‘so called’ Arab Spring, Weyland, (2012) 
explains that a constructivist methodology is conventially viewed as the most 
effective methodology. He explains the study of the dissemination of norms 
and values has much to offer when examining how the ideals of anti-
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authoritarianism and the empowerment of the masses spread from one 
country setting to another. This explanation assumes one autocrat’s demise 
in one country stimulated emulative efforts in other countries: 
“According to conventional wisdom, such a diffusion process could 
result from the spread of new norms and values that delegitimated 
authoritarian rule and motivated a rash of challenges, or from rational 
learning that inferred from the initial case of success the feasibility and 
promise of regime contention in many other settings. Normative 
approaches, derived from constructivism, help explain the goals that 
many protesters sought to attain.”  
(Weyland 2012: 919) 
 
Waltz (1979) theorizes three levels of analysis for international politics that he 
terms ‘images’. The first image, individuals, explains that international politics 
and conflict is caused by the difficult human nature of state rulers. The 
second image, based upon states, explains that international conflicts and 
wars are caused by the domestic makeup of states. Waltz’s (1979) third 
image, the international system, posits that the anarchic nature of the 
international state system is the root of conflict. Yet, in opposition to this 
Gourevitch (1978) has flipped the second image, and posits that domestic 
politics is determined by the international system. 
A ‘second-image reversed’23 post-internationalist conceptual framework 
which assumes that the international system is not only a consequence of 
                                                     
23 The pioneer of the idea that the international system shapes domestic politics is Peter 
Gourevitch. Gourevitch (1978) set out various approaches to this phenomenon which he 
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domestic politics and structures but a cause of them will frame this study. 
Domestic politics is determined by a state’s external economic relations and 
international security concerns. A post-international approach furthers this 
through framing a world society where physical borders of states have 
become intangible and a wide range of authorities have emerged to compete 
over the loyalties of global citizens (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996b). What is 
foreign and domestic has merged, and issues themselves, rather than 
sovereign borders are becoming the defining frame for what or who is 
spatially and temporally an ‘other’ or an active participant (Ferguson and 
Mansbach 1996). 
 
3.4 Data Collection and Research Method 
To explain how a state polity politically reproduces to mitigate the double-
security dilemma this research project uses a single case study approach on 
the ‘Turkish Model’ that has both explanatory and explorative elements. This 
is because:  
“The detailed qualitative accounts often produced in case studies not 
only help to explore or describe the data in real-life environment, but 
also help to explain the complexities of real-life situations which may 
not be captured through experimental or survey research.”  
                                                                                                                                                      
calls 'the second image reversed', in his 1978 paper 'The second image reversed: the 
international sources of domestic politics'. The core assumption of Gourevitch's (1978: 911) 
paper is that the, "international system is not only a consequence of domestic politics and 
structures but a cause of them." He explains that domestic politics is determined by a state’s 
external economic relations and international security concerns. These determine how and 
which political actors form both international and domestic policy and alliances. 
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(Zainal 2007: 4)  
The case study undertaken was a qualitative, largely online, desk-based 
research. The sources collected in this thesis were in the majority secondary-
data sources in Arabic, Turkish and English. The sources collected for 
analysis included: books, articles, government and civil society reports and 
publications, government and privately-owned news articles and videos, 
YouTube and social-media. These secondary sources were supplemented 
and directed by some primary informal discussions and anecdotal inferences 
through attendance at rallies, conferences, political meetings and through 
working in Turkey prior to the beginning of the study. As this data was 
collected for four years (January 2012-Dec 2015) during the period 
addressed by the research question (2002-2015), the data was relevant to 
the study and could be used as evidence. 
To understand the way in which the AKP politically reproduced through 
alliance-building the structures and functions of the Turkish political system 
were used as the basis of data collection and analysis. Data was collected on 
the AKP’s navigation of social institutions, social movements, organized 
interest groups, independent political parties, the party itself, Parliament, the 
bureaucracy, the President and the military. On analysing the horizontal 
dimension of the double-security dilemma, data was collected on the AKP’s 
navigation of the international political system including through diplomacy, 
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mediation, development and aid, trade, defence, warfare and the mass 
media.  
The data collected was concentrated on the period up until December 31st, 
2015 where the study ends. Originally, over 10 data sources were planned 
for collection and analysis within each category of: government documents, 
Turkish media, International media, NGO’s and International Organizations, 
and business and culture. However, by the end of the research project 75 
data sources were collected as demonstrated:  
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Table 3.1 Data Collection 
Data Source 
Type 
Number 
of 
Sources 
Collected 
Details Purpose for Analysis: 
Towards Alliance-
building or Towards 
Fortifying  
Purpose for Analysis: 
The Double-Security 
Dilemma 
Official AKP or 
Government 
Reports 
12 AKP General 
Election 
Manifesto 2002/ 
2007/ 2011/  
2014; Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 
TİKA, Turkstat, 
Strategic Depth, 
TBMM   
Political reproduction 
through socialization, 
recruitment, 
communication and 
policy-making and 
implementation 
Capacity of the AKP to 
extract, regulate and 
hegemonize 
 
 
Turkish News 
and Political 
Commentary 
24 Hurriyet Daily 
News, 
OrtadoguAnaliz, 
Insight Turkey, 
Hürriyet, 
Ortadoğu Etütler, 
Turkish Policy 
Quarterly, Turkish 
Weekly, TRT 
World, Turkish 
NY 
Analysis of political 
processes at play- 
Interest articulation, 
interest aggregation, 
policy-making and policy 
implementation 
 
Communication and 
socialization 
Openness or closedness 
of the discursive 
environment, ease of 
political articulation by 
rival polities  
International 
News and 
Political 
Commentary 
12 AlJazeera, 
Aawsat, Wall 
Street Journal, 
Open Democracy, 
Foreign Affairs, Al 
Monitor, Reuters, 
TIME, The 
Independent, 
Syria News 
Analysis of political 
processes at play- 
Interest articulation, 
interest aggregation, 
policy-making and policy 
implementation 
 
Communication and 
socialization 
Openness or closedness 
of the discursive 
environment, ease of 
political articulation by 
rival polities   
Domestic and 
International 
Non-
Governmental 
Reports 
(NGOs) and 
International 
Organization 
reports/ Rival 
Polities  
17 TESEV, OSCE, 
NATO, İHH, 
Ataturk Society, 
MÜSİAD, 
TÜSİAD, 
WhoProfits, 
European Court 
of Human Rights  
Political reproduction 
through socialization, 
recruitment, interest 
articulation and interest 
aggregation 
 
Level of polity competition 
and political centralization  
Culture, 
Business and 
Alternative 
Media 
10 YouTube, The 
Business Year, 
Turkish Soaps, 
Turkish Business 
Websites, Poetry 
and Literature   
Socialization, extraction, 
distribution and impact of 
policy-making 
Level of polity loyalty, 
hegemonic or 
counterhegemonic 
strength of economic 
stakeholders  
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The make-up and wide range of domestic and international varied sources 
was planned to give as full of a picture as possible of the horizontal and 
vertical elements of the polity economy faced by the AKP. The sources 
selected in each category were selected with the following rationale:  
Official AKP or government reports were selected as the AKP was the ruling 
party during the time of enquiry, thus, there literature was central to this 
study. The media articles and political commentary selected were based on a 
selection of the most widely-read pro and anti-government domestic and 
international outlets. Reports from rival or allied polities were selected based 
on the importance and influence of the rival polity in the double-security 
dilemma faced by the AKP. The data sources on culture and business were 
also selected due to their popularity or economic importance.  
When analysing the data, the themes that have been displayed in the final 
two columns in the table were deemed as the best method in understanding 
a polity’s maintenance of political membership, loyalty and identity through 
navigating through and effecting upon the openness/closedness/ or 
competitiveness/non-competitiveness of the domestic and international 
political system. 
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3.5 Research Method Limitations 
Desk-based research is both time and cost effective. Although this single 
case study was rigorous and applied a thorough online desk research 
approach which involved systematic identification, collection, analysis and 
documentation of data pertaining to the constitutive environment as defined 
in the theoretical framework there are, however, limitations to this method.  
Firstly, while this study gathered information from reliable online secondary 
sources, there is a risk the data is outdated as published data is seldom 
updated and is not always abreast with current changes. This is an issue in 
political science where situations are fluid, dynamic and constantly changing.  
Secondly, there is no opportunity when dealing with secondary data to further 
probe the authors for clarification on any ambiguous issues that may arise 
after analysis of the data, this means that conclusions can only be drawn on 
the information that’s available for analysis.  Therefore, there is a risk of 
analysing inaccurate data due to a lack of verification process that would 
allow the researcher to interview the original source or author of the 
information. 
In addition, there is always the disadvantage of analysing information that is 
severely biased to a certain perspective.  This is a main concern especially 
with political documents which may be authored to ascertain a narrative. This 
was thus kept in mind when analysing all data sources.  
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3.6 Ethical Considerations 
This research was conducted in accordance with ethical guidelines of the 
University of Bradford.  Thus, the study approach was to ‘do no harm’.  Most 
data for this study was gathered from secondary sources therefore, there 
were no personal safety or security risks concerns.  Furthermore, any 
photographs used in this research have blacked out the faces of participants 
to preserve their anonymity. All the sources for data that have been collected 
are mentioned in the bibliography. As this study’s formal contribution is to 
existing knowledge on theories around the political reproduction of states, 
and secondary contribution is empirical, primary data was in large not used 
thus breach of confidentiality was not an issue. 
 
 
3.7 Author’s Reflections  
My interest in the political reproduction of the Turkish polity was sparked by 
the 2010 “Gaza Flotilla Raid” when nine Turkish aid workers lost their lives 
due to an attack on the Mavi Marmara aid ship by Israel. This caused a 
diplomatic crisis between Israel and Turkey and elevated the AKP’s standing 
in the Arab region. Thus, I felt the need to investigate the behavior of state 
polities in the volatile Middle East region.  
I decided to take up a research position for two years at Sabanci University in 
Istanbul in 2012 and embedded myself within Turkish society and study 
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Turkish politics. This was not without difficulties, as my research was slowed 
down by the long bureaucratic processes of being an immigrant in Turkey, 
being a distance learner, and changes in my supervision team back in 
Bradford.  
Despite these difficulties, I continued to pursue my research and continued to 
embed myself in Turkish policy and activist circles, volunteering for a few 
NGO’s and journals. Thus, prior to the beginning of this study I undertook 
some informal discussions with key actors including AKP and opposition 
politicians, business leaders, political activists and NGO workers. During my 
research I have also regularly attended conferences, protests and political 
meetings to keep myself up to date with regular developments. 
I lived in Turkey for over four years in the post-Arab Spring environment 
when a lot of political and demographic changes were taking place. This 
furthered my anecdotal understanding of Turkish politics and familiarized me 
with the human impact of the regional and domestic changes.  
 
 
3.8 Research Question 
As explained in the introduction, the main research question of this study is,  
“How does a state polity politically reproduce to mitigate the double-security 
dilemma?”  
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This is achieved through the case-study of the ‘Turkish Model’ (as an 
example of an alliance-building mode of political reproduction from 2002-
2012). The case study will also look at why the ‘Turkish Model’ did not last 
and the constitutive and causal factors that led to its alteration. Thus, the 
‘Turkish Model’ is an example of how a political party/block maintained 
authority of the Turkish state through Islamic neoliberalism. 
The following research objectives were formed as a guide to break-down the 
above wider question by the researcher:   
 To examine what the ‘Turkish Model’ means in the context of state 
political reproduction and the double-security dilemma.   
 To analyse the elements of the Turkish state and political society that 
shaped the ‘Turkish Model’ of 2002-2011. 
 To analyse the elements of the regional and international system that 
shaped the ‘Turkish Model’ of 2002-2011. 
 To analyse how and why Turkey’s evolving double-security dilemma 
altered its mode of political reproduction during the AKP’s tenure. 
 To examine the implications of the above for Turkey and the rest of 
the Middle East. 
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3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has explained the uniqueness and relevance of the ‘Turkish 
Model’ of alliance-building political reproduction within the literature on 
polities and the double-security dilemma. It has set out which data has been 
collected and discussed issues that can occur when collecting empirical data 
on a state’s behavior. The chapter has also explained constructivist post-
internationalist methodology and the use of such a methodology in this 
project’s research question formation on state polity political reproduction. 
The research question does this through the lens of the double-security 
dilemma and the case study of Turkey’s alliance-building AKP model. 
This chapter is the final chapter that both justifies and sets out an analytical 
programme for the research. The next chapter will provide a historical 
background on the ‘Turkish Model’ case study.  This will be followed by three 
analytical chapters. 
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Chapter Four: Arrows of Change: Kemalism and the 
Roots of the ‘Turkish Model’ 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides the formation of the fortifying early modern24 Turkish 
nation-state out of the Ottoman Empire polity with a historical narrative. This 
historical narrative is preceded by a theoretical debate of several existing 
perspectives on the ‘Turkish Model’. Then, the historical narrative begins with 
a description of the formation of the Republic which institutionalized the 
Kemalist, secular, modern state. Additionally, it will explain how the Republic 
of Turkey developed into a Western-allied state and North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) member under the sphere of US influence, combatting 
the double-security dilemma propagated by the Cold War. An examination of 
the fortifying Kemalist nation-building process25 and an analysis of its key 
                                                     
24 Modernity refers to ‘modes of social organization that emerged in Europe from about the 
sixteenth century and extended influence throughout the world in the wake of European 
exploration and colonization.’… Modernity is fundamentally about conquest, ‘the imperial 
regulation of land, the discipline of the soul, and the creation of truth’ (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and 
Tiffin 2000) 
25 The Kemalist revolution was an engine for the progression and betterment of the human 
condition of the Turkish public. The Ottoman Caliphate had stagnated the destined progress 
of the Turkish people. Drastic and enforced rapid change was a necessity to lift the Turkish 
nation into modernism and this radical shift has culminated in the emergence of the ‘Turkish 
Model’ as a nation-building model for Muslim majority countries. The Ottoman Empire was 
an Empire born out of the Islamic conquests of the Oghuz Turks. At its peak it spanned 
Anatolia, South and Eastern Europe, North Africa, Western Asia, the Middle East, the 
Caucasus and the Horn of Africa. The administration of the Ottoman Empire was engineered 
through a Turkish interpretation of Shariah and the Millet system. Throughout the nineteenth 
century the Ottomans lost increasing amounts of territory because of irredentism and the rise 
of nationalist movements. Following concurrence with the Central Powers in World War I, the 
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reforms are crucial to understanding the historical foundations of the AKP’s 
'Turkish Model'. 
The first part of this chapter, 4.2 Theoretical Literature on the ‘Turkish Model’ 
examines the way that other scholars have looked at the ‘Turkish Model’ 
conceptually and contextually, noting the gaps that are yet to be studied. It 
notes the importance of centralizing both identity and history when studying 
the ‘Turkish Model’. The rest of the chapter thus centralizes identity and 
history within its narrative of the formation of the Turkish state and the main 
influences, structures and traditions that the AKP have had to both 
manipulate and mitigate.  
The second part of this chapter, 4.3 The Ottoman Empire, c.1299-1923, will 
explain how European ideas such as liberalism and nationalism infiltrated the 
Ottoman Empire. Part 4.3 will provide an explanation into how Mustafa 
Kemal's nation-building project emerged in the last days of the Young Turk 
period. It will also explain how the rise of ethnonationalism inspired 
Westphalian modelled revolts and ethnic conflict in the Empire’s remnants. 
The Balkan Wars and World War I led to an influx of Muslim refugees into 
Anatolia.  The climate of trauma fostered ideas of a Turkish nation-state as a 
                                                                                                                                                      
Empire disbanded and was replaced by the Republican regime of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk built a new Turkish nation-state on the territory of the Straits and 
Anatolia. He achieved this through Kemalism: “an eclectic framework of political, economic 
and social views to aid in the construction of a nation state on the remains of the Ottoman 
Empire.” (Aytürk 2011: 309) This 'founding ideology' of the Turkish Republic prompted an 
overhaul of the social and political body of the country. 
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form of protection for those refugees who self-defined as Turkish. It was 
through this discourse that Turkish nationalism was born. Thus, the new 
nation-state polity politically reproduced through the ‘othering’ of non-Turks 
and conservative Islamists. 
Section 4.4 The First Republic, then explains how republicanism, as a 
discursive and normative tool, mechanized the vertical political institutions 
which fostered democracy, such as the 1924 constitution. It also examines 
how the Kemalist populist project set out individual citizenship rights. 
Nonetheless, problems would arise for actors who did not ascribe to the 
Kemalist vision of the ‘Turkish nation'26. Lastly, part 4.4 explains how the 
Kemalists believed religion was to blame for lack of progress and 
development in the Ottoman period. Influenced by European positivism, the 
Kemalists pushed for a society founded in science, economic prosperity, 
knowledge and education.  
This historical chapter is important as despite the double-security dilemma 
being to unique every ruler throughout history, much of Turkey’s security 
context is unchangeable. Its geopolitical location as the bridge between 
Europe and Asia, its Islamic past and the vibrant polity economy that has 
thus formed has continually shaped its security agenda. The ‘Turkish Model’ 
                                                     
26 A legacy of ethnic-conflict had fostered a nationalist dogma, discriminatory against 
minorities. Internal stability and the institutionalization of Turkish nationalism were reinforced 
by the Western alliances Turkey had formed. 
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emerged as a political response to the binaries created throughout Turkey’s 
history- modernism and conservatism, the West and the East. Thus, 
analysing the evolution of these concepts into modern Turkey’s is imperative. 
 
4.2 Theoretical Literature on the ‘Turkish Model’ 
With regards to Turkey and the Middle East region, a wealth of theoretical 
literature has been published. A significant portion of the literature focuses on 
the changing nexus of international and domestic politics under the AKP (e.g. 
İşeri and Dilek 2012; Tuğal 2016; Waldman and Caliskan 2017). 
Ayşe Zarakol (2013) examines the connections between the recent political 
directions of Turkey and Thailand. She argues that global norms form the 
domestic power structures of each state. International norms have strongly 
influenced the identities of domestic groups. Concerning Turkey, the 
polarization between the secular strata and political Islamists, cannot be 
deduced to differences in culture or ideology. A class analysis of the 
economic differences between those with different ideologies is also 
insufficient in painting the full picture. Rather, Zarakol (2013: 160) states that,  
"The structural view gives us a better understanding of what is at 
stake in both Turkey ... by illuminating the degree to which... countries 
have been shaped by their earlier interactions with the modern 
international system, and the complicated—not to mention 
complicating—ways ‘‘modernizing’’ norms originating in Western 
centre of international society have diffused and continue to do so 
throughout the world."  
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This shows how globalization, an "always" phenomenon, has been 
hegemonized by the West since modern times and the inception of 
modernism into peripheral states such as Turkey has greatly altered the 
power dynamics and identity of groups within its domesticity.  
Mehmet Arda (2015) article explains how Turkey's activist foreign policy is 
linked to its domestic politics. Arda explains that the AKP ideological basis 
puts emphasis on empowering the weak and destitute.  "Domestically this 
comprises traditional, conservative and religious groups. Internationally, it is 
certainly marginalised or vilified countries and Muslim or Turkic minorities 
that Turkey thinks are mistreated." (Arda 2015: 222) Arda's analysis of AKP 
ideology and political action denotes that for the AKP neither the domestic or 
international take priority but are simultaneously important in policy 
considerations. Arda states that the AKP see their constituents to be as much 
the orphans in Gaza as the miners in Suma. 
İşeri and Dilek (2012) also explain that the stability of the Middle East region 
as a whole depends on the nexus between domestic and international politics 
within Turkey. İşeri and Dilek (2012) assert that Turkey's capacity to act on 
the international stage is directly correlated to the consolidation of democracy 
within the state. Within traditional IR, a state’s strength within the anarchic 
international system is based on its military and economic prowess. İşeri and 
Dilek explain that nothing is looked upon more favourably than democratic 
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consolidation within both the national and international theatre of public 
opinion. 
İşeri and Dilek expand their point into an analysis of the possible 
demonstrative effect of the 'Turkish Model' within the Arab region. They 
explain that as far as creating a domino-effect for the 'Turkish Model' in the 
Middle East, Turkey must ensure that the 'domestic political configuration 
functions to forbid undemocratic praxis.' İşeri and Dilek conclude quite 
pessimistically observing the current situation in Turkey as too authoritarian 
and not routed in constitutional democratic order. Therefore, the 'Turkish 
Model' will not have the desired effect of creating positive peace under the 
current political climate, as those outside the state will continue to have a 
cautious opinion of Turkish influence until Turkey's democracy is 
consolidated. 
In Cihan Tuğal's (2016) study of the ‘Turkish Model’ his theoretical framework 
is centred around how the politics of mobilization reconstructed state-society 
relations in Turkey. He explains how the political instability of the Middle East 
region in the 1970s led to the fear of the dominoing of revolt into Turkey. 
Preventing a situation like that of revolutionary Iran in 1979 and suppressing 
Kurdish rebellion was the primary concern of the Turkish establishment. To 
combat these threats the army launched a coup in the early 1980s as they 
felt the government did not have the capacity to suppress the uprisings. 
Tuğal marks the political birth of the ‘Turkish Model’ at this point.  
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The coup led to the political ascent of the subaltern Anatolian conservative 
strata as a form of appeasement. A key consequence of this was Turkish 
Islamism’s elevation as a viable political force (Tuğal 2016). It is the 
emergence of this strata of society into the traditional secular quasi-
democratic institutions of the Turkish state which has characterized the 
'Turkish Model'.  
The argument developed is that Turkish Islamism’s inception into the state 
apparatus and political establishment is the root cause of the fall of the 
‘Turkish Model’. This new political establishment sought to monopolize 
power. Gramscist political discourse describes this political process as 
'passive revolution'. Tuğal (2016: 26) explains, "They boast a powerful 
business class, appropriated huge chunks of the bureaucracy and had built 
many civic institutions that surrounded the core of Turkish power. Circa 2010 
they started to attack their benefactors." Thus, the political mobilization of this 
class of society and their absorption into state institutions has itself created 
more threats to the continuity and stability of the Turkish Republic, and its 
"democracy" (Tuğal 2016). 
Here a political sociological theoretical framework has been applied to the 
study of the fall of the ‘Turkish Model’ whilst simultaneously incorporating the 
importance of historical change. Tuğal (2016: 23) takes the ontological 
approach that the “lines between state and society, the elite and the people, 
are drawn and redrawn continuously.” His research explains how, why and 
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by whom these lines are being drawn and redrawn. Central to his study is the 
idea of political society: “a field of actors and organizations that have 
comprehensive social visions…” (2016: 23) Parties dominate the political 
scene in states in which democracy has been consolidated. Nevertheless, 
“in more dynamic situations, the field is populated by socio-political 
organizations and groups that are difficult to classify and label. 
Political society frequently remakes the boundaries between the power 
bloc and the people.” 
 (2006: 23) 
The failure of the ‘Turkish Model’ was compounded by the souring of 
geopolitics and domestic stability with the turn of the Arab Spring to winter in 
2013, and the Gezi Park uprising within Turkey itself in 2013. The Gezi Park 
uprising was a political reaction to the Islamist monopolization of institutional 
structures. 
A historical approach is central to Tuğal’s study as underlining the impact of 
past political changes on the region and the processes of change within it are 
the only way to navigate through the present. Studying the history of 
reactions to revolutions can lead to patterns emerging connecting events, 
society, and political institutions. The revolutionary change that swept the 
Middle East in 1789, 1968, 1979 and 2011 has sent shockwaves across the 
region as capitalism tries to protect itself by any means necessary (Tuğal 
2016).  
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Cihan Tuğal (2016) offers a wealth of theoretical contributions to the study of 
the 'Turkish Model' and its relation to both history and domestic and 
international politics.  His explanation on how the sociology of political power 
and power blocs within passive revolution offers a fresh perspective that is 
rarely incorporated into either realist or constructivist IR. One of the most 
central themes of his book is how the 'Turkish Model' was constructed as a 
reaction to threats from rival groups both domestically and internationally and 
this theme will also be a central theme within this thesis. Nonetheless, this 
constructivist thesis will depart from his heavily institutional approach and 
focus more on security, identity, ideology and rhetoric.  
The importance of religious identity or ideology is not dismissed by Tuğal. 
Yet, religious identity falls behind class analysis and economic interests 
within his research agenda. Although these factors are important in studying 
the 'Turkish Model', a constructivist methodology will elaborate more on how 
identity, rhetoric and discourse played a role in uniting the conservative 
Anatolian strata behind the AKP agenda no matter what the economic 
consequences might be.  
Tuğal’s book will be referred to as a core text within this project. All the same, 
a theoretical departure from his study will be the engagement of this project 
with the main debates within IR. A recent trend in IR research that Tuğal 
does not touch upon is that of postinternationalism. A postinternationalist 
approach to IR sees the role of the state as being less and less important in 
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world politics. James Rosenau, the pioneer of this approach, explains in his 
1990 book on 'turbulence theory' how non-state actors have played a central 
role in both domestic and foreign policy formation and destabilization. Like 
Tuğal, he focuses on the importance of domestic politics, but he directly 
applies it to IR. Suitable for a constructivist research agenda, 
postinternationalism or 'turbulence theory' brings to focus the role of 
international norms and the dilemma of intra-state violence and terrorism that 
is plaguing this world (Ferguson and Mansbach 2007). This project will follow 
a postinternationalist paradigm.  
A key approach within the postinternationalist paradigm is the 'polity' 
approach (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996). Another departure from Tuğal, 
who examines political society, a 'polity' approach encased with a 
postinternationalist dialectic can do more to bridge the gap between 
international and domestic politics, plus incorporate historical change. Using 
the political grammar of political society and institutionalism has its limits, and 
it does not consider the identity of various groups within political and civil 
society or how individuals within the groups identify with and become loyal to 
said group.  
A constructivist research agenda framed through the political grammar of 
'polities' can bridge these gaps (Weyland 2012). The polity approach applied 
to this research project frames the scope of political change as transient, 
rather than as clear-cut positivity. Ferguson and Mansbach explain that both 
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individual polities and polity types rarely vanish entirely, rather, they linger as 
a section of the worlds ‘living museum’… “sometimes as a historical oddity 
that may go back on show or be reconstructed in the future.” (Ferguson and 
Mansbach 2004: 107) It is here where the role of history, culture and identity 
can also tie in, as a mix of Islamic and Ottoman ideas based on the polities of 
the past have reinforced loyalty to the current Turkish polity both within and 
outside Turkey’s borders.  
 
4.3 The Late Ottoman Period 
 
 
The Young Ottomans, c. 1839-1902  
 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s nation-building project was developed in the 
increasingly hybrid environment of the last days of the Ottoman (Osmanlı) 
Empire. European philosophy which included ideas such as Westphalian 
sovereignty had begun to permeate the Empire’s dominant Islamic discourse 
from as early as the Ottoman 18th Century. These Europeanizing concepts, 
forces and actors would have a profound influence on the formation of the 
Turkish Republic (Unsar 2002). This increasingly hybrid environment was the 
defining character of the Tanzimat (reorganization) period (1839-1878) of the 
Ottoman Empire (Unsar 2002).  
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The Tanzimat period would introduce innovations in the ruling mechanisms of 
the Sultanate. The fundamental changes that revolutionised Europe during 
the 19th century, such as the French Revolution, generated the ideas of 
liberty and nationalism which spread to the south and east of the 
Mediterranean (Unsar 2002). The Sultanate undertook research into the 
European science of governance in the hope of deterring any dissenting 
forces. This generated multitudinous reform emulating a more European style 
of governance. One example was the 1839 Declaration of Gülhane, 
“guaranteed individual rights for the subjects of the empire in the form 
of security for ‘life, honour and property’, it neither challenged the 
Sultanate nor exceeded its limits by introducing a comprehensive and 
novel system to replace the obviously malfunctioning Ottoman 
system.”  
(Unsar 2002: 94) 
In 1865, a group of intellectuals, the Young Ottomans, surfaced which further 
drove the Europeanization process within the Ottoman Caliphate. The 
chattering classes had grown increasingly concerned with the authoritarian 
policy direction of the Caliphate (Saygın and Onal 2008). However, the 
Young Ottomans were not revolutionaries. They expressed allegiance to the 
Sultanate and many had a strong Islamic faith (Unsar 2002). They advocated 
for reforms of the Ottoman system such as a more liberal European style of 
citizenship framed on a constitutional monarchy (Unsar 2002). The Young 
Ottomans represented the first substantial force of liberalism in the Ottoman 
period (Unsar 2002). 
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The writings of the Young Ottomans would have a profound influence on 
Atatürk. Key thinkers such as Sadık Rıfat Pasha, Namık Kemal, Ziya Pasha, 
Ali Suavi and Hayreddin Pasha inspired the shape of modern Turkey (Saygın 
& Onal 2008). Notably, Ali Suavi is considered a pioneer of secularism in the 
region.  Suavi’s article ‘Half Thought Half Religion’ (Yarım Fakih Din Yıkar) 
demonstrates that Islamic teachings are acceptable solely within the private 
sphere of faith as in reality ‘the science of politics relies upon geography, 
economics and ethics’ (Suavi cited in Saygın & Onal 2008). Thus, the secular 
science of governance incepted the Ottoman Empire. In 1876, pressure from 
the Young Ottomans expedited the introduction of the 1876 constitution 
which inaugurated a ‘basic law’ encompassing all citizens despite their 
religious heritage (Unsar 2002). The Young Ottomans had sowed the seeds 
of liberalism and secularism in the Empire that would eventually culminate in 
the emergence of the Republic. 
However, the Young Ottomans saw their aspirations of the consolidation of a 
constitutional monarchy crushed in 1878 as the monarchy responded to their 
demands by fortifying their authority. In 1878 Sultan Abdülhamid II restored 
an absolute monarchy (Bozdaglioglu 2003). Then, the shattered remnants of 
the Young Ottoman movement, students from the military academy and 
students of the school of medicine came together to build a broader coalition 
of dissent against the absolute monarchy (Bozdaglioglu 2003). Facing arrest 
and repression, the dissidents moved to Paris and established the 
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Committee of Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti, IT) or the 
Young Turks in 1902 (Bozdaglioglu 2003). This rival polity would become the 
security dilemma that eventually saw the end of the Ottoman polity and 
ensured its nesting into the worlds living museum. That is, until its legacy was 
resurrected by Turkey’s Islamists in the 1990s.    
 
The Young Turks, c. 1902-1918 
 
Following the Young Ottomans, the Young Turks became the Empire’s next 
noteworthy rival polity. They constituted the primordial and most significant 
group of intellectuals in the Ottoman Empire to normatively distance 
themselves from Islamism (Unsar 2002). Staunchly against religion, and 
influenced by concepts such as Darwinism and Bersonism, the ideas of the 
Young Turks lay in scientific truth, art and ethics (Guvenc-Salgirli 2010). 
Enthused and inspired by the rebellious West, such as the ‘Other West’ of 
revolutionary France, they became radical modernists (Guvenc-Salgirli 
2010). Their radical ideologies would metamorphize Kemalist thought. 
Young Turk Abdullah Cevdet’s ideas can be credited as the tenets of 
modernization within Kemalist thought and the underpinnings of the modern 
Turkish nation. Cevdet’s prime contribution was on social revolution. Saygın 
and Onal (2008) refer to his 1912 article, ‘A Quite Awake Sleep’, which they 
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state ‘shows serious resemblance’ to the modernization and nation-building 
initiatives of Mustafa Kemal: 
“Fez will be banned and instead of it, a new hat will be accepted, …, 
small and big dervish lodges will be abolished and their revenues will 
be transferred to education budget, all madrasah will be closed and 
new literary and technical schools will be founded; wearing turban, 
cassock, etc. will be permissible only for certificated ecclesiastic men; 
saints, vows and presents will be forbidden and the money saved from 
them will devoted to national defence; writers of charm, healers and 
people like that will be removed and malaria treatment will be 
compulsory; functional schools will be opened for old people; Ottoman 
Turkish dictionary and grammar will be prepared by a committee 
consisting of linguists and writers.” 
 (Saygın and Onal 2008: 35)  
 
Young Turk sociologist Ziya Gökalp was also a Kemalist influencer. His most 
significant contribution was the idea of a Turkified common culture (hars) 
constructed around those who had experienced a similar upbringing (terbiye) 
(Kösebalaban 2011). This common culture would be based on a Turan or 
Turkish national identity that could be ascribed to by all Muslim citizens of the 
Sultanate regardless of their ethnic background (Kösebalaban 2011). His 
three steps towards the culture included: systematizing Westernization, 
forming a manifesto of transformations and changes and the consolidation of 
Turkism as culturally-based nationalism (Kösebalaban 2011; Saygın & Onal 
2008). Nonetheless, it is important to note that there was far from a common 
consensus amongst the Young Turks around Gökalp’s ideas. 
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An authoritative critic of Gökalp was Yusuf Akçura whose ideas differed from 
Gökalp in that he felt a Turkified common culture (hars) could only be based 
around ethnic, rather than culturally based nationalism. Kösebalaban (2011) 
highlights the importance of Akçura’s (1904) essay, ‘Three Political 
Resolutions ‘Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset’, in which he identifies three possible 
resolutions to the decline of the Ottoman Empire, ‘Ottomanism, pan-Islamism 
and Turkism’. For Akçura the only viable solution was pan-Turkism, an 
ideology that he felt would not come under the attack of Western imperialists 
and could possibly enjoy their support as a form of resistance against Russia. 
He saw Ottomanism and Islamism as short-sighted ideologies which 
diminished the essence of 'Turkishness' (Kösebalaban 2011). 
Notwithstanding their divided perspectives on ethnicity, Akçura and Gökalp 
were united over the issues of Turkificiation, Islamization, and Modernization 
(Türkleşmek, İslâmlaşmak, and Muasırlaşmak) which Gökalp named ‘the 
three currents’, (üç cereyan) (Kösebalaban 2011). Two of these ‘three 
currents’ would become the core values of Kemalism.  
Mustafa Kemal’s notions of the role of religion in the terbiye (education) of 
the Turk also departed from the ideas of Gökalp. Kemalism advocated for full 
separation of religion and statehood. However, Turkism could not carry a 
historical mission paradoxical to Islam, and Islam continued to inform the 
cultural undertone of Turkish identity. According to Kösebalaban (2011):  
 86 
 
“Kemalism allowed Islam to constitute the core of the Turkish social 
identity and produced an ethnic cultural nationalism…Kemalism in 
theory and in implementation was a project of nation-building where 
Islam served as the foundation of social consciousness. Despite 
attempts to purge Islam from the theory and practice of Turkish 
nationalism, Muslimness remained an awkward but powerful informant 
of the Kemalist identity.”  
 (Kosebalaban 2011: kindle Loc 1000 of 6250) 
 
The rise of the Young Turk movement and other counterhegemonic 
discourses in the Empire led to uprisings in the Ottoman occupied lands of 
Bulgaria, Crete, and Macedonia (Hale 2012). The Young Turks armed and 
the 1876 constitution was reinstated in the Young Turk Revolution of July 
1908 by a revolt of Third Ottoman Army officers in Salonika (Hale 2012). 
Parliament and elections were reconvened. Royal autocracy ended. Civil 
liberties such as freedom of speech and the right to free press were restored 
and aspirations were built for a ‘constitutional and representative 
government’ in Ottoman lands (Hale 2012). 
 
 
The Rise of Ethnonationalism in the Ottoman Empire, c. 1909-1918 
 
The Second Constitutional Era (1908-1918) was the last historical stage of 
the Ottoman Empire. This era saw the move to extremely fortifying behaviour 
to mitigate the polity’s collapse. The time was characterized by the onset of 
the Balkan Wars, the Armenian genocide at the hands of the Young Turks 
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and the entry of the Ottomans into World War I (Kösebalaban 2011). The 
Young Turks won the parliamentary elections in 1908 in the restored 
constitutional monarchy (Kösebalaban 2011). The next decade would see a 
power struggle between conservative elements, the IT and the monarchy 
(Hanioğlu 2001). The period would also see a growth in ethnic tension and 
an increasing level of revolt against the Empire (Kösebalaban 2011). The 
spread of irredentism paved the way for the Armenian genocide, a modern 
fractured Middle East at the mercy of European colonialism and a new ‘hero’, 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Atabaki and Zèurcher 2004). 
Ethnonationalism, influenced by Westphalian ideals of sovereignty, spread 
throughout the Sultanate at the turn of the century. Revolts in the Greek, 
Serb, Romanian, Macedonian, Armenian, Arab, Kurdish and Slav 
communities began to break out demanding independence from the Empire. 
This lack of consent and loyalty to the Ottoman polity posed the final double-
security dilemma of the Empire (Kösebalaban 2011). 
The leaders of the Empire began losing their grip on power within the Straits 
and Anatolia. As a consequence, there were several coups including the 
Ottoman countercoup of 1909, the 31 March Incident, the 1912 Ottoman 
coup d'état and the Raid on the Sublime Porte, the last coup of the Ottoman 
Empire, on June 11, 1913 (Kösebalaban 2011). This heralded the formation 
of a capstone IT dictatorship, ‘that brought the empire’ into World War I, 
subsequently causing its final annihilation (Kösebalaban 2011). 
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Yet, the ability of the Young Turks to develop a Turkified common culture 
(hars) to penetrate society was compromised by the resistance of competing 
ethnonationalist ideologies, such as Arab, Greek and Serb nationalism that 
no longer felt invested in the Ottoman Empire. This nationalist wave was 
amongst Christians, Jews and Muslims alike. Muslim Albanians revolted in 
1910 (Hale 2012). In 1911, Arab intellectuals and politicians from the Levant 
formed The Young Arab Society, a small Arab nationalist club, in Paris. 
Congruent in name and disposition to the Young Turks, Parisian 
intellectualism stemming from the ideas of the French Revolution, would 
have a gargantuan influence on the make-up of the modern Middle East 
(Hale 2012).  
The Young Arab Society sowed the seed for the spread of Arab nationalism 
within the Middle East. Numerous revolts took place in Arab lands against 
Ottoman rule and were met with a violent response. During this period the 
Arab elites looked continually to the Western colonialists for support and 
possible independence. However, they were betrayed by the 1916 Sykes-
Picot Agreement that ensured Western domination and control over the 
region. Arab nationalist movements began to look both within themselves 
and outside the region for inspiration for democracy, self-determination and 
dignity, thus turning their backs on the Turks (Kamrava 2005). Despite being 
under Western colonial control, the birth of Arab countries carved out of 
 89 
 
former Ottoman territories included: Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, 
Iraq and Saudi Arabia (Bhalla 2014). 
Image 4.1 Arab Dissidents Hung by the Young Turk Administration in 
Jerusalem, Palestine 1916 
 
                   (Author’s Family Collection) 
Moreover, the rise of ethnonationalism during the final years of the Young 
Turk regime led to mass atrocities and group violence became commonplace 
(Kinzer 2001). The Medz Yeghern, the Armenian Genocide, began on the 
24th of April 1915. 1.5 million ethnic Armenians were killed in Anatolia by 
Young Turk death squads. Up until this point, the Armenians had been 
pushing the Ottomans for civil rights for decades (Pope and Pope 1997). As 
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Christians, they were discriminated against in the Ottoman Millet system 
through high-taxation and a lack of political rights. As Turkish nationalist 
discourse became increasingly hegemonic, a binary was constructed 
between Turk and non-Turk, Muslim and infidel. The situation was not helped 
by the onset of World War I. Armenians were othered as pro-Russian and 
deemed a threat to national security (Kinzer 2001). Counterhegemonic 
resistance ensued amongst Armenians against the repressive policies of the 
IT. This resulted in the systematic ethnic-cleansing of ethnic Armenians from 
Anatolia (Kinzer 2001). 
The ‘Muslim populations of the Balkans, Crimea and Caucasia’ also suffered 
from the rise in ethnic violence (Hale 2012). These Muslim populations were 
attacked by the emergent Balkan states and the Russian military. The 
atrocities play a dominant role in Turkish collective memory and were 
instrumental to the creation of the Turkish Republic as a safe-haven for the 
Muslim refugees of the Balkans, Crimea and Caucasia (Hale 2012). 
It would be these refugees, the most prominent being Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 
who would feel the need for the protection and security that a new nation-
state in Anatolia could give them: 
“between 1827 and 1922 around 5 million Muslims in Greece, the 
Crimea, the Caucasus and the Balkans were killed, while about 
another 5.4 million were expelled and took refuge in the Ottoman 
Empire. A large proportion of these victims of Greek and Balkan 
chauvinism and Russian imperialism were ethnic Turks, but their 
numbers also included millions of Slavic Muslims and Crimean 
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Tartars, plus the Muslim minorities of the Caucasus (Muslim 
Circassians, Abkhazians, Chechens, Azeris and Muslim Georgians) 
many of whom had not been under Ottoman rule, but fled to the 
Ottoman Empire since they recognized it as a ‘kin state’.”  
(Hale 2012: 11) 
The influx of Muslim refugees from the surrounding regions led to a sharp 
rise in the Muslim population of Anatolia (Hale 2012). Amongst the Muslim 
refugees a shared feeling of injustice and trauma dominated conversations. 
This shared solidarity and suffering was absolved through the rhetoric of 
Turkic patriotism and led to the growth of Turkish nationalism (Hale 2012). 
 
 
War and Peace c. 19 
 
The Ottoman Empire’s horizontal relations and their eventual defeat in World 
War I is crucial to understanding the emergence of the Turkish Republic. 
Between 1568 until 1923 Russia and the Ottoman Empire went to war twelve 
times due to disputes over territory in Central Asia and the Balkans (Hale 
2012). In the late 19th century, the Ottomans joined an alliance with Britain 
against Russia. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 ended with the Treaty of 
Berlin. The Ottoman Empire lost Serbia, Romania, Montenegro, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and Cyprus. These territories had consisted of 5.5 million 
Ottoman subjects, a major loss to the Sultanate. The Ottoman Empire found 
itself at its weakest point.  
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These losses left the Ottomans with no option other than to seek out 
defensive realpolitik, trying to build alliances from a point of vulnerability. 
Germany appeared a rational ally, distant enough geographically not to pose 
a threat, but stalwart enough to offer the necessary military support that the 
Empire lacked (Hale 2012)27. The Ottoman Empire continued to face losses 
in the lead up to World War I. Uprisings against the Ottoman Empire in 
Yemen and Albania in 1910 (Lewis 1955) followed Bulgaria’s declaration of 
independence in 1908. This was succeeded by the invasion of Libya by Italy 
in 1911 (Lewis 1955).  
In 1914 when World War I broke out, Young Turk and Minister of War for the 
Ottoman Empire, Ismail Enver Pasha committed the Ottomans to side with 
the Central Powers against the majority of Osmanlı opinion (Lewis 1955). 
Turkey would join its new ally, Germany in their mission against Turkey’s old 
enemy, Russia. The Ottomans at this point had ordered two warships from 
British shipyards which they dispatched to bomb Russian Black Sea ports 
(Lewis 1955). When the Ottomans refused to apologize to Russia and meet 
the Russian demand of expelling German high-ranking officers from the 
Ottoman military, full war broke out across the Ottoman Empire and the 
Ottomans were defeated by the Allies in 1918 (Lewis 1955). All Ottoman 
territory would be annexed by the Allies.  
                                                     
27 It is interesting to note that the German’s built a regional railway between Istanbul and 
Baghdad during this period.  
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The Mudros Armistice was employed between Great Britain and the 
Ottomans on the 30th of October 1918: “All Ottoman possessions in Arabia, 
Syria, Iraq and Africa were placed under Allied military control.” (Lewis 1955: 
50) The Straits, Dardanelles and Black Sea ports were also annexed by the 
Allies (Lewis 1955). Although relief was felt in some quarters when the war 
ended, the 30th of October 1918 would be known as a ‘black day’ in Turkish 
public memory (Lewis 1955). 
Despite the end of World War I, violence and aggression continued in the 
post-Ottoman neighbourhood and continued to pose a security threat to the 
shrinking Turkish polity. The territories of Anatolia and the Straits were 
disputed by Greece and Armenia and with the support of the Allies the 
fighting continued against the Turks. During this time, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
a well-respected war hero and commanding officer, was sent to Eastern 
Anatolia (Symons 2012). He subsequently led the fight-back against the 
occupying forces of the Allied powers, Greece and Armenia. This would be 
the final push to defend the viability and geographical continuity of Anatolia 
as a homeland for the Turks (Symons 2012). 
The resisting Turks held onto Anatolia. Symons (2012) states that as Istanbul 
was under British control, the resistance moved to Ankara, ‘where a new 
national parliament was established on 23 April, 1920’. The Republic of 
Turkey (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti) formed in the new capital, Ankara. Symons 
(2012: kindle Loc 2618 of 5409) continues, “A set of successful battles 
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against the advancing Greek forces consolidated the new state and the war 
ended in 1923 with a comprehensive settlement which was eventually 
achieved via the Treaty of Lausanne.” The Ottoman period had ended, and a 
new Turkish Republican century was born. Yet, it would be the marriage of 
the historical legacy of both these polities that would become the ‘Turkish 
Model’ a century later.  
 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 19 May 1881–10 November 1938 
 
Dominant contemporary discourse in Turkey pits Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as 
the most crucial actor in both the formation of ‘Turkishness’ and the 
‘liberation’ of the ‘country shaped like a head of a mare’28. Under his 
command, the Turkish Army defeated the Greek forces, expelled the Sultan, 
and signed the 24 July 1923 Treaty of Lausanne -thereby giving birth to the 
Republic of Turkey (Bayar 2014; Mango 2001).  
Ghazi29 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s family background and upbringing were 
average for his time. The Ottoman-occupied Macedonian, present day Greek 
city of Thessaloniki, or as it was more commonly known at the time, Salonika 
                                                     
28 From Nâzım Hikmet’s poem ‘the plea’   
29 One of Atatürk’s many names, part of his original given name, it also means ‘great 
warrior’. 
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or Salonica, was the birthplace of Atatürk (Macfie 1994). His parents were Ali 
Rıza Efendi and Zübeyde (Macfie 1994). They had six children, and his 
father was a minor customs official in the Department of Pious Foundations 
and Excise (Macfie 1994). Macfie (1994) notes that although Atatürk had a 
relatively trouble-free middle-class upbringing, the deep divisions in Ottoman 
society with the emerging binaries of modernization/tradition and 
secularism/religion plagued his parents’ marriage. His mother was the more 
conservative of the two. It was these issues accompanied by Atatürk’s 
military schooling that would shape his ideology, later known as Kemalism 
(Mango 2001).  
Despite years of resistance from his mother, she eventually supported his 
dreams of a military career and at twelve years old Atatürk enrolled at the 
Military Secondary School in Salonika (Kinross 1964). After passing his 
school exams, in 1989 Atatürk joined the War College in Harbiye, in what 
was then Constantinople (present day Istanbul) (Kinross 2012). He 
eventually graduated from the Staff College in 1905, when he was 24 years 
old (Kinross 2012). It was at this age that Atatürk would become increasingly 
interested in politics (Mango 2001).  
Mustafa Kemal become progressively more critical of the Sultanate and 
began to join radical political reading groups (Kinross 2012). He was 
eventually arrested and jailed for his political activities for six months (Kinross 
2012). Once released, he became involved with the Young Turk Revolution 
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of 1908 (Macfie 1994). After the revolution, his youthful dissidence subsided, 
and he returned to focus on his military career. 
Mustafa Kemal would gradually rise through the ranks of the Ottoman Army. 
During his extensive military career, he fought in Tripolitania (Libya) against 
the Italians; he also spent time in Sofia, Bulgaria during the outbreak of the 
Second Balkan War (Macfie 1994).  By his thirties he had become a brigadier 
in command of the Eastern Front in the equivalent of modern-day Syria 
during World War I (Macfie 1994). The post-World War I violence between 
Greece and the Turks would then set Atatürk on the path to the leadership of 
a new nation (Rustow 1991).  
In 1919 Atatürk formed the Nation Pact, defining the regions of the Straits 
and Anatolia as the borders of a Turkish nation-state (Rustow 1991). This 
vision was not shared by the Allied powers or their partners (Rustow 1991). 
Facing aggression from the Armenians in the East, the French who were 
advancing from Syria, a British occupation of Istanbul and the Sultan’s army 
who wanted to crush the republicans, Mustafa Kemal managed to hold his 
ground (Rustow 1991). 
Atatürk and his cadre also managed to hold off invasions from the Greek 
Army who had been relentlessly attacking through the Aegean in 1919, 1920, 
1921, and then again in 1922 (Rustow 1991). The Turkish nationalists held 
strong and by the autumn of 1922 all Greek and other foreign troops 
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retreated from the Straits and Anatolia (Rustow 1991). This period went down 
in the Turkish history books as the Turkish War of Independence. On the 
29th of October 1923 Mustafa Kemal proclaimed the Republic of Turkey 
(Jacoby 2006). Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was elected President as the leader of 
the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) and the 
Sultanate was abolished. He then embarked on an immense reformation 
programme of Turkey and its ex-Ottoman subjects and institutions (White 
2003).  
Atatürk became leader of a society on its knees economically and politically 
after the high costs of the Ottoman losses to its territory at the hands of the 
Allies. Despite this, Mustafa Kemal not only rehabilitated the Turkish nation, 
but most of his reforms and institution-building projects have stood the test of 
history and lasted until the present day, forming the foundation of the ‘Turkish 
Model’.  Rustow (1991: 75) underlines how Atatürk’s legacy is ‘securely 
embodied in the political institutions’ of the Turkish republic. This 
consolidation of Kemalist institution-building happened in four phases:  
“(1) a preparatory phase (ca. 1915-May 1919); (2) an experimental 
phase (November 1918-March 1924); (3) a decisional or institutional 
phase (September 1919-26); and (4) a consolidation phase (1923-
38).” 
This gradual process restructured the nation through transforming Ottoman 
institutions and the formation of a new alphabet and calendar (Rustow 1991). 
The agenda for this transformation was based on the principles of Kemalism.  
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Esen (2014: 602) offers a comprehensive explanation of Kemalism and its 
principles,  
“Kemalism, the founding ideology of the Turkish Republic, served as 
the primary framework for political conduct under the rule of the CHP. 
Named after Mustafa Kemal, it was formulated around six principles 
(known in the political jargon as “arrows”): republicanism, nationalism, 
secularism, statism, populism, and revolutionism.4 Kemalism, as a 
secular, modernizing worldview, carried a political program focused on 
building a Turkish nation-state. This state support gave Kemalism an 
inherent advantage over other ideological alternatives, ensuring its 
dominance for decades to come. Owing to this hegemonic status, 
Kemalism appropriated, co-opted, and modified a host of political 
ideas, just as various movements appealed to different aspects of 
Kemalism to conjure legitimacy for their respective agendas.” 
These principles did not officially enter the CHP political program until 1931 
Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, differing interpretations 
of Kemalism have proliferated Turkish national discourse (Esen 2014). 
Significant to Kemalism’s consolidation into the institutions of a nation-state 
was Atatürk’s agility as a political strategist.  
During the early 1920’s Atatürk managed to co-opt large numbers of the 
Ottoman elite to his nationalist cause (Esen 2014). He used the societal 
networks that had existed under the Empire to coerce loyalty to his 
leadership (Esen 2014). As he met resistance from several sections of 
society including Islamists and Kurds he used military might and populism, 
through forming the First Group, a parliamentary caucus, to root out 
opposition (Esen 2014). The formation of the People’s Party was also a 
strategy to rule out rival polities. A one-party unity bloc was a tool to 
 99 
 
disenfranchise the opposition and for Mustafa Kemal to choose a party list of 
supportive candidates. Before the election he embarked on a nation-wide 
tour to ‘turn his military prestige into political support’ (Esen 2014: 607). 
When the capital was moved from Constantinople to Ankara, it allowed 
Atatürk to draw out new provinces which would then be ‘administered by 
Ankara appointed governors’ (Esen 2014: 607). 
Atatürk employed a similar strategy of monopolizing power within the military. 
He achieved this by increasing the wages of veteran officers to ensure their 
loyalty and transferring his opponents in the military to ceremonial posts 
(Esen 2014). In 1924 Members of Parliament with a dual role as generals in 
the army were no longer able to participate in the governance process, thus 
were forced to resign (Esen 2014). The Kurdish revolt, the Sheikh Said 
rebellion of 1925, provoked the Maintenance of Order Law (Takrir-i Sükun 
Kanunu), authorizing the regime ‘to outlaw almost any opposition group’ 
(Esen 2014: 609). As a result, the rights of political organization and freedom 
of the press were suppressed. The Communist and Progressive Republican 
parties were banned (Esen 2014; Hale 2012).  
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk set a precedent for the executive’s monopolization of 
power over the political process. Keyman and Gumuscu (2014) reconnoitre 
the monopolization of power by the executive over Turkey’s political process. 
They explain how incumbents in Turkey, such as the AKP, monopolize power 
over the democratization process to form ‘electoral hegemony’. They theorize 
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this concept as 'power fusion': 'the presence of a strong executive that rules 
with a majoritarian impulse and relies extensively on an electoral, rather than 
pluralist understanding of democracy'. Keyman and Gumuscu’s study into the 
ruling mechanism of the AKP’s ‘Turkish Model’ explains the Machiavellian 
nature of Mustafa Kemal’s rise to power. 
For Atatürk, monopolizing power was a necessity to modernize and 
consolidate both the Turkish state and the institutions that would define it 
throughout the twentieth century. These were guided by Atatürk’s ‘arrows’, or 
Kemalist principles. The instruments of the ‘Turkish Model’, Atatürk’s ‘arrows’ 
have been temporally continuous institutions of the Turkish nation-state 
throughout the twentieth and twenty-first century. Thus, they form the 
foundation of the ‘Turkish Model’. Nonetheless,  
“Kemalist principles are schematic and offer guidance for political 
activity rather than strict prescriptions, thus they frame political debate 
without actually determining it.”  
(Glyptis 2007: 36) 
During the twenty-first century the role of Atatürk’s ‘arrows’ within Turkish 
politics altered. Competing forces to the ‘arrows’ such as neo-liberalism and 
globalization took the leading role in restructuring Turkish institutions. 
Nationalist discourse around the Kemalist principles has had to adapt to a 
globalizing economy, the growing agency and power of Islamic organizations, 
and most recently the power of the ‘new money’ Islamic conservative 
Anatolian bourgeoisie. Analysing the ‘arrows’ of Kemalism and their impact 
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on institution-building and Turkish society is an effectual way to reconnoitre 
the history of nation-building in Turkey. The Kemalist principles were the 
yardstick that set the Republic on the path to ‘model status’. 
 
4.4 The First Republic 
 
 
Republicanism (cumhuriyetçilik) 
 
“...today (in 1930), the ideal of democracy resembles a rising sea...the 
20th century has seen many a tyrannical regime drown in that sea.”  
-Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
(Cited in Cornell & Karaveli 2008: 14)⁠  
  
For Mustafa Kemal, republicanism was the sole engine with the ability to lift 
the Turkish nation out of the despair the loss of the Empire had caused. He 
also saw it as an inevitable path in the empowerment of the Turkish nation 
(Glyptis 2007). Republicanism would provide the blueprint for the 
foundational institutions of the Turkish nation-state to best represent the 
‘wishes of the people’ (Stone 1998). The birth of republicanism in Turkey is 
recognized on the 23rd of April 1920, the date of the inauguration of the 
Grand National Assembly in Ankara (The Atatürk Society of Canada 2016). 
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Atatürk, despite being an advocate for a model of ‘government through the 
will of the people, parliamentary elections, rotation of office and popular 
sovereignty’ did not secure a transition to democracy during his incumbency 
(The Atatürk Society of Canada 2016).  
Atatürk tailored a constitution to emulate those of European republican 
states. The constitution would consolidate republicanism as the political 
creed of the Turkish sovereign state. The first constitution of the republic, the 
1924 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, articulated the fundamental 
statutes regarding the political processes of the state and its relation to its 
citizens (Ünsal 1979). The first constitution remained in place until 1961. The 
implementation of the 1924 Constitution provided the legislative framework to 
transform all six ‘arrows’ into political mechanisms, thereby providing 
governing agents a blueprint for the modernization of Turkish society (Ünsal 
1979).  
Resembling an excerpt from the constitution of any European modern liberal 
democracy, the 1924 Constitution established the normative constraints of 
the state:  
“Inviolability of person; freedom of conscience, freedom of thought, of 
speech, of press; freedom of travel and of contract; freedom of labour; 
freedom of private property, of assembly, of association; freedom of 
incorporation, are among the natural rights of all Turks.”  
(Article 40 of the 1924 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey) 
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When analysing the political arrangements of the 1924 Constitution a 
palpable shortcoming emerges in the extensive mandate of the executive 
branch. There is enough evidence to suggest this was a pivotal mechanism 
in Mustafa Kemal’s monopolization of power. The political processes and 
institutions codified in the constitution included:  
the formation of an elected Grand National Assembly holding 
legislative and executive power; an elected President who would then 
have the power to select a cabinet and held supreme command of the 
army; an independent judiciary; voting rights for every male citizen 
over the age of 18; an outline of the separation and checks and 
balances of power; and a procedure for the amendment of the 
constitution  
(Earle 1925; Ünsal 1979). 
Superficially, the 1924 Constitution was functional and democratic. 
Nevertheless, rather than consolidating democracy, the 1924 Constitution 
consolidated Kemalism as the etymological foundation of the political 
language of the state continuing well into the AKP’s tenure in the early 21st 
century (Glyptis 2007). It is the AKP’s pressing for a re-definition of Kemalism 
within the institutions of the state which moves the ‘Turkish Model’ apart from 
any other mode of political reproduction in Turkey’s history (Glyptis 2007).  
The sanctity of the Kemalist ‘arrows’ and their later insertion into the 1924 
Constitution, made it easy to condemn those who questioned them. 
Opponents of Kemalist discourse were marginalized and often criminalized 
as traitors to the sovereignty of the nation (Glyptis 2007; Weiker 1981).  
Therefore, critics of the 1924 Constitution have argued that it was a way of 
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ensuring the power of the establishment and marginalizing dissenting sectors 
of society. Cook (2007) frames the rights and freedom codified in the 1924 
Constitution as a ‘pseudo democratic facade’. These freedoms and rights 
were maintained solely to appease various societal actors.  
Cook (2007) explains in its infancy the Turkish Republic offered the new 
independent post-Ottoman nations of the Arab region a model of how to 
control society through political tools and militarism. Leaders of newly 
independent states that followed this model included Egypt’s Free Officers 
and Algeria’s Colonel Houari Boumedienne. Emulating the Kemalist model, 
the leaders of these nations developed constitutions with strong executives, 
ensuring the maintenance and consolidation of their power. This Kemalist 
model was characterized by single-party rule, a legislative framework limiting 
political participation, and military control over state-institutions. The military 
control over state-institutions in the Turkish Republic would ensure the 
completion of the Kemalist revolution and evoke a culture of fear of being 
‘othered’ as anti-Turkish (Cook 2007). 
The military were the ultimate defenders of the republican state and the 
Constitution. The Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, TSK) at this 
point had evolved from the squadrons who had abandoned the Ottoman 
army to join the Kemalist revolution and had become the defenders of the 
Grand National Assembly in Ankara during the War of Independence (Akşin 
2000). War hero Fevzi Pasha Çakmak became the Chief of General Staff of 
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the TSK (Zürcher 2005). A confidante of Atatürk, he had carte blanche in the 
management of the TSK (Zürcher 2005). His management of the Armed 
Forces was characterized by authoritarianism and austere measures. 
The Turkish nation was fragmented and economically weak after the War of 
Independence and the Kemalist political elite regarded a well-disciplined and 
united Armed Force as essential to the maintenance of law and order. 
Çakmak had a monopoly over the TSK enrolment process, the TSK 
curriculum and over the promotion of ranks (Haynes 2010). This meant that 
the officer corps was routinely purged of Kurds and conservative Muslims 
disloyal to Turkish nationalism (Haynes 2010). A unique unified force in a 
polarized society, the TSK has historically sustained cohesion and 
‘organizational integrity’ within its ranks despite the religious, ethnic, cultural 
and economic divisions in Turkish society (Haynes 2010). 
The authoritarian culture within the army was not limited to its ranks. The 
political terrain was also dominated by the authoritarian culture of the TSK 
(Haynes 2010). Enshrined in the 1924 Constitution was the role of the Armed 
Forces as the ultimate defender of the Constitution. This structured the TSK 
as the ‘hyper-secular’ protector of the Kemalist revolution (Haynes 2010). 
The Kurdish revolt of 1925, and the resulting Law of Maintaining Order 
effectively turned the First Republic into a military regime governed by martial 
law (Foss 2014). The TSK at this point gained the authority to shut down 
political parties and organizations (Haynes 2010). This was a huge blow to 
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the opposition, and Turkey became a single party state until the 1950s. The 
culture of military authoritarianism continued to dominate the Turkish 
Republic throughout the twentieth century. 
“The long-term structural effect on politics of aggressive secularization 
and military significance has significantly influenced the country’s 
political culture and made it difficult to develop an emphatically 
democratic regime.”  
(Haynes 2010) 
 
Not until over ten years after the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (10th 
November 1938) did republicanism achieve its raison d'etre, the democratic 
representation of the people as agents of political change. Through the late 
1930s and 1940s the Kemalist revolution was sustained through the 
leadership of Mustafa İsmet İnönü (Miller et al. 2012). İnönü’s incumbency 
constituted increasingly repressive and authoritarian policies, one-party rule, 
and radical transformations for the sole benefit of a minority of elite stake-
holders (Miller et al. 2012). The 1940’s were the antithesis of democracy, 
nevertheless, the will of the people eventually prevailed and 1950 witnessed 
a defining parameter in the Republican ‘arrow’ of the Kemalist revolution 
(Miller et al. 2012).   
In 1950 multi-party free and fair elections with universal suffrage were held 
for the first time in the Turkish Republic. Voting participation was at 89% for 
this election, and averaged around 76% for the 1950-1980 period, far above 
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the figures recorded for Western-European democracies during the same 
period (Rustow 1970). The Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP), was 
formed in 1946 by ex-CHP members who advocated for a more liberal 
economic policy.  
The DP won the 1950 election (Rustow 1970). Celâl Bayar became President 
of the Republic and Adnan Menderes became Prime Minister (Rustow 1970). 
Liberalizing the economy was not the only DP achievement, as there was an 
increased atmosphere of religious tolerance during the Democrat 
incumbency (Rustow 1970). 
One of the DP’s first legislative measures was the legalization of the call to 
prayer in Arabic (Rustow 1970). This opened the political space to Islamic 
conservatives who had been marginalized by İnönü and Atatürk. Empowered 
by democracy and religious freedom, protest and dissent grew amongst 
certain quarters of society. During the late 1950s, elite control had come 
under threat by the increased agency of the subaltern (Rustow 1970). The 
DP government reverted to implementing the repressive and despotic 
policies of the 1940s with aim to dominate the parameters of governance. For 
the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic, on the 27th of May 1960, 
the TSK exercised their power to defend the sanctity of the Constitution. A 
military coup removed DP domination.  This induced the birth of the Second 
Republic in 1961. The Second Republic was marked by further 
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authoritarianism, instability and ethnic conflict resulting in an increasingly 
fortifying mode of political reproduction by Turkey’s rulers (Rustow 1970). 
Republicanism, although not immediately fostering a democratic transition, 
tailored the Republic’s political institutions with the mechanisms to produce a 
democracy. Accordingly, the implementation of the 1924 Constitution 
signified the stability of the political process.  State-military relations were 
articulated in the 1924 Constitution, standardizing the dominant role of the 
executive and military in the political process. Hence, the Kemalist 
constitutional model became the prevailing constitutional model to follow for 
the military leaders of Arab nations. For these leaders, a strong-executive 
and military whose parameters of power were sanctified by a constitution 
would provide a monopolizing mechanism to maintain law and order as they 
consolidated their newly independent states.   
The uniqueness of Turkey's power fusion process lies in the disparity of the 
political class-rural, urban, Islamist, Kemalist which provides on the surface 
high levels of democracy. Nonetheless, competition between these actors 
has further facilitated the monopolization of power by any given ruling actor. 
International actors have been crucial to the acceleration of the post-Cold 
War democratic process. The most prudent of these is the European Union 
(EU), where economic liberalization and increased trade has encouraged 
democratic values.  
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Populism (halkçılık) 
 
“Who is the “effendi” [the steward and master] of this nation? Well, 
Turkey’s backbone, indeed, the ultimate master of the land is the 
“köylü” — the peasant, who produces our food, and fights our wars.” 
-Mustafa Kemal Atatürk  
(Cited in Özmeral 2012: 16) 
  
The Kemalist concept of populism was the tool of penetrating the masses 
with the dogma of social revolution. Citizen-government relations transformed 
with the onset of the First Republic. Ottoman subjects who had little agency 
under the Empire became Turkish citizens with full equality and the agency to 
influence the future of the nation regardless of their background or gender 
(Stone 1998).  
“Populism in the Atatürkist mould simply means that Kemalism is 
against class privileges and class distinctions and it recognizes no 
individual, no family, and no organizations as being above others. 
Hence, in this context Kemalism is a discourse centred around Turkish 
citizenship with a set of disclosures exhorting the people to achieve a 
sense of unity and national identity.”  
(Stone 1998: 27) 
Secularism and republicanism, by the ideological mandate of Kemalism, 
were the mechanisms to empower, penetrate and control the public. The 
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modern notion of ‘citizenship’ was standardized through a secular and 
republican system which was non-discriminatory and treated all Turks as 
equals within the eyes of the law. In the eyes of the Kemalists, equality and 
popular participation could only come about through a social contract 
between citizens and the state, not the parochial control of a Shariah system 
(Stone 1998).   
Several reforms immortalized the concept of citizenship in the Turkish mind 
set. The first of these was the replacement of the Ministry of Shariat with the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs, emancipating citizens from Islamic law 
(Ulutas 2010). Accordingly, a new civil code removed the Ottoman system for 
family, marriage and property. These reforms culminated in the annulment of 
Islam as the official religion of the Republic in April 1928 (Ulutas 2010). The 
rollback of religion at the time was influenced by Europeans (Hyland 2008). 
The European nation-states renegotiation of power relations and the newly 
defined parameter of church-society relations across the continent provided a 
model to follow for the Kemalists.  
The nation-states to most influence Turkey during this period was France, 
Italy and the Soviet Union. The Turkish penal code was a replica of the Italian 
model (Earle 1925; Ünsal 1979). The civil code was a replica of the Swiss 
model (Zürcher 2005). The school curriculum was influenced by the French 
and German model and included French novels and French and German 
philosophy (Zürcher 2005). Standardizing modern education as a right of all 
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citizens, where they could learn the European concepts of modernism and 
liberalism corresponded a liberating pedagogy in Kemalist dogma. Enabling 
social mobility and active citizenship would contribute to the modernization of 
society (Zürcher 2005).  
Atatürk was adamant that it was necessary to educate women and girls. For 
Mustafa Kemal, women had an equal role to men as active citizens of the 
nation-state (Foss 2014). To set a precedent for the rest of society to follow, 
in the 1920s Mustafa Kemal adopted four girls. He encouraged his daughters 
to become as educated as possible. The most famous of his daughters, 
Sabiha Gökçen, became the first Turkish female combat pilot. Today, one of 
Istanbul’s two international airports carries her name, Istanbul Sabiha 
Gökçen International Airport. Another one of his daughters, Professor Ayşe 
Afet İnan, became a world-renowned historical scholar and anthropologist. 
She was a founding member of the Turkish Historical Society and was a 
pioneer in reinvigorating Turkish nationalism (Foss 2014).  
It is important to note, however, that the enabling of academic or professional 
success of the daughters of state rulers is not a reflection of the 
emancipation of those women, or any women at all within the state. In many 
instances the daughters of state rulers can themselves worsen the position of 
women through their roles.  Despite being portrayed as free and powerful,  
“There remained, however, a large discrepancy between formal rights 
and the social position of women in Turkey. Women were perceived 
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as mothers of the republic and as blind supporters of Atatürk’s one-
party government and his CHP.” 
(Binder and Richman 2012) 
 
Nonetheless there was measurable success for the societal position of 
women at this time. For example, Atatürk pushed for several legislative 
measures to ensure the increased role of women in Turkish society and the 
political process. In April 1930, suffrage for women in municipal elections and 
their right to stand in them were adopted as law (Earle 1925; Ünsal 1979). 
Full suffrage for women in national elections and their right to stand for 
national office was achieved in December 1935 (Earle 1925; Ünsal, 1979). 
The first female deputies were elected to the General National Assembly in 
March 1935 (Earle 1925; Ünsal 1979). 
The Kemalist populist project safeguarded individual citizenship rights and 
attempted to tailor a collective Turkish consciousness in tune with the 
European ideal of a modern and engaged general public who actively 
participated in society. However, it is important to note that life in the first 
Republic was far from utopic. In reality, only those who agreed to make a 
social contract with the Kemalist nature of the state could benefit from the 
new opportunities that arose from the Republic’s modern laws and 
institutions. Problems particularly arose for actors who did not ascribe to the 
Kemalist vision of the ‘Turkish nation’ in and of itself, thereby, disqualifying 
their citizenship ‘rights’.  
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Historically, women had been disembedded from the political system; the 
essence of the Kemalist project was to embed those from society historically 
outcast by Ottomanism into the Republic through populism. The aim of this 
was to compete for their loyalties by giving them a stake in the Kemalist 
populist project, through education and empowerment. Thereby, thrashing 
any ability of peer polities to command their loyalty. Nonetheless, this created 
a new security dilemma for Turkey’s Kemalists, as the more empowered and 
educated women became, the less they consented to the status quo. This 
explains their key role in the collapse of the first and second republic.  
 
Nationalism (milliyetçilik) 
 
“Peace at home, peace in the world.” 
-Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
(Cited in Young, Zuelow, & Sturm 2007: 96) 
 
Inevitable in every newly independent nation-state is a nationalist discourse 
(Stone 1998). Stone (1998: 27) defines Kemalist nationalism as the “principle 
that the Turkish state is an indivisible whole comprising its territory and 
people.” Kemalist nationalism recognizes a common Turkish culture and the 
right of the Turkish people to the lands of Anatolia and the Straits as set out 
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by Mustafa Kemal after the War of Independence (The Atatürk Society of 
Canada 2016).  A central theme of Kemalist nationalist dogma is the concept 
of duty to the nation, and the common goals of the ‘arrows’ which would 
modernize the Turkish nation. For Mustafa Kemal, the ancient Turkish people 
were the cradle of civilization and had achieved greatness, and their 
descendants were destined to achieve greatness once again30.  
Collective memory is the essence of all nation-building projects. At one fell 
swoop, 'apparent difference' is countered, by an emergent discourse of self-
identity and otherness, thereby connecting the 'unconnected' (Massad 2001). 
Illuminating themes on construction of the nation state Massad (2001) 
explains, “The nation's commitment to the preservation of a traditional 
national culture carried through from the past and its project of technological 
modernization as the present goal to be achieved in the future place the 
nation on a synchronic temporal continuum.” (Massad 2001: 9) 
Researching and reaching a common consensus over Turkish history was 
the Kemalist’s first step to building a national identity and it was through this 
history that several of Atatürk’s nationalist aims would be met. These aims 
were: to justify Anatolia as the home of the Turkish nation, to strengthen the 
                                                     
30 Comparisons can be drawn between Ataturk and Hitler; in fact, Hitler was greatly 
influenced by Ataturk (Ihrig 2014). As both felt their nations were treated badly by the victors 
of WWI, they mobilized their nations on ethnic lines to be able to overcome what they felt 
were the injustices brought upon them by the WWI allies (Foss 2014).  However, unlike 
Hitler, Ataturk was anti-war, pro-democracy and did not want to agitate the West.  
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idea of secularism as part of Turkish national consciousness and to pit it as 
an ‘equal’ amongst great nations thus elevating Turkey’s ancestry as the 
architects of modern civilization along with the Ancient Greeks and Romans 
(Özmen 2015). It was also important to Atatürk that his investment in this 
new history would dismiss what he deemed were fallacies present at the time 
in Western discourse about Turkey (Foss 2014). These fallacies included the 
ideas that the Turkish people were not Aryan and were uncivilized with no 
ancestral right to Anatolia (Foss 2014). Awareness of the aims of Atatürk’s 
new history in the formation of a Turkish consciousness and a source of 
national pride is essential for grasping the construction of ‘Turkishness’ in the 
First Republic. 
History was a priority within the Kemalist educational and research institution 
formation process (Özmen 2015). The 4240 law on the History of the 
Revolution was codified on the 15th April, 1942 (Özmen 2015). This law made 
history a compulsory school subject throughout the educational curriculum. 
The history curriculum was based on the Ministry of Culture’s ‘History’ 
textbook (Foss 2014). The textbook explained that all civilizations evolved 
from Turkish civilization or were influenced by it (Foss 2014). Turkish 
civilization had originated in Eurasia, and the textbook included a map of 
central Asia with routes of how the Turks had dispersed around the globe 
from there (Foss 2014; Guvenc-Salgirli 2010). 
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The textbook was preoccupied with the ‘New History Thesis’ a Kemalist 
constructed historical narrative of the roots of Turkish civilization (Guvenc-
Salgirli 2010). The ‘New History Thesis’ engineered the historical claim that 
the Turks were the first nation to build a civilization (Guvenc-Salgirli, 2010). 
This civilization started near a sea between the Caucasus and Tien Shan 
(Foss 2014). The history thesis explained that by 10,000 BC the Turks had 
settled and were living off the harvest of the land and animals (Foss 2014). 
Another engineered claim was that the Turks were the first nation in history to 
develop metal work and agriculture (Foss 2014). The ‘New History Thesis’ 
produced a historical narrative the Turkish people could be proud of; through 
a pioneering history that constructed their ancestral home as the cradle of 
civilization.  
The ‘New History Thesis’ paved the way for linguists to synchronize the 
Turks ‘historical mission’ with an ideological reminiscence of the etymological 
foundations of the Turkic/Turan languages. This engineered etymology 
claimed all languages have a Turkish origin. Accordingly, a historical 
discourse on the trans-historical dissemination of the Turkic language and 
civilization was produced (Guvenc-Salgirli 2010). The historical narrative on 
the dissemination of Turkic was that in the final years of the Ice Age, the 
environment of Central Asia rapidly changed (Foss 2014). The land was no 
longer fit for agricultural production and the Turks became environmental 
refugees and nomads who dispersed across the continents (Foss 2014). 
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Once settled again in various geographic locations the Turkic peoples 
founded the origins of the Hun and Scythian Empires, their influence 
stretching to India and China (Foss 2014).   
One of the most fundamental ‘research’ developments of the ‘New History 
Thesis’ was the ‘discovery’ that the Sumerians were ‘in fact’ the Turks of the 
Near East, therefore Sumerian Turks had invented the first writing system 
(Foss 2014). The epistemological foundations behind these claims were 
published by Ahmet Cevat Emre (Aytürk 2004). He stated that both the 
Sumerians and Mesopotamians had originated from Central Asia. Since 
neither Sumer or Turkic had Indo-European or Semitic routes they therefore 
had the same route, Turkic (Aytürk 2004). Historical linguists attempted to 
validate the claim of Turkish origins for the words Iran, Aryan and Eire. All 
three of the names for these nations were simply metaphors for the Turkish 
words ‘er’ and ‘man’ (Foss 2014). The ‘New History Thesis’ enabled 
historians to frame historiography with ‘Turkishness’ at the centre. Through 
the history thesis, any nomadic people could be identified as having Turkic 
origins. 
A priority of the engineers of Kemalism’s nationalist dogma was that the ‘New 
History Thesis’ reflect the Turkish nation’s indisputable right to the land of 
Anatolia. Central to their claim to this land was the history of the Hittites 
whose formative civilizational stages took place in Anatolia around 1600BC 
(Foss 2014). The Hittite civilization communicated in a language with a close 
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etymology to Sumerian Turkish (Foss 2014). This enabled Kemalist 
historians to claim the Turkic peoples were the ancestors and descendants of 
the Hittites and by default the indigenous people of Anatolia.  
The ‘New Turkish History Thesis’ was not just the history studies component 
of the tertiary education system. The ‘New Turkish History Thesis’ was 
‘official doctrine’ and delineated the historiography and self-determining 
claims of the Turkish Republic. Mustafa Kemal ensured that there was a 
substantial amount of investment into historical research. He held three 
Turkish History Congresses, one in 1932, one in 1934 and in 1937 to 
expound the ‘New Turkish History Thesis’ to international experts and the 
press (Guvenc-Salgirli 2010). The September 1937 History Congress 
attracted over 400 attendees. Many of the delegates were teachers and 
Western academics (Foss 2014). Atatürk sought to both popularize and 
institutionalize the ‘New Turkish History Thesis’ thereby reinforcing consent 
through patriotism and forming a Kemalist hegemony in the new nation-state.  
Atatürk developed and restructured several institutions to ensure the 
standardization of the ‘New Turkish History Thesis’ doctrine. The most 
notable of these was the Turkish Historical Society, established in 1935, 
which is an active research body that has continued to produce research until 
the current day (Foss 2014). In 1935, Atatürk inaugurated a new university in 
Ankara, the Language, History and Geography Faculty (Foss 2014). This 
university provided taught programmes in languages that were deemed to 
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have Turkic etymology (Foss 2014). This included Sumerian, Akkadian, 
Chinese and Hindi (Foss 2014). Mustafa Kemal also invested heavily in 
archaeological excavations. This was a dark point in Kemalist history as the 
excavations were used to draw blood samples from human fossil to 
substantiate the claim that Turks were Aryan (Guvenc-Salgirli 2010). Another 
low point occurred in the formative stages of Mustafa Kemal’s nation-building 
project in 1933. At this time 187 out of 240 academics from Istanbul 
University lost their positions for criticizing the ‘New Turkish History Thesis’ 
(Foss 2014).  
The ‘New Turkish History Thesis’ was accompanied by the ‘Turkish 
Language Thesis’, both of which became the main frame of reference within 
the state for the formative stage of the hybridity between the Turkic peoples 
and the antiquities of the West (Aytürk 2004). Fundamental to ‘Turkish 
Language Thesis’ was the sun-language theory of the Turkish Language 
Institute (Türk Dili Tetkik) formed by Samih Rifat, which became part of the 
active discourse of the state in 1936 (Aytürk 2004). Influenced by the 
research methodology of 19th century European psychoanalysts such as 
Sigmund Freud and Carl Gustav Jung, the theory purported that all 
languages originated from Ancient Turkish (Aytürk 2004). In Rifat's opinion 
this was because each correspondence between sounds and their meaning 
had been initiated during Ancient Turkish civilization (Aytürk 2004). 
Worshipping the sun had provoked the use of language as part of ritual. 
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Consequently, academics in the new republic could provide evidence for the 
connection of the Turkic peoples and any other nation that had once prayed 
to the sun (Aytürk 2004). This theory would further instil, sustain and enforce 
patriotism amongst the public. 
Aytürk (2004) summarizes the use of language and history in the Kemalist 
nationalist project. He explains the radical shift from the Ottoman Empire to 
the Turkish Republic was a colossal change from one civilization to the next. 
In one fell swoop, the new Turkish polity had to demonstrate its validity and 
historical legitimacy in an era of mass social change. The Kemalist nationalist 
project would be the reincarnation of the forgotten grandmother of Western 
civilization, the Turkish nation. Framing the Ancient Turkish nation as a 
civilizational pioneer would give Turkish citizens a sense of ‘national pride’ 
and loyalty no matter their social class (Aytürk 2004). 
Researching the history and influence of the Turkish language was not the 
only mandate of the Turkish Language Institute. To the Kemalists the future 
trajectory of the Turkish language was as vital as instilling a sense of pride in 
its past. Standardizing a modern Turkish vocabulary that would be tenable in 
a developing Westernizing nation was the ultimate priority of linguists and 
this would be at the core of the nation-building project (Aytürk 2004). 
In the opinion of the Kemalists, Ottoman Turkish was archaic and obsolete. 
Most of the nationalist elite had been educated in European languages and 
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felt that it was necessary to modernize the Turkish language to befit 
European standards (Aytürk 2004). In May 1928 the Latin alphabet and 
numerals were adopted to replace Ottoman Arabic (Ünsal 1979). In 1932 the 
Turkish Language Institute was mandated to 'purify' the Turkish language 
(Aytürk 2004). Accordingly, there was a ‘cleansing’ of words deemed to hold 
a non-Turkish etymology (Aytürk 2004). Modern standard Turkish became 
the official language of the Republic and was injected throughout the 
educational curricula. Mustafa Kemal was passionate about the literacy of the 
Republic's citizens, for him, improved literacy in modern Turkish would 
guarantee the involvement of all Turks as engineers of social change in the 
great Turkish nation (Aytürk 2004). Atatürk also believed the creation of an 
official modern standard language would ensure the fortification of Kemalism 
in the diverse Republic where a multitude of languages were spoken. 
Consequently, the language rights of Kurds, Greeks, Armenians, Laz, Arabs 
and other ethnic groups became compromised and blocked.  
Language rights were not the only minority rights that were compromised 
through the Kemalist nationalist project. A moot point in the academic 
literature on Turkish nationalism is regarding the inclusiveness of Kemalism's 
ethnification project and how much it marginalized or encompassed 
minorities.  Some researchers such as Tepe (2008) and Foss (2014) suggest 
that Kemalism discriminated against non-Muslims, much as the Ottoman 
Caliphate had done.  Declaring irredentism, a danger to peace and security, 
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Turkish nationalism became an othering discourse through which Christians, 
Kurdish nationalists and other minorities were reframed not only as outsiders 
but as a threat to the sovereignty of the nation. The First Republic, like the 
formation of most nations, was not founded through non-violence. 
Another school of the literature is sympathetic to the nationalist raison d'être 
of the Kemalists. Scholars such as Aytürk (2011) and Kösebalaban (2011) 
route the origins of Turkish nationalism in the refugee crisis which plagued 
the Balkan wars. This body of literature focuses on the construction of 
Anatolia as a refuge for Muslims fleeing from religious conflict in Eastern 
European and Russia. Thereby, there was an emphasis on the Islamic 
character of 'Turkishness' by the Kemalist elite. This was reflected in 
Atatürk's words at the Grand National Assembly in 1920,  
“The people who are present here and constitute the Great Parliament 
are not only Turks, Circassian, Kurdish or Laz. They are an honest 
community comprised of the elements of Islam….The unity that we are 
determined to construct is not for Turks or Circassians only but for the 
entire elements of Islam.”  
(Kösebalaban 2011: kindle Loc 1108 of 6250) 
Aytürk, (2011) notes that Kemalism was a cosmopolitan ideology in 
comparison with the vertical social relations dogma dominant in the lion’s 
share of European states in the early twentieth century. Turkish Jews for 
example, received comparably better treatment than Jews in Europe. Aytürk, 
(2011) also explains far more dangerous racist ideologies were emerging in 
Turkey than Kemalism. The scholarship on Kemalism's ethnification project is 
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polarized. Nonetheless, it is clear that ethnic conflict played a central role in 
the construction, sustainability and enforcement of Turkish nationalism.  
The transgenerational trauma of the Turkish people due to the loss of the 
Balkans (Rumeli) by the Ottoman Empire between 1911 and 1913 cannot be 
underestimated (Zürcher 2005). This region had been part of the Ottoman 
Empire for 500 years. This transgenerational trauma created a feeling of 
mistrust of Christians and Jews amongst many Turks. It also made statehood 
a necessary protection for those who self-defined as Turks who had been 
ethnically cleansed from Eastern Europe. Most of the architects of Kemalism, 
including Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, were in fact refugees (muhacireen) from 
the areas that had been annexed by the Western powers in this period 
(Zürcher 2005). There was a feeling amongst the refugees that Anatolia was 
the 'Turk's last stand' (Zürcher 2005). This feeling was not exclusive to 
Kemalists and was shared by its opponents such as Nâzım Hikmet Ran 
(Zürcher, 2005). His poem Davet (The Plea), articulates the theme of 
Anatolia as a haven for the unity of the Turkish people and the end of the 
domination and oppression of their history: 
Davet (The Plea) 
“Galloping forth from far off Asia 
stretching like a mare’s head into the Mediterranean 
this country is ours 
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Wrists bloodied, teeth clenched, feet bare 
and like a silken rug 
this hell, this heaven is ours 
 
Let doors of bondage be closed, never to open again 
abolish man’s subjection to man 
this plea is ours 
 
To live unique and free like a single tree 
and like a forest in fraternity 
this yearning is ours” 
(Gencer 2015) 
The words of another poet cited in Zürcher, (2005), Yahya Kemal Beyalti, a 
native of Skopje, really relay the feelings of loss over the Balkans and the 
need for a homeland amongst the muhacireen: 
Açık Deniz (High Seas) 
“When I passed my youth in Balkan towns 
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I felt a yearning with every breath I took. 
Byron's sad melancholy ruled my heart then. 
In youth's daydreams I roamed the mountains; 
Breathed the free air of Rakofça's fields. 
I felt the passion of my raiding ancestors: 
Every summer, for centuries, a run to the North 
That has left a thundering echo in my breast.”  
(Zürcher 2005: 387) 
 
The dominant culture during the formative stages of Turkish nation-building 
was hegemonized by romanticising the history of struggle of Turkic refugees. 
Absent from the hegemonic discourse was of course the role the muhacirs 
from the Balkans and the Caucasus had in the expulsion and ethnic 
cleansing of ethnic Armenians and Greeks from the Straits and Anatolia 
(Zürcher 2005). These expulsions were 'justified' by the 'falsified' 'historical' 
claims that there was a link between the Turkic peoples and the ancient 
civilizations of Anatolia such as the Hittites. This refuted the claims of other 
ethnic groups such as Greeks, Armenians and Kurds to the land, “...whose 
earth had been coloured red by the blood of the martyrs since the first 
Turkish conquest in 1071.” (Zürcher 2005: 389) This constructed a binary 
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between Turks and non-Turks and this binary would perpetuate a cycle of 
violence.  
Indeed, the Turkish Republic was consolidated through a campaign of 
violence. Mustafa Kemal was a military man and the War of Independence 
was won through a campaign of bloodshed. The remnants of the Armenian 
people who had already suffered genocide at the hands of the Young Turks 
and Ottomans during World War I were further ethnically cleansed from the 
Republic during the War of Independence. The 1922 defeat of the Greek 
military operation across the Aegean had culminated in the ethnic cleansing 
of 750,000 ethnic Greeks from Turkey (Zürcher 2005). The 1923 Lausanne 
Agreement saw the forced deportation of the remnants of the ethnic Greeks 
from Turkey. Greek Muslims were also ethnically cleansed from Greece 
(Zürcher 2005).  The legitimacy gained through the ‘New History Thesis and 
New Language Thesis’ provided the Kemalist elite an ideological mandate to 
secure Anatolia as the permanent home of the Turkish people with infallible 
borders by any means necessary. Instilling a sense of national pride would 
reinforce Turkish identity and allegiance to the Kemalism. Nevertheless, 
those who did not self-identify as Turks were othered and marginalized and 
constructed through nationalist hegemonic discourse as the antithesis of 
modernization (Zürcher 2005). 
The Kemalists were as concerned about the external threats to the nationalist 
project as they were the internal. Despite their fortifying behaviour, to mitigate 
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the vertical security dilemma, they believed that at least a small level of 
alliance-building with horizontal peer polities was necessary to maintain the 
security and stability of the Turkish nation-state. Thus, new international 
alliances were formed by the Republic in the post-World War I era. The era 
was a time of rapid change where new threats emerged such as communism 
and fascism. The final years of the Ottoman Empire paved the way to the 
restructuring of power in the international system. The defeat of the Empire 
opened space for the emergence of new superpowers.  The Kemalist 
trajectory received increasing validation from the West and the alliances 
formed during the First Republic would stay solid throughout the next 
century.  
For Turkey's Western allies, Kemalism was a favourable ideology. Pro-
Western and secular at its core, the allies could be assured that an Islamic 
civilization would not resurface in the European vicinity to threaten the 
colonial modern Western way of life. Turkey, in a stage of increasing 
liminality, was turning its back on the Arab region, this gave the Allies a carte 
blanche at manipulating events in the new Arab independent nations. 
The main objective of Kemalist nationalism was to ensure the Turkish nation-
state was consolidated as an indivisible whole with indisputable borders 
comprising the territories of the Straits and Anatolia. This territory would 
encompass a great people, the Turks, whom the Kemalists believed were the 
ancient architects of civilization itself and were set for a grandiose future. The 
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construction of a national-identity that Turks could be proud of was a priority 
for the Kemalist elite; resulting in major investment in historical research and 
linguistics. This national identity would be institutionalized through a modern 
standard Turkish language that 'cleansed' it of other influences such as 
Arabic.   
A legacy of ethnic conflict during the Balkan Wars had bolstered the 
Kemalists determination to build a safe-space in Anatolia and the Straits that 
all Muslims who wished to self-define as Turks could call home.  Those who 
did not self-define or ascribe to Turkish nationalism had no place in the new 
Turkish nation-state and were ‘othered’ and marginalized. 
 
Some Further Remarks on NATO 
 
 
A core component of the AKP’s 'Turkish Model' is its role in the international 
system as a Western-allied state with a Muslim majority where Western 
values such as democracy are the status quo. The history behind Turkey's 
role in the US/European axis and the growing influence of the US in the early 
twentieth century will be explored below. 
Mustafa Kemal was a firm believer in international peace through action 
rather than neutrality (Mango 2000). Under his leadership Turkey was an 
active member of the League of Nations. Measures taken by the Turkish 
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state as a member included taking part in the sanctions of Italy under 
Mussolini and the Balkan Pact (Mango 2000). Yet, it would be after Atatürk’s 
death and during World War II the Cold War that Turkey's role in international 
politics would expand.  
İsmet İnönü replaced Atatürk as president in 1939, at the onset of WWII. 
İnönü was lobbied by both the Allies and Axis31 to join the War as part of their 
alliance. Nonetheless, İnönü continued with Atatürk’s policy of neutrality, 
particularly because of the way that the Turks had suffered during WWI 
(Olson 1977).  This suited the Allies well up until 1942, as Turkish neutrality 
blocked the expansion of the Nazis into the resource-rich Middle East. Yet, 
Axis gains during the first few years of war began to worry the Allies who 
then pressed Turkey to militarize the Balkans. The Nazis continued to incept 
and penetrate Turkish society during the War, playing on the nationalist 
sympathies of the Kemalists with the hopes of creating public support for an 
alliance with the Axis powers (Olson 1977).  
However, once Turkey was invited to join the UN if they joined the Allies, they 
declared war on the Axis in February 1945. İnönü was also promised 
economic aid and most importantly, assurance that Turkey would be 
defended by the Western Allies in case of aggression from the USSR (Olson 
                                                     
31 The Axis powers included Nazi Germany, Italy, Japan, Hungary, Romania plus Bulgaria 
and  the Allies included the US, Britain, France, USSR, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
China, Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa and 
Yugoslavia. 
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1977). The biggest concern of the Kemalists during WWII had continued to 
be Soviet expansionism, particularly in the Straits and Dardanelles. The 
promise of defence by the US and UK in case of Russian invasion set the 
precedent of the West as allies in Kemalist foreign policy. The Truman 
Doctrine in effect married Turkey to the US with binding conditions in return 
for military and financial aid (Olson 1977).  
Yet, Harris (1971: 9-30) asserts that a differing perspective is that the US 
were the greater threat than the USSR, and the Russian ‘menace’ had in fact 
diminished through direct diplomacy between Turkey’s and the USSR’s 
leaders in the late 1940s. 
IR scholar Barın Kayaoğlu (2009) offers a comprehensive insight into 
Turkish-US relations in the early years of the Cold War. He explains that 
realpolitik drove the US side of the alliance. In the opinion of the Americans if 
Greece, Turkey or Iran came under the influential sphere of the communist 
Soviets, a domino effect would see the whole region at threat. Loy 
Henderson, the State Department's Director of Near East and African Affairs 
during the Truman incumbency explained,  
“Strategically, Turkey is the most important factor in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and Middle East, Turkey constitutes the stopper in the 
neck of the bottle through which Soviet political and military influence 
could most effectively flow into the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle 
East.” 
(Kayaoğlu 2009: 325) 
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Kayaoğlu's (2009) research into the official documents of the Truman 
administration indicates that the administration's foreign policy formation 
towards Turkey was solely driven by geopolitical considerations, in which the 
promotion of democracy was non-existent. 
In spite of this, the rhetoric of democracy promotion was a mechanism of 
bolstering public opinion in favour of an alliance. In fact, the military aid that 
Turkey received from the US during the Cold War ensured the consolidation 
of Kemalist nationalism and turned Turkey into a militarist state where dissent 
had no place. Security considerations and internal stability were 
Washington's priority in its involvement with Turkey, and the Kemalist elite 
took full advantage of that (Kayaoğlu 2009). 
Historically, the Straits had always been an area of contention between 
Russia and Turkey. As Russia's main sea route through to the Mediterranean 
depends on securing access to the Straits, it has been a priority for every 
Russian leader. Up until the 1940s, the Soviets had pushed for a joint 
defence pact with Turkey with regards to the Straits. Turkey was keen to stay 
neutral in the Cold War and not employ a joint defence pact with the Soviets 
as this might be seen as a hostile act by the USA who was becoming the pre-
eminent superpower in Turkey’s neighbourhood.  
Aside from the Soviet’s diplomatic pressure on Turkey, Kayaoğlu explains, 
“Parallel to their demands, the Soviets were reportedly amassing 
troops into Bulgaria and the Caucasus for a possible attack against 
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Turkey. For President Truman, these moves constituted 'an open bid 
to obtain control of Turkey' and he believed that the proposal for a joint 
defence of the Straits was a (Soviet) pretext to control Turkey.”  
(Kayaoğlu 2009: 325) 
Subsequently, policy-makers in Washington began to push for stronger 
security ties with Turkey so the Soviets would not view Turkey as 
defenceless. Turkey’s neutrality ended and the following years would see a 
gradual growth in the alliance between Turkey and the US to counteract the 
Soviet threat. The first step to this was on the 22nd May 1947 when the US 
Congress approved the Greek and Turkish Aid Bill (Kayaoğlu 2009). In 1948 
Turkey received $100 million in military aid from the US (Kayaoğlu 2009).  
Nonetheless, despite NATO’s formation in 1949, Turkey did not become a 
member until the 18th February 1952. Throughout the 1940s Turkey had 
been pushing for a Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO) which would 
include Britain, Greece, Turkey, Egypt and Iran. Ankara, however, became 
increasingly concerned with the rise in anti-British sentiment in Egypt and 
Iran and did not feel that the organization would be a solid or tenable 
alliance. The US was expanding its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean at 
the time wanting to replace Britain as the hegemonic power in the region 
(Kayaoğlu 2009). The foreign policy direction shifted in Ankara away from 
diplomatic pressure on Britain.  With the formation of NATO in 1949 all efforts 
were put into securing NATO membership, thereby, becoming solid allies 
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with the US. The geo-strategic security concerns of the US culminated in 
Turkey’s accession process which began in 1951 (Kayaoğlu 2009). 
There are four key factors that explain why Washington eventually gave into 
Turkey’s demand to be part of NATO (Kayaoğlu 2009). Firstly, Turkey had 
been putting constant diplomatic pressure on the US for years. Secondly, it 
became clear to Washington that they would need Turkish airfields in the 
case of a launch of air strikes against the Soviets. Thirdly, the Turkish military 
would be a line of defence against any Soviet advance westward. The fourth 
factor was the onset of the Korean War (Kayaoğlu 2009). 
On 25th June 1950 the Korean War broke out. Turkey sent their military to 
join the operations in solidarity with NATO (Kinzer 2001). Ankara felt that this 
act of solidarity would help build bridges in the future especially if they were 
to face a future Soviet invasion. Their allies in Korea would come to their 
deliverance. The Korean War did in fact prove to the world that Turkey was 
serious in its rhetoric to combat communism (Kinzer 2001).  
The internal stability and institutionalization of Turkish nationalism were 
reinforced by the international alliances Turkey had formed. Turkey had 
become a crucial member of NATO and was viewed by the West as a 
fortress in its line of defence against Soviet communism. The USA was 
emerging as the pre-eminent power in the region at the time. Washington 
valued a strong and unified Turkey where any form of dissent would not be 
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tolerated. The military aid received by Turkey in the 1940s and 1950s would 
ensure that irredentism was no threat to Turkish nationalism (Kinzer 2001). 
Nonetheless, as will be examined in Chapter 7, irredentism began to pose a 
threat to Turkey during the tenure of the AKP, as despite military aid from the 
US, Kurdish nationalism began to spill-over from the 2013 Syrian War and 
seriously threaten Turkey’s territorial contiguity in the Anatolian south.  
 
Secularism (laiklik)  
 
 
“We shall live in the area of civilization as a progressive and civilized 
nation. Only knowledge and science can make such a life possible.” 
-Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
(Cited in Mango 2000) 
Perhaps the most prominent component of the AKP’s alliance-building 
‘Turkish Model’ has been the party’s ability to navigate state secularism 
despite being of a conservative Muslim ideology. To understand the 
significance of this, it is important to understand the historic capstone 
fortifying embeddedness of secularism within Turkish institutions that 
characterized the polities survival under Republican rule. The Atatürk Society 
of Canada (2015) define the Kemalist 'arrow' of secularism as a means of 
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separating religious truth from scientific and purely political matters. In the 
opinion of Kemalists, “A religious moral people are necessary to an ethical, 
healthy republic, but faith is best inculcated at home and church rather than 
school.”   (The Atatürk Society of Canada 2016)  
Çarmikli (2011) furthers this definition in his research on secularism in 
Kemalist discourse,  
“The Kemalist understanding of secularism is not only a separation 
between state and religion, but also a subordination of religion that 
defines Islam as, ultimately, an affair of the state. In this sense religion 
is secondary to the aims of the state that seeks to orientate social life 
around the rationalist principles of ‘public administration’ using science 
and technology as its guiding tools.”  
(Çarmikli,2011: 140-141) 
Atatürk was a staunch believer that Islam should be a personal conviction 
and that it should not play a part in the public administration of the state. It 
was important to him to institutionalize secularism as a way of rejecting the 
role Islam had played in public affairs during the Ottoman period (Zürcher 
2005). This rejection of Ottomanism became the dominant discourse 
amongst the Kemalist elite. According to them, the religious figures of the 
Ottoman Empire were to blame for the stagnation of Turkish society. The 
characterization of the Islamic clergy as 'forces of darkness' became a 
common theme in literature (Zürcher 2005). An example of this was Yakup 
Kadri's 1922 Nur Baba ('Father Light') (Zürcher 2005). Mustafa Kemal 
believed secularism was the key to modernism, a society open to rationality 
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and science could take the Turkish nation into the contemporary world 
(Zürcher 2005).  
The institutionalization of secularism was a gradual process in the formation 
of the Turkish Republic. Mustafa Kemal first pledged to form a secular 
republic in 1919 at the start of the War of Independence (Mango 2000). In 
1928 Islam would cease to be the official religion of the state. In 1937 
secularism was codified into the second article of the Constitution (Çarmikli 
2011). It was illegal for any government to alter this section of the 
Constitution. Codifying secularism into a normative political institution was 
only the formative stage of the Kemalist secular project (Çarmikli 2011). True 
societal transformation was their aim and this could only be achieved through 
educating the public.  
“The only true spiritual guide in life is science.” (Zürcher 2005: 389) This 
quote by Atatürk illuminates his staunch belief in logical positivism. Mustafa 
Kemal had received a French secularist education himself at military college. 
In fact, 27 out of 37 Kemalist leaders were also graduates of these military 
colleges which had been modelled on the French grandes écoles system 
(Zürcher 2005). At military college, Mustafa Kemal and his peers studied 
nineteenth century French positivism and German materialism (Zürcher 
2005). These concepts would then have a profound impact on their 
pedagogical philosophy: “The belief in science brought with it an equally 
 137 
 
strong belief in education as a gateway to development and modernization.” 
(Zürcher 2005: 390)  
Kemalist leaders were elevated in public life as the 'enlightened ones' 
(münevver/ aydın) and as model citizens to follow the footsteps of (Zürcher 
2005). Mustafa Kemal took centre stage and was repeatedly depicted as the 
all-knowing teacher of the nation. This metaphor was translated into symbols 
and imagery expounded through statues, photos and paintings of Mustafa 
Kemal in the role of a teacher (Zürcher 2005). 
It was important to the elite to ensure that the quality education they had 
received would be available to the Turkish masses. The Ministry of Education 
would undertake this task (İnal 2015). The Ministry of Education became one 
of the most important mechanisms of the modernization of the state in this 
period. They pushed for a secular education that would unshackle the 
masses and create empowered citizens: 
 “For the Republican cadres, a populist/peasant based educational 
philosophy, mixed with a version of positivism and elitism, produced 
and controlled by the elite class; and a practical education approach, 
aimed at training the “citizen” against the conception of “servant” (kul) 
of the Ottoman Emperor, would, with the help of enlightened teachers’ 
hard work, modernise Turkey.” 
(İnal 2015: 32) 
To facilitate the education of the masses the Ministry employed several 
reforms. Religious schools were closed by the Ministry and a new secular 
curriculum took the place of the Quran (Foss 2014). Similar reforms were 
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applied to higher education. Istanbul Darülfünun, a religious university in the 
Ottoman period, became Istanbul University in 1933 (Guvenc-Salgirli 2010). 
The mülkiye was also reformed and moved to Ankara, thereby becoming the 
University of Ankara (Guvenc-Salgirli 2010).  
From the Kemalist perspective religion was to blame for the lack of progress 
and development in the Ottoman period. Influenced by European positivism, 
they wished to employ a contemporary pedagogic vision for society with solid 
foundations in science, knowledge and education. The precondition of this 
would be the removal of religion from matters of public life and 
administration. These inroads towards secularism in the political process 
were in-sufficient to modernize the entirety of Turkish society. To secure the 
empowerment of all citizens, it was deemed necessary to revolutionize the 
education system and put secularism at the centre of the curriculum.  
 
 
Etatism/ Statism (devletçilik) 
  
 
“There can be no political independence without economic 
independence and ... national sovereignty should be supported by 
financial sovereignty.” 
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-Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
(Cited in Takim & Yilmaz 2010: 551) ⁠  
 
Development, one of the AKP’s key tenets, was a central characteristic of the 
‘Turkish Model’ through neoliberalism and urban expansion. Nonetheless, it 
was not always this way, as Ataturkism envisaged the state at the main 
resource extractor and user within the economy. This is known as ‘statism’. 
The term 'statism' infiltrated Kemalist discourse in the 1930s in reference to 
the 'leading role the state should take in initiating development projects' (Park 
2012). 
Conservative supporters of this 'arrow' saw it as a fixed ideology. In the 
opinion of the conservatives, the state should be in control of economic 
development and industrialization (Guvenc-Salgirli 2010). Like many of the 
developmentalist states of the early 20th century, imagery and metaphors for 
socio-economic improvement and modernity became prominent in public life. 
These included smokestacks, railways, dams and tractors (Guvenc-Salgirli 
2010).  
The committee that Mustafa Kemal tasked with reforming the economy would 
meet regularly in a train carriage at Ankara Rail Station to discuss policy 
formation. This committee, headed by Ziya Gökalp, reorganized the structure 
of the economy:   
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“This structure featured authoritarian management with an economic 
infrastructure based mainly on agriculture, where commerce and 
industry were almost completely dominated by the Europeans.”  
(Takim & Yilmaz 2010: 549)  
An important influence on the 'statist' model was President Roosevelt. The 
US 'New Deal' had popularized Keynesian economic development after the 
Great Depression (Park 2012). Another important influence at the time was 
the Soviet Union who at this point was undergoing rapid industrialization 
(Takim & Yilmaz 2010). Soviet experts advised the İnönü administration on a 
5-year development plan to encourage self-sustaining growth (Takim & 
Yilmaz 2010). Mustafa İsmet İnönü, more so than Mustafa Kemal, would 
make this economic model the foundation of state-business relations in the 
Republic during the 1940s. Some notable achievements of İnönü included 
the creation of new towns and town centres buzzing with cafes, tearooms, 
clubs and theatres (Zürcher 2005). Nevertheless, this was perhaps the least 
stringent and durable of the 'arrows'. The economic policy of the Turkish 
Republic evolved to a more liberal model in later years.  
One reason for this was that for more liberal Kemalists statism was deemed 
as a necessary short-term measure in order to kick-start economic growth 
and put the economy back on track. The new republic had inherited the debts 
of the Ottoman Empire and desperate measures were needed to spur 
economic growth (Takim and Yilmaz 2010). Once the economy was growing 
again, the role of the state in the economic sphere would be reduced (Park, 
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2012). During the 1950s, the framing of the 'West' altered from being solely 
about Europe to encompass the US (Guvenc-Salgirli 2010). The new 
American model of capitalism and free-market development that came to life 
under the Truman administration became increasingly popular in Turkey 
(Guvenc-Salgirli 2010). Private entrepreneurship boomed in Turkey during 
the 1950s. 
The least ideologically stringent of the 'arrows', statism was a permeable 
metaphor for economic development. An evolving concept, whose normative 
articulation was an economic tool rather than the foundation of the state, the 
priority of policymakers such as Gökalp was to lift the new Republic out of the 
economic despair that had been a consequence of the loss of Ottoman 
territory. Influenced by a multitude of international actors, the Turkish 
economy was rapidly restructured. Despite Mustafa Kemal and İnönü's 
conservatism when it came to statism, the economy of the First Republic 
would experience an injection of international investment and a more 
liberalized economy the 1950s.   
 
Reformism/ Revolutionism (devrimcilik/ inkılâpçılık)  
  
“Man as an individual is condemned to death. To work, not for oneself 
but for those who will come after, is the first condition of happiness.... 
Each person has his own preferences. Some people like gardening 
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and growing flowers. Others prefer to train men. Does the man who 
grows flowers expect anything from them? He who trains men ought to 
work like the man who grows flowers.”  
-Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
(Cited in Karpat 1985: 899) 
 
The 'arrow' of Reformism/Revolutionism was the concept that rapid, drastic 
social change and cultural transformation was a necessity to drive Turkey 
into the league of modern nations. In the opinion of the Republicans, the 
Ottoman era had represented a dark-age in the history of the Turkish nation. 
Mustafa Kemal had vowed to bring about a 'new country, a new society, 
(and) a new State.' (Ataöv 1980: 31) Mustafa Kemal was quoted explaining 
his programme for this: 
"Our country will become out and-out modern, civilized and new ... 
The masses want to be prosperous, free and affluent ... The nation 
has decided to adopt, thoroughly and in the same form and essence, 
the life and the means which contemporaneous civilization has 
assured to all nations. The nation is determined not to permit 
centuries-old varieties of he and fraud to retard, for a moment, its 
efforts in the sphere of innovation and reform ... We cannot live within 
an orbit, shut off from the rest of the world. For nations, which persist 
in conserving certain traditions and beliefs which cannot stand the test 
of reason, it is not only difficult, but also impossible, to progress."  
(Ataöv 1980: 32) 
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For the Kemalist elite, cultural modernity was a metaphor for the fashion and 
tastes of the European ruling class (Zürcher 2005). A dress code based on 
European fashion had been promulgated in 1926 (Foss 2014). The fez was 
banned. Mustafa Kemal himself began to adopt European dress. The Turkish 
public were encouraged to keep dogs and cats as pets this had become a 
popular cultural practice in Western Europe (Zürcher 2005). Horse racing 
became a popular sport and Ankara’s high-society would regularly socialize 
at the races, a symbol of prestige reflecting events such as Britain's Ascot 
(Zürcher 2005). Symbols and metaphors for modernism continued to be 
infiltrated into the daily life of the Republic, with the hope of fostering a 
modern society in mimicry of the West. 
The rapid social change that occurred during this period was not solely 
symbolic. The Republicans also enforced normative measures that they 
trusted would create a more efficient society. The Islamic calendar had been 
the norm during the Ottoman period. The Gregorian calendar was adopted to 
align the State’s temporality with the European standard (Foss 2014). 
Perhaps one of the most notable achievements of the Kemalists at the time 
was the eradication of malaria (Zürcher 2005). The concept of 'public health' 
had begun to guide discussions on social policy.  
To the Kemalist elite, the Kemalist revolution was a social mechanism for the 
progression and betterment of the human condition of the Turkish public. The 
Ottoman Caliphate had stagnated the progress of the Turkish people. Drastic 
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and enforced rapid change would be a necessity to lift the Turkish nation out 
of subalternism and into the West. These measures could only be achieved 
through vertical social policy formation.  
 
 
The Legacy of Mustafa İsmet İnönü, 24 September 1884-25 December 1973 
and the Increasingly Fortifying State 
 
“My defeat was my greatest victory.” 
 -İsmet İnönü 
(Cited in Kayaoğlu, 2009) 
 
Dominant discourse in Turkey regards Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as the founder 
of the Turkish nation-state. Featured less in the symbols and imagery of the 
Republic is Mustafa İsmet İnönü. If Kemal Atatürk was the pioneer of 
Kemalism, it is only fair to herald İsmet İnönü as the consolidator of 
Kemalism. İsmet İnönü became president of the Turkish Republic until the 
introduction of multi-party democracy in 1950. 
İsmet İnönü accelerated the Kemalist reform process. The onset of the Cold 
War opened space for those who had felt marginalized by Kemalism to resist. 
İnönü, worried that the Kemalist revolution would be compromised, enforced 
a crack-down on opposition and administered a police state. İnönü's 
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incumbency resulted in the development of a political system, “separate from 
society, fostering politics and society as two separate entities linked by the 
political domination of experts, career politicians, and the military.” 
(VanderLippe 2012) 
Notwithstanding these changes there were key moments where Inonu 
expressed his will to encompass minorities. He was quoted as saying at 
Lausanne, “the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey is the 
Government of the Kurds just as much as the Government of the Turks.” 
(Hale 2012). A combination of domestic and international factors led to İnönü 
eventually opening up the political process in 1945. İnönü, very much 
wanting to align with the West in the Cold War environment, was under 
increasing pressure to disband the one-party police state administration and 
replace it with a more liberal democratic state (Hale 2012). In 1945, İnönü 
disassembled the single-party political framework and legalized the formation 
of opposition parties. Adnan Menderes and Celâl Bayar, ex People's party 
members disillusioned with the growing authoritarian nature of the state, 
founded the DP that same year (Hale 2012). 1950 would see a key milestone 
in Turkey's democratization process. Multi-party free and fair elections were 
held for the first time with universal suffrage, and the DP came into 
government under Adnan Menderes (Hale 2012). 
Yet, the achievements of İnönü at widening the political system were short-
lived as during the 1950’s the state became increasingly fortifying. As Hall 
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(1999) explains, the level of democracy within a state does not always impact 
whether it will become increasingly blocking or not. Despite the opening up of 
the democratic process and an increase in religious rights in the early 1950s, 
as DP rule became more consolidated, repression grew during the late 
1950s.  
Rustow (1991) describes the tools used by the Democratic Party government 
to quash opposition activity such as instigating rioting at opposition rallies 
and meetings, then suppressing those rallies and meetings through brutal 
military and police force. On 27 May 1960, the military took a stand against 
being used as a political tool by Menderes, and launched a coup32. They 
arrested Menderes and other leading party members. He was accused of 
violating the constitution, corruption, and violent repression, including the 
Istanbul pogroms33. The military then ruled the country for a year and a half 
through a junta, the National Unity Committee. The DP was banned, and 
Adnan Menderes was executed by the junta on 17 September 1961 (Rustow 
1991). A new constitution was formed, and a new electoral system using 
proportional representation was put in place. Under military tutelage, 
elections under the new constitution were held in October 1961. There was 
                                                     
32 This period saw increasing political intervention from the military, with three coups -1960-
61, 1971-73 and a final coup in 1980-1983. Nevertheless, the military justified the coups as a 
way of restoring the democratic process, and each time they returned to the barracks leaving 
the political process in the hands of civilians. The actions of the military during this time have 
been described as 'military tutelage' or 'guided democracy'. 
33 The Istanbul Pogroms were mass racist riots and the ethnic cleansing of Greeks from the 
city. 
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no clear majority, however, the newly- formed Justice Party (formed as a call 
for justice by Menderes' and Democrat supporters) did extremely well. 
Turkey saw a variety of unstable coalition governments during the 1960s, up 
until 1965 and 1969 when the Justice Party, under the leadership of 
Suleyman Demirel, managed to gain a parliamentary majority (Rustow 1991).  
The 1970s in Turkey were characterized by an increase in terrorism and 
extremism, and violent street battles between right and left extremists. In 
1971, the military concerned with the volatile security situation in the country, 
launched another coup and imposed martial law. The military formed a new 
multiparty cabinet, and gradually law and order was restored to the Republic. 
In 1973, an election was held, democracy was restored and the military 
returned to the barracks (Rustow 1999). The rest of 1970s, like the 1960s, 
saw the onset of a number of weak coalition governments, as both the CHP 
and DP failed to secure majorities. Some of the coalition governments that 
were formed encompassed extreme parties such as the Islamist National 
Salvation Party of Necmettin Erbakan and the ultra-right Nationalist Action 
Party of Alparslan Turkes. Governance was characterized by minority 
cabinets, which failed to secure parliamentary votes of confidence (Rustow 
1991).  
Rustow (1991) explains the late 1970s saw a, “prolonged vacuum at the 
center of government...filled by mounting waves of violence and terrorism of 
Right and Left that dwarfed the outbreaks of the early 1970s and, by mid-
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1980, claimed as many as 20 to 30 lives every day.” The Cold War decades 
represented the increased fortifying political reproduction of the Turkish state.  
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The formation of the Turkish Republic represented the radical historic fission 
of the Ottoman Empire’s expansive polity. As Ferguson and Mansbach 
(1996) explain, the more expansive a polities territory, the more difficult it is 
to unite and control diverse communities and geographies. The Kemalist 
‘arrows’ restructured the social and political body of the remnants of the 
Ottoman Empire into a fortified modern nation-state, protected by sovereign 
acceptance of European peer polities and a heavily controlled society by 
capstone institutions and a uniform racist secular political culture. 
This chapter has unearthed key themes that build a picture of the fixed 
variables of the double-security dilemma that every Turkish leader has faced, 
such as the trans-historical nature of Turkish hybridity and ‘Europeanness’, 
the role of geo-strategic realpolitik in the formation of Turkey’s nationalist 
discourse, and ‘othering’ as a discursive strategy of ‘Turkishness’. All these 
issues were crucial factors that the AKP had to mitigate to come to and 
maintain authority, as will be examined in the next chapter.  
Driving the Turkish nation-building process has been a multitude of horizontal 
and vertical factors. On the horizontal level, international alliances have been 
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crucial in influencing, validating and consolidating the Turkish nation state. 
Also, the transnationalism of discursive concepts such as modernism, 
secularism, nationalism and democracy provided the nation-state with an 
ideological mandate for its normative parameters. As the modern 
international system became institutionalized through mechanisms such as 
transnational organizations and transnational militarism, this in-turn 
reinforced and standardized the Turkish Republic’s legitimacy and validity as 
Westphalian.  
On the vertical level, significant actors such as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 
Mustafa İsmet İnönü and Ziya Gökalp played a multifaceted role in ideology 
formation and social innovation. Their contributions to the emergence of the 
AKP’s ‘Turkish Model’ cannot be overstated. The role of individual actors who 
had internalized European modernism and nationalism and were determined 
to expound their deep-set beliefs into social policy was a decisive factor in 
the success of the Turkish nation-state’s formation.  
The Kemalist normative structures of the Turkish Republic have stood the 
test of time and are the raison d'être of the ‘Turkish model’. Yet, the ‘Turkish 
Model’ has evolved since the First Republic to contain the binaries of Islam 
and modernity and encompass a form of consent amongst rural Anatolia and 
across the Muslim world that Kemalism just could not. The harmony of these 
binaries are the key determinants of the ‘Turkish model’s’ success as will be 
demonstrated in the next two analytical chapters. 
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Chapter Five: Vertical Alliance-building Political 
Reproduction in Turkey: The Turkish State Polity 
under the AKP’s Mounting Authority 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will focus on the structures and functions of the political system 
that posed vertical obstacles to the AKP regime over issues, resources and 
loyalties during the party’s advancement into government.  This chapter 
argues that the AKP formed and maintained an alliance-building model of 
political reproduction through an Islamic neoliberal pattern of authority to 
consolidate their power. To understand how this operated, it is important to 
analyse both the functional dimension of sovereignty and the constitutive. 
Here the vertical dimensions of the 2002-2011 period within Turkish politics 
and society are examined to analyse how the AKP sustained its authority 
through penetrating society and opening the political system. Alliance-
building whilst maintaining power is usually done through expanding a power 
base and creating vested interests amongst a wide range of identities under 
the guise of establishing a ‘liberal peace’ within society, as (Hall 1999) has 
stated occurred in democratic consolidation of the penetrative states of 
Western Europe. 
This chapter will be divided into three sections. Each section analyses the 
alliance-building mode of political reproduction that ensured the AKP’s 
authority within a part of the political system. Section 5.2, ‘The Post-Islamists 
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and Power’, focuses on the emergence of the AKP to power. The political 
context in which their tenants of neoliberalism, modernity and political Islam 
surfaced will be explored. This will be followed by an analysis of how they 
competed for political authority with other political parties and the established 
elite. Section 5.3, ‘Political Authority and Development’, explains the political 
programme of socio-economic development that the AKP undertook which 
created a multitude of new stakeholders, altering the face of modern Turkey. 
Section 5.4, ‘Executive Power and Lawfulness’, examines how through their 
alliances, the AKP consolidated executive power and became synonymous 
with the regime in addition to the impact of this on liberation campaigns and 
minority rights. Thus, chapter 5, will build a full picture of the transition of the 
Turkish political system under the authority of the AKP which would become 
‘The Turkish Model’.   
 
5.2 The Ascent of the Post-Islamists and their Formation into 
a Power Bloc 
To comprehend the political reproduction undertaken by the Turkish state 
from 2002 to 2011, the transformation of the state and political society must 
be placed in a historical context. Therefore, the starting point of analysis in 
this chapter is the 1970s when Turkish political society began to change, and 
new blocs were formed as a counter-revolutionary reaction to both the 1968 
leftist uprisings in Turkey and the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution. As 
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explained below, the Islamic and neoliberal political blocs evolved as a 
reaction to these currents throughout the later decades of the 20th century. 
They eventually became one new Islamic neoliberal power bloc at the 
beginning of the 21st century; culminating in the nesting of the power bloc into 
the state apparatus through the early alliance-building governance of the 
AKP.  
Turkish Islamism’s34 advent as an organized political polity took place with 
the 1970 founding of the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP) by 
Necmettin Erbakan. Erbakan had authored the National View (Millî Görüş)35 
manifesto in 1969 which advocated for religious education and economic 
development (Yilmaz 2012). The National View manifesto turned into the 
National View mass movement as the manifesto had resonated with small 
enterprise owners, peasant farmers and artisans who had been marginalized 
by the fortifying Kemalist regime (Tuğal 2013). Therefore, this section of 
society could identify with the National View as they had an aversion to 
                                                     
34 Turkish Islamism was a top down Islamisation of society by the state and the military. 
Known as the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, it was an effort to block the spread of socialism and 
other leftist thought into Turkey through penetrating society with Islam. Some policies 
included compulsory religious education at the primary stage and community-based Quran 
classes. The philosophy of Islam taught was a combination of Turkish nationalism, Hanefi 
Islam and Ottomanism drawn from the Aydınlar Ocağı (Intellectuals Hearth) school of 
thought. This legitimized the authority of the new rulers, fortified the polity from Islamic ideas 
from the Arab region and Iran, and weakened the ideological prowess of the left all deemed 
as a security threat to the stability of Turkey (Yilmaz 2012). 
35 Throughout the 1970’s the National View movement’s political parties and organizations 
were regularly shut down by Kemalist secular governments. Therefore, once the National 
Order Party was shut down, the movement formed another political party named the National 
Salvation Party, (Millî Selâmet Partisi, MSP). 
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Western consumer culture and were the losers of the import-substitution 
economy.  
Due to the restraints on religious political activism within the secular republic, 
the Islamists realised they needed to look to socialization to shape political 
society. Thus, the National View began publishing on Sharia principles and 
opening Imam Hatip schools (religious schools aimed at the education of 
preachers). These attracted religious families dissatisfied with secular public 
education (Yilmaz 2012). The graduates of these schools became the first 
socially mobile religious class within Turkey and came to “occupy important 
public positions, constituting a religious middle class, capable of competing 
with the secular elite, a new ‘Muslim intelligentsia’” (Tuğal 2013: 115).  
Turkey’s Islamists, despite being unable to gain governing power in the 
1970s, became a formidable political force. Political entrepreneurship and 
smart socialization had ensured the loyalty of a large segment of Turkish 
society that felt that they had had no stake in the secular capstone system. 
The 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran lent the National View a renewed 
confidence that a “new society away from Western modernity…(could) be 
constructed through the apparatus of the state.” (Dagi, 2013: 75) 
During the 1970s, Turkey had become embedded in a proxy civil Cold War 
conflict between right and left, resulting in the September 12, 1980 military 
coup. This was because the civilian government led by Suleyman Demirel 
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had been incapable of preventing the factional violence. The military, 
therefore, decided to intervene, dissolving parliament and suspending the 
constitution. The country was put under military rule, and they implemented 
new security measures to halt the wave of violence; this included a ban on all 
political parties (Kösebalaban 2011). The military crackdown and ban on 
political parties diminished the mobilization capacity of the left whose 
increasing power and support from the Soviet Union posed a revolutionary 
threat and enforced more state-control over the terrorist activity of the 
extreme-right. The metropolitan youth of the lower classes inspired by the 
1979 Islamic revolution of Iran and attracted to the National View’s faith-
based welfare initiatives began to look to Islamic revolutionary politics in the 
place of leftist politics (Tuğal, 2013). The 1980’s would see the Islamist 
project undertaking more ‘sustained interactions with civil society and the 
state’; this development of Islamism within political society resulted in its 
ability to transpose and better determine the fate of the Turkish republic 
(Tuğal 2016: 117). 
This was where the first cracks in the fortifying Kemalist regime emerged and 
began opening up to Islamic polities and nesting them into the Turkish state. 
This encapsulation by the regime co-opted the Islamists into the political 
system, appeasing the potential threat they posed to state power, something 
that the Shah’s Iran had been unable to do. Dinc (2005: 299) explains how 
this new alliance between Islam and the state was a typical method of 
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appeasement by secular regimes in majority Muslim nations: “The Turkish 
case supported the view that in many Muslim countries the relatively secular 
state elite helped the rise of Islamism by promoting a moderate version of 
Islam.”   
This new alliance between the secular state and Turkey’s Islamists became 
entrenched in the 1982 constitution. Despite rejecting pluralism, the 
independence of civil society and legitimizing the role of the military in civilian 
affairs; the junta authored constitution redefined “Turkishness” with reference 
to Islam (Miller et al. 2012). This was to the great detriment of Kurdish, 
Christian, leftist and workers organizations; but Islamic organizations such as 
the Gülen Community36 and other post-Sufi and semi-clandestine groups 
flourished. The Islamic vote steadily increased until the mid-1990s, mainly 
due to the increasing absorption of Islamic ideology by the state who in turn 
controlled its penetration into society (Tuğal 2013).  
As for the National View movement, Erbakan oversaw the founding of the 
Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) once civilian rule had returned in 
                                                     
36 The Gülen movement is a religious social movement with a vast transnational network of 
educational, business, media and lobbying organizations. It was founded and is led by 
Fethullah Gülen, an Islamic preacher in self-exile in Pennsylvania, USA. Aras and Caha 
(2000) note that the values of the movement are based upon a moderate Turkish Islam with 
both Sufi and Ottoman influences. Gülen’s goals are “simultaneously to Islamize the Turkish 
nationalist ideology and to Turkify Islam...[hoping] to re-establish the link between religion 
and state that existed in the Ottoman era.”(Aras and Caha, 2000:32) The soft power reach of 
the Gülen movement is vast, with an estimated international membership of 4 million 
including media outlets (for example the English language Today’s Zaman), schools, 
universities and business supporters across the globe. 
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1983. Their popular slogan was being the hak (truth and virtues) amongst the 
batil (corrupt) (Dagi 2013: 80). This meant to have a Godly anti-corruption 
message against the political establishment who at the time were rampant 
with venality which the Islamists attributed to the lure of Western materialism. 
The 1991 general elections represented the first alliance-building behaviour 
of the once insular Islamists, and the RP made an alliance with two other 
right-wing nationalist parties. RP’s electioneering focused on social issues 
rather than sticking to the religiosity of their past. Erbakan's discourse was 
critical of the West and Israel, but at the same time, was pluralistic in the 
domestic Islamic sense, where his terminology highlighted the shared history 
of all Muslim stake-holders in Turkish society, including that of the Muslim 
Kurdish minority (Hale 2012). The RP wanted to expand their power base to 
the metropolitan poor through messages of anti-Imperialism, anti-austerity, 
redistribution and social protection. This strategy worked, and they became 
the largest party in 1996 (Hale 2012). 
At this point the RP and most of Turkey’s Islamists were anti-European. The 
Europeanisation process had started in 1995 when the then prime minister 
Tansu Çiller signed a Customs Union agreement with the EU with the hope 
of Turkey becoming a full member in the near future. This led to a free-trade 
area between Turkey and EU member states, where goods would be 
exchanged tax-free (Hale 2012). However, these economic incentives failed 
to bring about an immediate transformation to Turkey's political and 
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economic situation. Yet the Customs Union did still enable Turkish industry to 
adapt itself to the demands of a globalized economy. Turkey's full 
membership goals were continually quashed by the EU up until 1998, when 
the German parliamentary elections saw the end of anti-Turkish Christian 
Democrat rule. In 1999, Turkey attained EU candidate country status, at the 
Helsinki summit (Hale 2012). 
Aside from the anti-EU/marketisation stance, the rise in support for the RP 
must be understood in the context of the Bosnia War and the Chechen 
conflict in Russia. Both were matters of grave concern to the Turkish public 
(Kösebalaban 2011). It was perhaps this shared Islamic grievance that kept 
the Islamists united during this period. Divisions had started to emerge within 
the RP between Erbakan’s followers and the younger activists who were 
gaining influence in their localities. The economic reforms as part of the EU 
accession process sparked the growth of an emerging middle class within 
Islamic conservative rural Anatolia. This new middle class included and was 
energized by the RP’s young and upcoming cadre who were more 
economically savvy than their party elders. Significant members included 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül, Bulent Arinc and Abdulatif Sener 
(Kösebalaban 2011). 
Erdoğan’s inclusionary political strategy as party branch chairman in Istanbul 
was particularly popular with a wide range of residents.  In March 1994 he 
won the mayoral election with the political slogan of “Just Order”. This was a 
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double reference to the “Divine Order” and a just distribution of wealth (Dagi 
2013). The RP managed to change the face of Istanbul through the policy 
implementation of Erdoğan37. Two policy initiatives that the RP had failed to 
implement in Istanbul were the reconversion of the Hagia Sophia into a 
mosque and the building of a mosque in Taksim Square. Although, these 
initiatives would re-emerge after 2011 when the Islamists gained increased 
power (Tuğal 2013: 118).  
Despite these successes, the Islamist project faced a major setback in 1997. 
The Islamist polity had become too powerful for the Kemalist regime and the 
secular state institutions retreated to their blocking behaviour. The power and 
loyalty generated by the Islamists was not enough to translate into the state 
apparatus at this stage, deemed as a vertical threat to the institutional 
makeup of the still very Kemalist regime, the National Security Council 
reinforced their authority and launched a ‘post-modern’ coup against the RP 
(Çağlar 2012). 
Unlike the coups of the past, the military tried to co-opt its ‘security’ agenda 
through building a broad consensus against RP governance. Elements of the 
judiciary, civil service, academia, labour organizations and the media joined 
                                                     
37 The Islamist policy initiatives employed included increased controls on the sale of alcohol, 
the institution of prayer rooms in municipal buildings and swathes of Islamic and Ottoman 
symbols and heritage restoration within public places, including the mass planting of tulip 
flowers in green and tourist spaces. Tulip flowers had been important Ottoman symbols. 
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the military in their call for the resignation of the Erbakan government (Çağlar 
2012). The National Security Council met on February 28 and agreed to 
impose sanctions on the Erbakan government if it failed to instigate 
measures to mitigate a rise in ‘reactionary danger’ within political society. 
Erbakan continued with political business as normal, to demonstrate political 
stability to the public. There was no physical confrontation between the army 
and the government, but under the pressure the RP resigned before the end 
of the year (Howe 2000).  
The military repression was felt on both a national and local level and 
Erdoğan was deposed as Mayor and sentenced to jail for four months. 
Hurriyet (1999) reported that Erdoğan was convicted of ‘inciting hatred based 
on religious difference’ due to his public recital of a poem by Ziya Gökalp in 
Siirt. Erdoğan had stated, 
"Our minarets are our bayonet., Our domes are our helmets. Our 
mosques are our barracks. We will put a final end to ethnic 
segregation. No one can ever intimidate us.” 
"If the skies and the ground were to open against us. If floods and 
volcanoes were to burst, We will not turn from our mission. My 
reference is Islam. If I am not able to speak of this, what is the use of 
living?" 
(Aslaneli 1999) 
These words were significant as it had been extremely rare for a public 
official to challenge the secular status quo. Erdoğan’s use of Islamic 
metaphors were deemed as unpatriotic and a threat to the secular Kemalist 
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foundations of the Republic.   The court decision was unpopular, and tens of 
thousands of protesters rallied against it. Before his jail term, Erdoğan 
addressed his supporters with a powerful message38,  
"I am not saying goodbye. This is just a pause. We will continue to 
work on the projects we have worked on together in the past. The 
notes that will follow will bring Turkey peace, love, brotherhood and 
will continue to unite your love."  
(Aslaneli 1999) 
On the national level, in 1998 the RP had been officially banned and Erbakan 
took a complaint about the closure decision unsuccessfully to Court of the 
European Human Rights. This was a significant moment in Islamist history, 
as it was the first time they looked to Western liberalism to defend their 
rights. Dagi (2013: 88) states that this was an attempt by the Islamists to form 
“new allies outside Islamist circles at home and abroad” in the hope of 
reducing the power of the National Security Council and military. The 
National View movement replaced the anti-globalization RP and reemerged 
with the more organic Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP). Dagi (2013) 
elaborates that this was an important historical moment for the Islamists, 
learning the fragility of their political power, they transformed from more 
blocking Islamist polity reproduction to a more alliance-building post-Islamist 
polity reproduction. The FP abandoned the Islamist politics of the National 
                                                     
38  This powerful message is an early example of Erdoğan’s charismatic ability as an orator, 
using language that the masses could relate to, and continually referring to Islamic 
brotherhood in the context of a Turkish shared identity.  
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View, the notion of ‘Just Order’, and focused on democratization and EU 
accession.  
The ‘National View’ Islamists had learnt that classical Islamic doctrine could 
not be institutionalized into modern Westphalian state institutions. In order to 
penetrate them, it would have to reinvent itself with a qualitative shift (Bayat 
2013). The loyalties of the Islamist supporters were shifting too, over the 
years Muslim response to politics altered under the influence of globalization, 
marketisation, the spread of the internet and the growth of educated elites 
(Dagi 2013). Bayat (2013: 8) explains that “following a phase of 
experimentation, the appeal, energy and sources of legitimacy of Islamism 
were exhausted even amongst its once ardent supporters.” Therefore, the 
upcoming Islamist cadre, the young educated elite, began trying to change 
the movement from within for the modern era. They attempted to merge 
religious discourse with human rights discourse, the practice of faith as a 
practice of freedom and liberty and promote pluralistic ideals rather than the 
singular authoritative voice of past Islamic revolutions. The key ontological 
shift they underwent was to understand the practice of religion as individual 
choice rather than religion as collective responsibility (Bayat 2013). 
This did create an internal conflict between the older generation of ‘National 
View’ Islamists and the new more moderate post-Islamists. The Islamist 
generation who had become active in the 1980s, inspired by the 1979 Islamic 
revolution, wanted to build a new Turkey beyond the chains of Western 
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modernism (Bayat 2013). The post-Islamist modernizers, who now 
represented a majority, pushed for a political strategy that utilized democracy 
“within a new language that enables building coalitions with different political 
and social groups” (Dagi 2013: 72). At this point, after the lessons of the 
February 28th coup, Islamic social institutions and business groups had lost 
their trust in the Islamist movement and began to withdraw their support and 
capital as they no longer saw the movement as capable of ensuring their 
security (Tuğal 2016). This gave the modernizers the backing they needed to 
make a positive change once and for all. 
At party congress, the moderates from the FP launched a leadership bid 
against the traditionalists. Gül launched a challenge against the Erbakan-
backed Recai Kutan. Gül’s bid was unsuccessful, and in 2001 the FP was 
closed by the Constitutional Court for threatening the secular character of the 
state (Dagei 2013). The movement split in two, the old guard Islamists 
retreated back into the National View and formed the Felicity Party (Saadet 
Partisi, SP). The new guard modernist post-Islamists formed the AKP under 
the leadership of Gül as Erdoğan was banned from office at this point due to 
his prior conviction (Dagi 2013). 
To understand how the post-Islamists penetrated the Kemalist state, it is 
important to grasp the basis of the new guard’s political ideology. The early 
political thought and ideas of the AKP were a combination of Turkish 
conservatism, conservative democracy, neoliberalism, and post-Islamism 
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with strong Hanefi undertones. This was a split from the Islamist thinking of 
the 70s and 80s which had been inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB) 
Sayyid Qutb, the shar’ia state advocate Syed Abul A'la Maududi and 
liberation Islamist Ali Shariati Mazinani (Tuğal 2016). Turkish post-Islamist 
thought which can be read in the old 1990s pro-Islamist publications of 
Conservative Democracy, Yeni Safak, Vakit and the later Akit, was inspired 
by reformist Abdolkarim Soroush and Mohammed Abed Al Jabri (Tuğal 
2016).  Soroush was paraphrased regularly in Conservative Democracy, for 
example: 
“Human rights have to be defined as independent from 
religion…Pluralism has to be accepted…Religion and religious 
interpretation and understanding are different. Religion is one, 
religious understanding is not. The acceptance of this opens the door 
to pluralism…Religion has recognized the freedom to reject religion.” 
 Akdoğan paraphrasing Soroush, (Tuğal 2016: 85-86) 
This quote explains the post-Islamist digression from Islamism, the Islamism 
of the past rejected pluralism, Westphalia human rights discourse and 
secular government. In contrary, post-Islamism framed the freedom of 
religion and religious practice as a universal human right. At the core of post-
Islamist thought was the idea to emancipate and serve the people and in turn 
this would be a service to God. In order to do this, it was necessary for them 
to accept modernization and partial Westernization (Tuğal 2016). Turkish 
conservatism provided a specific framework for doing this, through 
democracy. The post-Islamists campaigned for an end to the Westernised 
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elite and military tutelage of the past. They believed democracy was the way 
to empower and emancipate the masses who they felt adhered to ‘true’ 
Islamic values. Then again, this created suspicions of collaboration of 
minorities with the elitists, such as Alevis and Christians (Tuğal 2013). This 
was because still at the core of mainstream Turkish post-Islamist thought 
was Hanefi Islam. The modern institution of the nation state was framed as a 
valid tool of governance for the time being, until the Ummah would unite 
(Dinc 2005). Dinc (2005: 317) explains that the AKP, 
 “constitutes in one sense a retreat of the Islamists, this time in a 
leading role, into the fold of the conservatism of the centre-right which 
is more amorphous, more acceptable by the regime and hence less 
open to the attack of the forces of secularism.” 
Summed up by Erdoğan, the AKP sought: 
 “a modernity that does not exclude tradition, a universality that 
accepts locality (native values), a rationality that does not reject the 
meaning, a change which is not radical.”  
(Dinc 2005 317) 
Aside from ideologically, the AKP differed from their predecessors due to 
their professionalism, media savvy and pro-business agenda. As explained 
by Cihan Tuğal in the New Left Review,     
“They were also vociferously pro-European. They made frequent 
trips to the United States, holding meetings whose agendas have 
remained private. Gül helpfully explained to an American audience 
that the AKP were ‘the WASP (white Anglo-Saxon protestant’s) of 
Turkey’. It was clear that the new leadership was trying to reclaim the 
territory of the centre-right in Turkish politics—in effect, to 
reconstitute an updated version of that alliance of provincial 
businessmen, religious intellectuals and state elite at which the 
subordinate fraction of the ruling power bloc had traditionally aimed, 
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but which had become impossible with the rise of a radical Islamism. 
Now, this alliance could also offer to strengthen the hand of the neo-
liberal and export-oriented sectors of Turkish capital. Large numbers 
of center-right politicians, intellectuals and supporters soon swelled 
its ranks.”    
(Tuğal 2007: Online) 
This pro-European pro-US stance can also be evidenced in the AKP’s 2002 
manifesto, Herşey TÜRKİYE için or ‘Everything For Turkey’ where it is stated: 
“Turkey should maintain the geographical and historical aspects of its 
close relationships with Europe. Maintaining its relations with 
European countries should be top of Turkey’s foreign policy agenda. 
Turkey’s relations with the European Union and continuing Turkey’s 
European Union’ accession commitments conditions will be met with 
preoccupation with artificial problems. 
Turkey and NATO will continue to work in parallel, in addition, the 
European Security and Conservation Initiative created under the new 
European Defence Strategy will also continue.” 
 (Yıl and Dmbş, 2002: 92, translated by author) 
The fast rise of the AKP sent shock waves through Turkish political society. 
The post-Islamists astute political strategy meant that political alliances and 
blocs that had almost become consolidated within the Kemalist political 
system began to shift. As Islamic neoliberalism penetrated political society, it 
eventually altered the political system. Key to the modification of political 
society was the rise in consumerism as a uniting force that both the pious 
and secular masses had a stake in (Tuğal 2016). Unlike the anti-materialist 
‘National View’ the AKP embraced consumerism. Also, dissimilar to the 
‘National View’ the AKP had incorporated rather than blocked the ruling 
secular elite. Rather than dethroning them and trying to block their power, 
they allied with the centre-right and conservatives and convinced them their 
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moderate religiosity was the end to the ‘Islamist’ threat (De Leon, Desai, and 
Tuǧal 2009).   
This led many liberal politicians and intellectuals to support the AKP, they 
identified with their democratic message and were disenchanted by the 
coups of the past. The AKP had built a cross societal power base that gave it 
an election victory in November 2002 with 34.28%39 of the vote (De Leon, 
Desai and Tuğal 2009). This reshuffling of the Islamic political strategy from a 
blocking to a more alliance-building strategy, “led to the formation of the most 
hegemonic bloc in Turkish history. The top academics, the most revered 
public intellectuals, many activists and a large proportion of the popular 
classes had become one with the regime, even if they attributed contrasting 
meanings to their adherence.” (Tuğal 2016: 94) 
The AKP continued to out-compete other viers for political authority over the 
Turkish state apparatus. This was for two reasons, firstly as Hall (1999) has 
explained, the more embedded a state polity becomes in the international 
economy, the more alliance-building it will become in order to encourage 
international investment and free flows of capital. In turn, the more alliance-
building a state polity becomes, the more power it is able to wield as it 
actively opens the political system to layers of other polities who will thereby 
                                                     
39 The 2002 general election in Turkey produced a two-party parliament, with only the AKP  
and the CHP able to pass the 10% parliamentary threshold. The CHP secured 19.39% 
becoming the main opposition. 
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have a stake in maintaining the status quo. The AKP were also able to 
mitigate the grievances of the lower strata as inequality grew, through 
politically targeted welfare initiatives. These welfare initiatives meant that the 
AKP were able to maintain their consensual contract with the vast majority of 
the lower strata up until around 2013 and mitigate any disenchantment 
(Morvaridi 2013). Secondly, the more alliance-building it became the more 
‘common sense’ its politics and policy initiatives became in the eyes of the 
world and the public. The opposition struggled to find political space. It was 
very difficult to argue with modernism, stable government, democracy, liberal 
Islam and economic success (Tuğal 2016). 
In order to contextualize the above argument about the AKP’s alliance-
building political strategy, the evolution of the main political actors in Turkish 
political society during the early years of AKP instituted governance will now 
be explained. The novel form of governance that the AKP implemented, 
supplemented by the Europeanization process, led to a reconstitution of the 
cleavages of Turkish political society as new alliances, power blocs, and 
hierarchies emerged. The winners of the early years of the AKP tenure 
included the post-Sufis that had been more or less clandestine under the 
capstone Kemalist state and the rising economic force of the Anatolian 
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middle class. The losers continued to be the CHP40, the Nationalist 
Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) and other political parties 
that just could not form a power bloc capable of challenging the AKP’s 
electoral hegemony. 
A vital element of the AKP-led bloc was the post-Sufi Gülen movement.  
Their alliance with the AKP Tuğal (2016: 90) denotes as in actuality being 
less of an alliance and more of a merger; as Gülen supporters had incepted 
both the AKP leadership and membership. At first, the merger seemed like a 
useful tactic for widening the AKP power-base through having an element of 
control over the popular media and by increasing their financial weight, 
supporters and number of socialization projects. For the Gülen movement, 
the merger meant that for the first time they would have a direct influence 
within the policy process in Ankara, and were able to become an active and 
visible element of public life (Tuğal 2016). 
The Gülen movement’s reach was wide indeed. Their membership was about 
6 million people, of whom donated on average between 5-20% of their 
annual income to the movement. Those with a higher income were expected 
to donate up to 30%, aside from regular significant donations from the rich 
and business community. These donations were used to fund development 
                                                     
40 CHP at 80 years old is the oldest party in Turkish politics, and the party of Ataturk. It is a 
traditional Kemalist, secular, social democratic party. The party was led by political scientist 
Deniz Baykal from 1992 until 2010, when Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu took over.   
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ventures in health, education and poverty reduction. Initiatives such as these 
were popular with the public and stimulated loyalty within society to Islamic 
neoliberalism (Tuğal 2016).  
Several Gülen backed institutions served to disseminate the Gülen/AKP 
ideology. These included media institutions, universities and banks. The most 
prominent included: the Bank of Asya, Samanyolu television station, the 
Journalist and Writers Foundation, Today’s Zaman, Fatih university, and 
Aksiyon Weekly (Morvaridi 2013). These institutions were uncritical of the 
government agenda and at the time served as an important mouthpiece to all 
sections of society up until around 2010. As common practice with political 
alliances, cracks began to emerge in 2010 and the Gülen movement’s 
strength and support began to pose a threat, rather than being a support 
base for the AKP government. 
The first cracks that emerged were over the government backed 
Humanitarian Relief Foundation’s41 (İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri ve İnsani 
Yardım Vakfı, İHH) maritime humanitarian mission to Gaza on 31 May 2010. 
This mission resulted in the death of 9 humanitarian workers who were killed 
by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) in international waters. The humanitarian 
operation was condemned as too risky and poorly-planned by some 
segments of Turkish society, due to the Israeli history of international law 
                                                     
41  An Islamic charity group with close ties to the AKP. 
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violations against humanitarians (Tuğal 2016). Fethullah Gülen was one of 
the most prominent critics of the Gaza Flotilla and he criticized the İHH for 
not waiting to receive permission from the Israeli authorities for the mission. 
This view was very unpopular amongst the majority of the Turkish AKP-
sympathizers and other pro-Palestinian segments of Turkish society. From 
this moment on, Fethullah Gülen and his supporters were accused of being 
in league with the Zionists and were deemed untrustworthy (Tuğal 2016). 
This reinforced and furthered the view amongst many media commentators, 
and in turn the public, that Gülen were operating a parallel state and were 
infiltrating the police force and judiciary (Akyol 2013). Conspiracy theories 
and anti-Semitism have always been offered too much weight in Turkish 
public discourse and suspicions grew as the Hanefi AKP bloc felt threatened 
by the immense power that the Gülen movement had built within and outside 
the party. Tensions continued to grow in the coming years and eventually 
after 2011 the AKP resorted to blocking behaviour towards the movement, 
which will be examined further in the following chapters.  
A crucial ally to the AKP within political society, aside from the Gülen 
movement, has been the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen 
Association (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği, MÜSİAD42) (Tezcür 
                                                     
42 MÜSİAD was founded in 1990 by Turkish businesspeople from small and medium-
enterprises in order to increase the political influence of SMEs that had vastly increased in 
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2010). Key to the AKP’s formation had been its split with the anti-Western, 
anti-globalization Islamists whom it felt were out of touch with the needs of a 
growing economy. The AKP cadre had come from a generation which had 
benefited from the opening of the economy and were pro-business, pro-trade 
and saw neoliberalism as vital to economic development. As such, it was 
important to them to build solid alliances with business groups who would 
support their tenure and lift Turkey into the top ten world economies. It was 
also imperative to the AKP that Muslim businesses that had not been aided 
by capstone Kemalist governments would play a leading role within AKP’s 
Turkey. MÜSİAD represented Muslim small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) and was the perfect tool for the alliance (Tezcür 2010)..  
MÜSİAD flourished in the early years of the AKP government. The EU 
accession process had altered the make-up of Turkish political society and 
regular dialogue began between state officials, government, civil society and 
economic actors (Yankaya and Dilek 2009). MÜSİAD was very negatively 
affected by the February 28th coup which had banned Islamic groups and 
parties. However, with the economic opening of the AKP it began to grow 
immensely. In 2009 its situation had changed significantly, in total the  
“member firms operate in each and every sector in the economy: in 
total, they produce 15% of the national revenue and employ more than 
                                                                                                                                                      
number due to the export-driven economic growth of the 80s and 90s. MÜSİAD had a pro-
Islamist line and had been an imperative backer of the Welfare Party (Tezcür 2010). 
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80,000 people. Moreover, they also operate in the international 
market, their major import and export areas cover Europe, Central 
Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. As an interest group, its 
strength stems from the breadth of its social base: the headquarters 
being in Istanbul, the association organizes more than 2,700 firms 
through its national structure of local branches all over Anatolia.” 
(Yankaya and Dilek 2009: 6) 
 
Historically, the fortifying Kemalist state had politically blocked this large 
segment of Anatolian society. Not only had it not involved conservative 
Anatolia in political processes, it actively blocked its economic success, 
hence the low membership of MÜSİAD in 1999 and its non-existence before 
the 1990s. As the Turkish economy became more export-driven and more 
embedded in the global economy in the 1980s and 1990s, it no longer 
became tenable for the elite to block the Anatolians, their cities and their 
agriculture (Morvaridi 2013). The Anatolian populace were becoming a 
valuable source within the rapidly-changing production process driven by 
technological advancement, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and EU led 
structural adjustment; and a shift in demand for Turkish produce from the 
domestic to the international economy. Any new government that was to 
succeed in this open economic environment with rapid development would 
have to reproduce Turkish political functions into an alliance-building mode 
that nurtured the economic might of this once marginalized section of society 
(Morvaridi 2013).  
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Indeed the AKP fostered this open and competitive environment. As noted by 
Morvaridi (2013), this created rapid industrial development in the Anatolian 
heartlands and cities such as Gaziantep, Eskisehir and Kayseri began to be 
models of the success of the mix between Islamic culture and the free 
market; “earning it the accolade of the ‘Anatolian Tiger’” (Morvaridi 2013: 
310). This export-driven economic success meant the representation offered 
to the SMEs by MÜSİAD was ever more important to ensure that the correct 
fiscal decisions were being made by Ankara. MÜSİAD became one of the 
largest lobbying groups within the political system out-competing the 
traditional economic elite group, TÜSİAD43  for the government’s ear. 
MÜSİAD’s active engagement became widespread as it brought its agenda 
to the media and put forward its members for AKP parliamentary and local 
positions (Tezcür 2010).  Key issues it lobbied for included EU accession and 
an alliance-building approach to foreign policy that it believed would foster 
new trade links. It pushed the AKP to pursue an even more alliance-building 
form of political reproduction, 
“Its new ambitious pro-Europe attitude led it to criticize the AKP 
government for not sufficiently taking advantage of the parliamentary 
decision which forbade the passage of American troops through 
Turkish territory for the war in Iraq in order to strengthen the alliance 
with ...France and Germany who opposed the invasion.”  
                                                     
43 TÜSİAD was founded in 1971 by several heads of large companies who wanted more 
political influence in Ankara. In the late 90s TÜSİAD was close to the old regime and 
Kemalist elite (Ugur and Yankya 2008). 
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(Yankaya and Dilek 2009: 12) 
Then again, much like the merger between the Gülen movement at the AKP, 
the strong alliance between MÜSİAD and the government would begin to 
implode the entire penetrating pattern of authority in the later years of AKP 
tenure. The problem was that the AKP alliance with MÜSİAD stalled its 
capacity to build alliances with other polities and elements of political society 
as allegations of corruption, favouritism and lack of transparency grew. As 
Morvaridi states,  
“Many MÜSİAD businesses provided financial donations that are 
administered by Municipalities, a gesture which…is likely to accord 
these companies reciprocating privileges in their business-related 
interactions with the local political authorities. There is a lack of 
transparency in some of these interactions and in the distribution of 
assistance, both by the municipalities and by the local branches of the 
central welfare administration. This concords with a social protection 
system that is largely discretionary.” 
(Morvaridi 2013: 314) 
In fact, these concerns were raised by MÜSİAD’s secular rival, TÜSİAD, from 
2005 onwards as they were concerned that the AKP were pandering too 
much to its religious support base. TÜSİAD had backed the AKP continually 
until 2004 and were an important strategic ally against trade unions, the 
military and judiciary. They had lauded the EU accession process undergone 
by the AKP and described the economic and political stability offered by them 
as the “transformation the country had been longing for (TÜSİAD 2004)” 
Then again, as the AKP gained more power and more elements of political 
society were pushed out of the political process, TÜSİAD began to question 
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whether the AKP’s pattern of authority was alliance-building at all. Ugur and 
Yankya (2008) description of the depth of criticism about fundamental rights 
violations says it all: 
“TÜSİAD criticised AKP government for its reluctance to assume the 
political responsibility for amending the anti-democratic legislation and 
for its complicity in the destruction of Orhan  Pamuk’s novels. It also 
criticised the government for its complicity in the opening of court 
cases against Hrant Dink, the editor of the Armenian magazine Agos, 
and other intellectuals including Hasan Cemal, İsmet Berkan, Murat 
Belge, Haluk Sahin Erol Katırcıoğlu for organizing a conference on the 
Armenian issue. TÜSİAD’s criticism included statements that pointed 
out to Turkey’s obligations under the Copenhagen criteria and 
stressed the need to broaden the freedom of expression, consolidate 
civil society organisations, and ensure the necessary conditions for the 
use of collective liberties.”  
(Ugur and Yankya 2008: 24-25) 
By as early into its tenure as 2004, divisions had begun to emerge between 
the AKP and its allies, such as TÜSİAD. So, who could groups such as 
TÜSİAD turn to with their criticisms? What was the political make-up of the 
opposition? Could they pose a challenge to the AKP or even push it to be 
more alliance-building? Could there be a third-way, away from both Kemalist 
authoritarianism and Islamic neoliberalism? 
The political parties that could pose a challenge to the AKP from 2002 
onwards were the Kemalist opposition, the CHP, the ultra-nationalist MHP 
and Kurdish parties in their different forms. The only factor uniting these 
parties, however, was their opposition to the AKP, as each had their own 
grievances, very different ideological background and loyal constituency.  
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Preventing any policies that would undermine the secular make-up of the 
Turkish political system dominated CHP’s interest articulation from 2002 to 
2010. This was the fundamental concern of the CHP44 cadre who were fearful 
of the religious rhetoric of the AKP. One of the most significant issues of the 
time was around the Islamic veil which had historically been banned in public 
institutions, parliament and universities. On February 7, 2008, an amendment 
regarding the headscarf ban was added to the Constitution by the AKP 
majority parliament. This amendment would legalize the headscarf in Turkish 
universities.  
The legalization of the veil was politically marketed as one of the AKP’s EU 
backed policy initiatives to increase both gender equality and religious 
freedoms, thus, successfully stopping the lifting of the ban proved difficult for 
the CHP who led the opposition against the legalization of the veil. In a public 
letter towards the wife of the then Prime Minister, Emine Erdoğan, the female 
deputy leader of the CHP Canan Aritman, wrote,  
“The way you dress while on trips abroad where you are representing 
the Republic of Turkey offends Turkish women. I respect your 
personal preference. But women in the modern Republic of Turkey 
have accepted a non-veiled, contemporary Western style of dress. If 
you must go on visits abroad with your husband, be like a 
contemporary Turkish woman. If you can't be that way then please 
stay at home.”  
(Turgut 2006)  
                                                     
44 The CHP cadre mainly consisted of Kemalist loyalists who were culturally Westernized. 
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On June 5th, 2008, the lifting of the headscarf ban was cancelled by the 
Constitutional Court, in a move promoted as a victory by the CHP45.  
Nonetheless, sensing the climate of the time and in an effort to widen the 
party’s electoral base, Deniz Baykal opened CHP political membership and 
recruitment to those wearing the scarf which proved a victory for the alliance-
building bloc. Despite this, polarization between the secular loyalists and the 
modern Islamists dominated political processes at the time. This was 
because through the alliance-building pattern of authority; political space 
opened to Islamist and Anatolian sections of society historically marginalized 
by the Kemalist blocking state. The CHP had no choice other than to try to 
broaden their appeal within this political context but struggled to succeed as 
both their hard-line ideological foundations and hard-line support base 
restricted their democratic opening (Öniş 2013). 
Their pro-military, secular loyalties meant that up until the early 2000’s the 
CHP were not diffident of pushing for a return to authoritarianism, and 
regularly called for the support of the military and secular establishment in 
ending the authority of the AKP (Öniş 2013). This in turn led to the liberals 
they frequently tried to attract, abandoning them and voting for the AKP. An 
                                                     
45 This was then overturned again in 2010 by the AKP bureaucracy. Loopholes in the law 
currently allow for the wearing of the headscarf in a particular manner at universities.  
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opportune moment for the CHP to demonstrate to political society that it had 
broadened its hard-line agenda to liberalism was during the 2008 Ergenekon 
trials46, in which prominent members of the military and the secular 
establishment (including CHP members were accused of planning a coup 
through the clandestine Ergenekon organization) (Akyol 2008).  
The AKP government were accused of responding to the coup attempt 
disproportionately and utilizing it as an opportunity to arrest and crack down 
on opponents. Their response was condemned by numerous sections of civil 
society internally and externally. The CHP’s rejoinder to the crackdown, 
however, also prompted condemnation from liberal elements of political 
society. Rather than solely criticizing the crackdown, the CHP actively 
defended the motives of the Ergenekon network, with leader Deniz Baykal 
declaring himself as the “advocate of the Ergenekon suspects” (Akyol 2008). 
This pushed liberals who would have been sympathetic to the CHP campaign 
for secularism, to turn to the AKP (Öniş 2013). 
The CHP had the potential to become the main checks and balance of the 
AKP Islamic neoliberal policy project within Parliament. Yet, in the 
                                                     
46 In 2008 the Istanbul Heavy Penal Court 12 and 13 began trials against the first 
ideologically Kemalist organization accused of terrorism in the history of the Turkish 
Republic, the clandestine Ergenekon network. This network had been accused of trying to 
organize a coup against the democratically elected AKP government, and assassinating and 
fomenting violence against minorities. Those in opposition to the government with ideological 
leanings affiliated with the Ergenekon network were also arrested and accused of being part 
of it, including some members of the CHP (Tuğal, 2016). 
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increasingly open and competitive environment pushed by the 
Europeanization project, the CHP’s ties to the traditional blocking regime 
posed difficulties in drawing votes across ethnic and religious divides. The 
CHP lacked the savvy political entrepreneurship needed to tackle the all-
encompassing rhetoric of the AKP and provided a weak and divided 
opposition.  
At the very heart of the AKP’s reshaping of the Turkish state was to make a 
powerful institutional expression of pluralism. The demands of the increasing 
embeddedness of the Turkish economy into the EU and global systems 
called for a neoliberalism based on consent with political society. Liberal 
peace on the domestic front was key to this consent, so the AKP launched a 
‘democratic opening’ initiative. The ‘democratic opening’ was a shift of 
Kurdish (and other minority) issues from a security concern to be dealt with 
by the military, into a political problem with a viable political solution based on 
democratic deliberation (Keyman 2010: 92).  
However, as stated by Araj and Savran (2016: 11), the ‘democratic opening’ 
did very little to improves the lives of Kurds from 2002 onwards:  
“Studies have highlighted that overall Kurds experience higher levels 
of income poverty, unemployment, illiteracy (especially among 
women), fertility, infant mortality rate, and lower levels of educational 
opportunities and performance (e.g. shortage of teachers, large 
classes, lack of mother-tongue medium instruction) compared to their 
Turkish counterparts (Icduygu et al. 1999; Aydin 2005; Koc et al. 2008; 
Yalcin Mousseau 2012) (despite the democratic opening). (As of 
2012) The unemployment rate in the ESA (was) almost double the 
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national average, and higher among youth. At the same time, Kurdish 
labourers (made up) a significant majority of the working class and the 
urban poor in Turkey (Park 2012: 83), particularly in the construction 
sector though most work in the agricultural sector.” 
Despite the ‘democratic opening’ doing little to improve the position of Kurds 
in Turkey, it was still perceived as sedition by the Kemalists and far right. The 
CHP and other nationalists such as the alt-right MHP47  condemned the 
‘democratic opening’ as a grave threat to Turkish sovereignty (Keyman 
2010). They blamed the initiative on the influence of outside forces, such as 
the EU. In a public speech in 2006 CHP leader Deniz Baykal accused the EU 
project of creating “artificial minorities” in Turkey (Keyman 2010).  
Throughout the early years of the AKP’s political authority, the nationalists 
continually framed their opposition to alliance-building political reproduction 
as defence against the weakening of Turkish sovereignty and power by the 
enemies of the Turkish nation (Celep 2010). These nationalist sentiments 
resonated with some and the MHP secured parliamentary representation in 
2007 with 14.27% and in 2011 with 13.01%48. This was because the MHP 
managed to pick up votes from nationalist Islamists who were disgruntled by 
the AKP’s soft ‘political solution’ approach to the Kurdish issue. Also, MHP’s 
support on campaigns such as the wearing of the headscarf in universities 
                                                     
47 The MHP stands for ultra-nationalist neo-fascism in Turkey, they first emerged in 1969 
under the leadership of Alparslan Türkeş.  
48 There is a 10% election count threshold to enter parliament in Turkey. 
 181 
 
and their backing of Abdullah Gül as President swayed religious voters with 
more nationalist tendencies (Celep 2010).  
Aside from the ‘threat’ of the Kurds, the nationalists were also vehemently 
opposed to the EU ‘dictating’ foreign policy on Cyprus. The CHP and MHP 
were critical of the nature of the EU accession targets, finding them 
submissive and contrary to the proud nationalism of Ataturk (Celep 2010). 
Deniz Baykal was one of the most vocal opponents against the 2005 
Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement regarding the conditions of EU 
accession. The agreement stated that Turkey should open its market to 
Greek-Cypriot trade. Baykal expressed that this would be akin to an official 
recognition of a Greek Cypriot state and a threat to the national interest of 
Turkey (Hürriyet 2005).   
It must be noted that the AKP regime’s alliance-building mode of political 
reproduction, especially the ‘democratic opening’, had wide support from 
majority Kurdish areas, who had been historically blocked out of the political 
process by the Kemalist capstone state (Araj and Savran 2017). This 
explains the large Kurdish vote share for AKP in 2002. Conversely, from 
2007 onwards as Kurds had been empowered and had increasing access to 
political space, they began to self-organize and were re-framed as a threat by 
the AKP. In 2009, the Kurdish DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, Democratic 
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Society Party) was banned by the Constitutional Court for alleged links to the 
PKK49 (Araj and Savran 2017). 
This section has addressed the AKP’s consolidation of political authority 
through building vertical and horizontal alliances across political society. 
During the 20th century, the Turkish state and regime was entrenched in 
blocking behaviour. Nonetheless, with the onset of parasitic capitalism, the 
embeddedness of the Turkish economy in the international and EU economic 
system, and the fear felt by the regime of revolutionary change as had 
occurred in 1979 Iran, the post-Islamist polity was able to assume power. It 
accomplished this through re-articulating the classic Turkish model of 
coercive governance into a governance of consent. This met the security 
demands of the regime, the state and political society and the AKP 
penetrated Islamic neoliberalism into public life- incepting the state and 
becoming the new ‘Turkish Model’50.  
                                                     
49 The Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK) is an illegal left-wing 
organization based in Turkey and Iraq. Since 1984 the PKK has waged an armed struggle 
against the Turkish state for equal rights and self-determination for the Kurds in Turkey. 
50 Lindberg (2001: 183) has explained how through alliance-building within civil and political 
society, a polity may expand its power: “A penetrative state works through and with society 
andsocial organizations to accomplish its tasks. A mutual, yet asymmetrical, 
relationship enables the state to reorganize and mobilize society to create better 
incentives for its continued rearticulation, adaptation, or restructuration. Hence, 
the penetrative state has greater potential for flexible response to changes in its 
environment.”  
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Section 5.2 has examined how the AKP out competed established political 
parties, established Islamism, and the economic elite for political power. 
Here, the focus has been on shifting alliances, emergent ideologies and 
polity power relations. Section 5.3 will further analyse what the alliance-
building mode of power articulation meant for the socio-economic 
development of Turkey. 
 
 
5.3 “Hope is the Bread of the Poor”: Political Authority and 
Development51 
At the core of the AKP’s Islamic neoliberal pattern of authority was its 
penetration and reorganization of political society through altering economic 
relations. Lindberg (2001) explains that a state extracts and uses resources 
to sustain itself through either blocking or mobilizing social groups. An 
alliance-building mode of reproduction which is established by bargain or 
consent means resources will be extracted through taxation, confiscation of 
private property, and the use of trade barriers. Revenues will be spent on the 
management of society and mobilization of social groups for state purposes 
(Hall 1999; Lindberg 2001). Social groups can be organized and empowered 
within the framework of the state through education and socialization, 
economic management and control, support to civil organizations and 
                                                     
51 “Hope is the bread of the poor” is an old Turkish proverb. 
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administration of state functions by semi-autonomous groups (Almond and 
Bingham Powell 1996). This is how state polities reproduce their power 
through socio-economic development.  
A formation of ‘infrastructural power’ (Mann 2012), creates a bargaining 
relationship in which a political society that has been penetrated by the state 
through resource extraction and use, can feedback inputs, leading to an 
integrated state polity. Consent for this uneven hierarchy (where the ability to 
extract resources in a territory is monopolized by the state) will be built 
through state-spending on the welfare system or other popular means 
(Lindberg 2001). This double-security analysis thus differs from purist 
Gramscian thought in that it does not distinguish between political and civil 
society in terms of state polity reproduction. Gramsci distinguishes between 
the realm of political society, namely the state apparatus and institutions, 
operates solely through coercion and threat, in contrary to the public realm of 
civil society that is oppressed through consent (Femia 1981).  
Yet, through an ‘infrastructural power’ framework it can be deemed that the 
early laudation of the ‘Turkish model’ was based on its ability to prevent 
revolution through poverty reduction, marketization and consumption culture, 
ensuring the consent of a broad stratum of Turkish society. Within this 
system, the myth was created and propagated that those who work hard and 
honestly would achieve higher standards of living and modernity (Tuğal 
2016).  
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The new hegemonic bloc of post-Islamists reshaped economic relations 
through pulling back the state and allowing the private sector an expanded 
role (Dagi 2013). This economic liberalization was possible through the 
subordination of peripheral margins of society (as well as the reproduction of 
old subordinations) as the AKP power base of business-owners became the 
hegemonic force in a new business-oriented society (Tuğal, 2016: 119). 
Social welfare was provided by a number of private actors close to the AKP, 
in the consciousness of those in need, the AKP and the private actors were 
one- creating the myth of and consent for the ‘generosity’ of neoliberal Islam 
(Morvaridi 2013). 
Mainstream pre-2013 coverage of the Turkish economy lauded it as a 
success52. A large section of the coverage focused on the astounding growth 
of GDP under the AKP which is demonstrated by Figure 5.1 (Tuğal 2016; 
The Business Year 2011; Bank and Karadag 2012).  
 
 
                                                     
52 In 2010 progressive steps were made in the auditing of public expenditure. The Law on 
the Turkish Court of Accounts was put into force which authorized the court to audit public 
expenditure on behalf of parliament. This move was commended by the European Union 
(European Commission 2011)  
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Figure 5.1 GDP per Capita (Constant Prices, Turkish Lira) in Turkey Every 5 
Years 
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (International Monetary 
Fund 2018) 
The figures in 5.1 demonstrate how in the first ten years of AKP tenure GDP 
per capita in Turkey grew at a rapid pace. The predominant reason for this 
was because the AKP agreed to work with the IMF and EU to privatize public 
enterprises (such as Turk Telecom, the Turpas oil refinery and Erdemir steel 
and iron producer) (Türkmen 2008).  Privatization revenue amounted to 
$30.6 billion (Morvaridi 2013). Privatization and the opening to investment led 
to a gargantuan increase of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In 2002 the 
number of active companies was 498, by 2011 this was 25,927. Foreign 
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capital was worth $1.5 billion in 2002 and increased to $22 billion in 
(Morvaridi 2013; Tuğal 2016). In turn leading to a stabilization of inflation, but 
the AKP was unable to close the trade gap. Exporters remained dependent 
on the import of capital and were harmed by the tech-negative pressure of 
import substitution. This meant that the Turkish economy became very 
dependent on abroad and vulnerable to a possible slowing of capital flows 
(Tuğal 2016: 121). As such, dependency on, and embeddedness in the 
international economy furthered the need for maintaining horizontal alliances 
with international polities. 
Because of the neoliberal turn and IMF and EU targets, there was an 
increased pressure on the AKP to penetrate society without losing 
government revenue. Fiscal tightness ensued and faith-based organizations 
sympathetic to the AKP filled the welfare gap so as not to lose the power 
blocs penetrative consent with political society (Morvaridi 2013). Social 
expenditure was well below the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) average in 2007, at 19.2% of GDP. Inequality 
persisted, as demonstrated by Figure 5.2 which shows the Gini coefficient at 
an average of 0.40 over the first decade of AKP tenure53. 
                                                     
53 The Gini coefficient is a measure of the income distribution within an economy. A 
coefficient of 1 represents perfect inequality, implying that a single individual holds all wealth. 
A coefficient of 0 indicates perfect equality with wealth distributed equally among participants 
(Human Sciences Research Council 2014). Nonetheless, the Gini index has come under 
criticism for only revealing some aspects of inequalities and not others so must be taken 
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Figure 5.2 Gini coefficient in Turkey from 2002-2012 
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Source: World Bank (World Bank 2018) 
The AKP did make some headway in poverty reduction rates. The poverty 
rate dropped from 26% in 2002 to 17.7% in 2007- which Morvaridi (2013) 
notes may have been a catalyst for support from the poor when the AKP 
were re-elected in 2011. Figure 5.3 demonstrates AKP’s trend towards fiscal 
tightness with regards to limiting government expenditure. The AKP’s 
rejection of the role of government expenditure was not just based on their 
neoliberal values, but also their Islamic values. As far as the culture around 
                                                                                                                                                      
subjectively. For example, it does not account for differing population demographics or an 
economy’s total wealth. It also does not include income from the informal sector or measure 
social benefits such as access to education or subsidized housing (Human Sciences 
Research Council 2014). 
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social welfare was concerned, it stemmed from the socially conservative 
tradition of reliance on family for assistance. 
 
Figure 5.3 Government Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP from 2000-
2015  
30%
35%
40%
45%
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015
Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP
 
Source:  IMF World Economic Outlook Database (International Monetary 
Fund 2018) 
Morvaridi (2013) argues that this perpetuated power relations based on 
patriarchy, class and religious authority making the welfare system far from 
universal. Morvaridi (2013) further comments that casual workers and 
vulnerable groups had to rely on faith-based organizations and non-
governmental organizations if the family structure was not in place. 
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Tuğal (2016) goes as far as to say that rather than the neoliberal competitive 
environment leading to voluntary consent from subordinate classes, the 
reform of social provision by the AKP was an act of war against the 
subaltern. Between 2007 and 2011, the AKP cut healthcare, raised the 
retirement age, depressed wages, curtailed unions and limited strikes54. 
Morvaridi (2013) highlights the removal of the Yeşil Kart system, a state 
scheme to ensure the provision of health services to the poor, forcing the 5 
million Kart holders to pay a premium. Aside from transfiguring the health 
sector, the education sector was also vastly transformed by the AKP’s 
neoliberal Islamic agenda.  
Government spending in the Turkish education sector grew steadily under 
the AKP government between 2002 and 2011. In 2011 this, in addition to 
private and international investment amounted to TL34 billion, 15% of the 
national budget. Private and international investment in education was 
encouraged under the AKP through tax breaks and other incentives (The 
Business Year 2011). 
Expansion of access to education was a key policy initiative of the AKP 
government. Access was increased across all levels of education between 
2002 and 2011. A fundamental process between 2002 and 2011 was the 
                                                     
54 Islamic unions flourished during this period- securing many welfare-like benefits (vacation 
packaged, car credits and scholarships) (Tuğal 2016). 
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expansion of early year’s education. A large amount of education spending 
was directed towards kindergartens. Access to kindergartens became 
widespread throughout the country bringing about a 22% increase in 
enrolment in 2009-2010 from 2008-2009. Compulsory elementary education 
to 8 years was implemented through the government’s Ninth Development 
Plan 2007-2013 which in turn increased the number of pupils entering 
secondary school (The Business Year 2011).  
The number of universities also increased under the first two AKP party 
governments. This was due to fiscal incentivising of the founding of private 
universities. The number of universities doubled between 2006 and 2011. 
These changes led to an increase of enrolled students in further education 
from 25.5% of the male population and 17.7% of the female population in the 
1998/1999 university year to 49% of the male population and 39% of the 
female population in the 2008/2009 university year (The Business Year 
2011). 
The AKP’s international turn has had a formidable impact on educational 
opportunities within Turkey and within the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region. In addition, the Europeanization project eased access of 
study for Turkish students within Europe, specifically through the Erasmus 
program. In 2009-2010 approximately 7,000 Turkish students went to 
university in Europe through the Erasmus initiative. Although this is a 
relatively small number in the context of the circa 3 million university students 
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in Turkey, it is a large increase from prior years (The Business Year 2011, 
Yurtseven 2016). Turkey hosted 20,000 foreign students in 2011, mainly from 
the Middle East and North Africa (The Business Year 2011).   
Despite the increase of access to education, concerns were raised by 
educational experts about the quality of education that Turkish youth 
received:  
“The AKP has not only lifted the headscarf ban in higher education 
and popularised the Imam Hatip Schools, but also Islamised the 
national curriculum through the addition of certain optional courses at 
secondary school level, and with the transformation of the school 
textbooks on Religious Culture and Morality in 2007 and 2008.” 
(Kaya 2015: 57) 
Worries have persisted regarding the use of socialization within the education 
system by the post-Islamists to further their Islamic ideology. Gür (2016) 
refers to the mass increase of Imam Hatip schools, the schools that were 
traditionally for the education of Sunni Muslim clerics. Many secular schools 
have been converted into Imam Hatips and a number of new Imam Hatips 
have been built in what has been condemned by secularists as an attack on 
the independence of the school system. The growth of Imam Hatip school 
students generally coincides with the tenure of an Islamic government in 
Turkey. The large growth of the number of Imam Hatip students since the 
AKP came into government in 2002 can be evidenced in the graph below 
(5.4). The high number of Imam Hatip school students in the mid to late 90’s 
coincides with the rule of the Islamic Welfare party. The number rapidly 
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decreased because of the post-modern secularist coup in 1997 before rapidly 
rising again with the AKP in power: 
 
Figure 5.4 The Proportion of Imam Hatip High School Students in the Total 
Number of High School Students (1995-2014) 
  
 
Source: Al Jazeera Center for Studies with data obtained from the Ministry of 
National Education Statistics (Gür 2016) 
Another example of the creeping Islamization is the ‘FATIH Projesi’, which 
was introduced by the AKP in 2010. The aim of this project was to 
technologize learning throughout the Republic, introducing the use of tablets, 
e-books and other technology into the classroom. The project ‘Fatih’ is 
named after the ‘opening’ of a new era, when the Ottoman Empire began, 
and Istanbul was ‘liberated’ from the Byzantines (Lüküslü 2016). The use of 
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this language resonates strongly in Turkish Islamic discourse. These 
programmes have alienated many young people who reject the Islamization 
project. The young people who have protested such government 
programmes have been condemned as ‘çapulcu’ (looters, marauders or 
bums) by the AKP elite (Lüküslü 2016: 643-644).  
Demet Lüküslü (2016: 638) explains that the ‘Turkish Model’ of ‘Islamic 
democracy’ has “proved unsuccessful in solving the chronic problems of 
Turkey’s education sector and the many socio-economic challenges its 
young people have been facing.” She argues that there has been a creeping 
Islamization of youth culture by the government. As the post-Islamist project 
was marketed so well as being penetrative and alliance-building, those who 
did not subscribe to it were condemned as ungrateful and ostracised.  
Yet, Bozdaglioglu (2003) is more sympathetic towards the cultural-identity 
framework of the AKP’s Islamism. In comparison to other states with Muslim 
majority populations such as Saudi Arabia, the AKP has a soft Islamic 
approach. This approach very much reflects domestic currents such as the 
rise of the Anatolian conservative middle-class. The Islamism and 
conservatism of the AKP, however, has been constrained so as not to offend 
the traditional Kemalist elites of Istanbul and the army.  
The expansion of neo-liberalism is also driven by the consumerist identity of 
the growing Turkish Anatolian conservative middle-class. The Turkish state 
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polity under the AKP put development at the centre of its maintenance of 
power, “through the muting of internal differences and social opposition as a 
precondition of healthy change and growth.” (Tuğal 2016: 110) Power 
struggles became common throughout the education system and state 
bureaucracy, not just between the religious and the secular, but also between 
management and workers55 over their employment rights and pay. In fact, the 
open and competitive environment encouraged by the AKP seemed to cause 
more conflict and polarization rather than competitive behaviour and alliance-
building. Divisions were so intense, that vertical competition over power 
threatened the very sovereignty and territoriality of the Turkish state. In 2004 
a Presidential veto of the Framework Law on Public Administration prevented 
devolution of power to local government from central government on the 
grounds that it “conflicted with constitutional provisions related to the unitary 
character of the state.” (Türkmen 2008: 161) 
The social and economic policies implemented by the post-Islamists heavily 
altered the make-up of Turkish political society through political 
socialization56. The AKP managed to maintain a myth of the spoils of 
                                                     
55 The weakness of the state bureaucracy meant international corporations could get away 
with treating workers inhumanely without repercussions. Between 2002 and 2011m, 5213 
workers died due to occupational injury (Tugal 2016: 147). 
56 Political socialization is the way in which loyalty is built towards a particular political culture 
by a state’s citizens. This is achieved through a number of agents and institutions, 
educational and religious institutions being central to the formation of political attitudes. As 
Almond and G Bingham Powell (1996: 51) explain, “It is the way one generation passes on 
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neoliberal Islam emancipating the young and the poor. They accomplished 
this through gentrification, and metaphoric symbolism of Ottoman wealth in 
urban spaces and public discourse, which in turn-built consent and loyalty for 
the AKP state polity. Despite these attempts, polarization was reinforced by 
inequality, foreign interference, and a culture of bias in favour of religiosity 
and conservatism within the education and health sectors. Rather than the 
AKP’s success lying in employing coercion and fortifying behaviour, it lay in 
“dressing it in democratic and Islamic garb.” (Tuğal 2016: 93) 
The next section examines how through their alliances, the AKP consolidated 
executive power and became synonymous with the regime through becoming 
the very oppressors of the liberal society it championed.  
 
5.4 The AKP’s Struggle for Executive Power, Justice and 
Lawfulness  
The first decade of AKP tenure witnessed a growing monopoly on power by 
the party, with the suppression of press freedoms, lack of transparency and 
allegations of corruption within the state bureaucracy, the closure of 
opposition political parties and organizations, court manipulation, the 
suppression of the right to assembly and demonstrate and an increase in the 
number of arrests of political opponents. The AKP’s power to implement 
                                                                                                                                                      
political ideas and beliefs to succeeding generations, a process called cultural transmission. 
It transforms the political culture when it leads the citizens, or some of them, to view and 
experience politics in a different way.”  
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these repressive measures was reinforced on September the 12th, 2010 
when a referendum was held regarding 26 amendments to the constitution. 
The results of the referendum led to the passing of all the amendments. 58% 
of the population voted in favour of these changes.  
Some of the key democratic changes in the referendum were the 
strengthening of the governing parties influence over the power of the 
military, and trials to be held in civilian, rather than military courts. However, 
many saw the referendum as a way for the AKP to increase its 
monopolization on power, rather than hand power back to the people. 
Through decreasing the power of the military and judiciary, it increased the 
power and capacity of the executive to pursue their agenda of Islamic 
neoliberalism (Hale 2012).  
The military's role as the ultimate arbiter of Turkish politics decreased 
significantly under the AKP. The ruling party strengthened civilian control of 
the military as part of its efforts to meet the necessary requirements for EU 
accession. One such initiative was the re-organization and diminishing of the 
power of the National Security Council, which was moved to civilian control 
away from military control (Hale 2012). By the mid 2000’s the political culture 
in Turkey had shifted away from a strong military role in the democratic 
process, as had been the norm during the 1980s. This was seen with the 
selection of the President in 2007, where military objection to a Presidential 
candidate increased the candidate’s popularity (Hale 2012).  
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Traditionally, the Presidency had been held by a secularist non-affiliated to a 
political party. From 2000 to 2007 this was President Ahmet Necdet Sezer. In 
the Grand National Assembly in April and May 2007 the AKP put forward a 
ballot to make AKP foreign minister, Abdullah Gül, president. The president 
had historically been chosen by the legislature (Hale 2012). The ballot was 
boycotted by the CHP and mass protests spread throughout the country. 
These protests were supported by the military who publicly opposed Gül’s 
candidacy. The military who were the historical defenders of Kemalist secular 
traditions, were gravely concerned about Gül’s Islamist beliefs. The 
presidency had historically been held by a secularist. Due to the CHP 
boycott, the ballot was unable to go ahead. The AKP then pushed forward 
several laws to enable a change in the rules of the selection of the president: 
“the candidate who receives the absolute majority of the valid votes 
becomes the elected President.”  
 Amended Article 101 (TCCB: 2007)  
The presidency was also reduced to 5 years from 7, but two terms were 
legalized. As the reforms were vetoed by President Sezer, early elections 
were called in July 2007 where AKP managed to increase their vote from 
34.3% to 46.6% which they felt gave Gül a mandate for the presidency. The 
AKP nevertheless, still failed to secure Gül’s presidency. 
“Gül …failed to receive the required two thirds majority vote in the first 
two attempts. However, constitutional provisions reduced the two-
thirds majority requirement to a simple majority if no candidate gains 
office in the first two votes. With the main opposition CHP boycotting 
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the vote, Gül gained election to the presidency on the third ballot with 
339 votes (61.6%).”  
(Polity IV Country Report 2010: Turkey 2009) 
The outcome of the AKP’s proposed changes would mean that the president, 
not the prime minister would oversee the daily running of the country. The 
AKP argued that a strong Presidential role in the state would end the 
polarised political deadlock that had been characteristic of the Republic’s 
policy making process throughout the 20th century; which was marred by 
coalition governments. The opposition parties have been vehemently 
opposed to the proposed changes, one of which would ensure the President 
the power to appoint half the justices (Hale 2012).  
Nonetheless, some improvements have been made within the political 
system ensuring a fairer playing ground for opposition parties. In 2011 the 
‘democratic opening’ process meant that for the first-time political broadcasts 
by all legal political parties were permitted. The cost of the political 
broadcasts would have to be met by the political parties and could be in any 
language including Kurdish. A number of political parties did in fact broadcast 
in Kurdish (European Commission 2011).  
Yet, despite this ‘democratic opening’, Kurdish political parties continued to 
face closure. In its report on Turkish accession the European Commission 
(2011) condemned Turkey for violating the freedom of assembly and 
association, with continual bans on political parties. The report also noted 
that a relatively high number of MPs were also arrested, and some banned 
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from political office. It stated that women, ethnic and religious minorities and 
the disabled have been under-represented in Parliament. The overall 
summary was that,  
“Laws concerning financing of political parties and election campaigns, 
closure of political parties and parliamentary immunities have yet to be 
aligned with European standards. Further efforts are needed to 
strengthen parliament’s capacity to perform its functions of law-making 
and oversight over the executive.” 
 (European Commission 2011) 
The EU Accession Partnership Document had specified 117 areas for 
political and economic reforms in line with the Copenhagen Criteria for EU 
members (Atasoy 2009). In 2003 the AKP instituted the Emergency Action 
Plan to better enable the state to meet the Copenhagen Criteria. This 
resulted in the harmonization laws, with seven political reform packages. The 
AKP significantly altered the make-up of the state in the early 2000s through 
a huge amount of legislation: 
“In the brief period from October 2004 to July 2005, the AKP -majority 
parliament succeeded in passing 166 laws. The general assembly 
convened 125 times, having met for a total of 696 hours and 
generating 33,049 pages of documentation. Parliamentary 
commissions worked 1231 hours and recorded 17,200 pages of 
deliberation (Turkish Daily News 21 July 2005).” 
(Atasoy 2009) 
As a result of this, changes to Turkish law included the implementation of 
freedom of association, deterrents against torture, safeguards for the rights of 
prisoners and the closure of political parties was made more difficult (Tuğal 
2016). Despite these positive changes, the repression of religious and ethnic 
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minorities persisted. This was accompanied by crack-downs on the freedom 
of the press and media.  
Turkey’s Accession Partnership with the European Union had altered the 
relationship between the state and religion. The blocking secular state 
historically had a repressive culture towards religious practice. From 1991 
onwards, the policy-making priority around religion was to ensure freedom of 
practice and an end to religious discrimination. The Directorate of Religious 
Affairs, or Diyanet, is the state religious institution in Turkey, which has taken 
Hanefi Islam as its foundation.  
Between 2002 and 2011 the AKP launched a number of reform projects 
within Diyanet. These have empowered the religious majority but 
marginalized religious minorities and can be argued to impede other human 
rights. The Alevi minority have been one of the most repressed groups by the 
Institution (Tepe 2008). 
The Alevi minority have accused the Directorate of not recognizing the sect’s 
religious traditions. The AKP have not met the needs of self-determination of 
the Alevi community, and have not accepted them as a unique religious 
group with unique religious needs. The AKP leadership asserts that, “had the 
Alevis been recognized as a religious group, the Aczemendis (an extremist 
eccentric Islamist group) would have to be included as well.” (Tepe 2008)  
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However, in line with the alliance-building ‘democratic opening’, some liberal 
change did take place under the AKP government. A landmark case 
regarding the Alevi minority was brought to the European Court of Human 
Rights in 2004 after failure of a just settlement in the domestic courts. The 
case brought to the court by Mr. Hasan Zengin and his daughter Miss Eylem 
Zengin was against “the manner in which the compulsory lessons in religious 
culture and ethics were taught.”  
The compulsory religious classes in public schools, based on the 
homogeneous idea of Hanefi Islam, were found to violate the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European 
Court of Human Rights 2007). This led to a softening of the religious agenda, 
and as a result of the ruling the Turkish regime applied an improved, more 
open religious education curriculum.  
Another liberalization of religious practice, which was brought into 
implementation by Diyanet, was the allocation of a quota to female ‘muftu’ or 
religious assistant provincial leader, to readdress the gender imbalance in 
religious leadership.  Unfortunately,  
“The party’s failed attempt to fill women’s quotas in its own 
organization was matched by that of the directorate: the quotas for 
muftu were left unfilled due to the unavailability of qualified candidates. 
Indeed only 2,450 of the 80,000…directorate employees are women.” 
(Tepe 2008) 
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Tepe (2008) argues that the AKP implemented a much more pluralist attitude 
towards religious practice than the conventional Kemalist establishment of 
the blocking state. Nonetheless, this has resulted in a lazy approach that 
does not challenge the status quo or the hegemonic religious culture of 
Hanefi Islam over Turkish society. Tepe (2008) explains “the party’s 
inclusiveness is not based on principled commitment but is limited to those 
actors who do not challenge the presumed religious unity.” Diyanet is the 
most widespread administrative body in Turkey, its network spanning all 
regions. This provides any elected party the means to influence religious 
discourse on a mass scale, thus setting the milieu for societal relations57.  
Nye (2004: 59) explains the reason for this in relation to religion as a soft 
power tool, “Religion is a double-edged sword as a …soft power resource, 
and how it cuts depends on who is wielding it”. When soft power rests on 
notions of foreign policy activism, cultural attraction and political values (Nye, 
2004) a fixed religious ideology and identity although popular with some, can 
also pose limitations when building bridges with others. 
 
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
The alliance-building mode of political reproduction undergone by the AKP 
dramatically overhauled the legislative and institutional framework of the 
                                                     
57 Here again we can see political socialization in action, where the AKP tried to build as 
much consent as possible, widening the acceptance of their political programme.  
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state. Key reforms have included: the abolition of the death penalty, the 
legalization of Kurdish and other minority languages, property rights for non-
Muslims, an increase in religious freedom including the right to wear an 
Islamic headscarf in public places, and comprehensive limitations on the 
power of the military to intervene in civilian affairs.  
The AKP incumbency has also seen the mass opening up and liberalization 
of the economy, which has led to the emergence of a new bourgeoisie, 
traditionalists from the heartlands of Anatolia, known as the ‘Anatolian Tigers’ 
whose economic interests have played an increasing role in the formal 
political process. Nonetheless, the greatest success of the ‘Turkish model’ 
was its ability to mitigate revolutionary change from below through re-framing 
Islamic neoliberalism as social justice and opportunity.  
What emerged was the nesting of Islamic neoliberalism into the Turkish state 
polity, its absorption becoming a new-found institutional expression to divert 
rival polities and potential wielders of power. Here the importance of the 
second-image reversed thesis in IR must be stressed. The political 
reproduction of the Turkish state altered to alliance-building because of the 
changing structure of the international political system, which naturally poses 
a double-security dilemma to states. The double-security dilemma faced by 
the Turkish state took the form of the threat of the spread of revolutionary 
Islamism to its domesticity after the 1979 Iranian revolution; plus, the 
increasing embeddedness and dependency of the Turkish economy on the 
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international economic system. In one fell swoop, the ‘Turkish alliance-
building model’ of political reproduction de-centred equality and revolution 
from the centre of Islamist discourse, and replaced it with post-Islamist 
materialism and avarice.  
Nonetheless, this model in and of itself was unsustainable, as despite the 
best efforts of the AKP to maintain consent, discontent grew amongst those 
who felt unrepresented by the religiosity of the project, alongside those who 
felt as inequality grew, that they did not have a stake. These themes will be 
further explored in the next two chapters.  
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Chapter Six: The AKP’s Horizontal Alliance-building 
Political Reproduction of Post-Islamist Turkey’s 
Functional Sovereignty 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter focused on the polities and non-polities of the political 
system that posed vertical competition to the AKP regime over issues, 
resources and loyalties during the 2002-2011 period. How the AKP 
maintained constitutive sovereignty over the Turkish state through an 
alliance-building model of political reproduction with an Islamic neoliberal 
pattern of authority was explored, with special reference to Turkish political 
and civil society.  In this chapter, how the AKP maintained the functional 
dimension of sovereignty of the Turkish state will be examined. In the first 11-
13 years of AKP rule, Turkey competed for power horizontally through co-
opting and becoming increasingly alliance-building58 to mitigate the threats 
from other state polities and non-polities59 vying for political authority and 
sovereignty across international space60.  
                                                     
58  It is important to note that alliance-building and fortifying political reproduction are not 
positivist concepts, a state is either becoming more one or the other at any given time, but 
always displays some behaviours of either. 
59 These threats are what Ferguson and Mansbach term the double-security dilemma  
60 The alliance-building form of political reproduction lasted around 2 years longer 
horizontally, than it did vertically. Through the lens of the second image reversed approach, 
which will be explored more in the next chapter, it is evident how as the regional security 
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A polity will seek to take the best advantage of its constitutive and 
environmental factors to ensure its preservation61. Ferguson and Mansbach 
(1996: 44) explain that “a polity is more durable to the extent it co-opts or 
incorporates competing ideologies and identities into its ideological 
framework.” This was what Turkey’s lead foreign policy architect and 
practitioner, Ahmet Davutoğlu62, recognized; hence the AKP took advantage 
of its Ottoman history in addition to its neoliberal prowess, to undertake an 
alliance-building strategy of power consolidation within the international 
sphere (Natil 2016). The combination of the Islamic neoliberal vertical 
constitutive dimension of sovereignty and the neo-Ottoman horizontal 
functional dimension of sovereignty ensured the AKP mitigated the double-
security dilemma and maintained the authority of the Turkish state. By 2011, 
this combination would become internationally known as ‘The Turkish Model’.  
This chapter is divided into four analytical sections. The first section 6.2, 
‘Neo-Ottoman Statecraft as a Response to the Double-Security Dilemma of 
the New Century’ explains how as US power was on the decline, Turkey’s 
                                                                                                                                                      
situation deteriorated, the reaction was to crack down on civil society domestically whilst 
maintaining alliances regionally. This unravelled as Turkey’s regional alliances started to 
falter and it was clear that liberal peace was no longer tenable. 
61 As Lindberg (2001: 180) explains, “The most fundamental activity of state, governance, 
and regime institutions is to extract resources and then make use of them to preserve its 
continued existence.” 
62 Turkish academician, Prime Minister of Turkey from August 2014 to May 2016 and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2009 to 2014 (Falk 2014). 
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post-Islamist leaders began inventing and utilizing new tools of statecraft to 
expand their ‘passive revolution’ across borders and consolidate their 
regional power. The next section 6.3, ‘Between middle-state and greatness: 
Turkey’s horizontal alliance-building, moral power, and functional consent in 
the Middle East and beyond’ examines the soft power implementation of the 
AKP’s statecraft toolbox and Turkey’s middle state activism; as ‘virtuous 
power’ was constructed to build loyalty and consent for Islamic neoliberalism 
across the periphery.  
Section 6.4, ‘The two faces of Turkey: the AKP’s maintenance of hard power 
during the alliance-building period’ provides evidence of Turkey’s continued 
fortifying behaviour through economics, trade and defence. Despite 
becoming more alliance-building with Iran and the Arab states, this section 
explains how Turkey’s triple entente with the USA and Israel was at the 
centre of their defence politics. Section 6.5, ‘A deconstruction of ‘The Turkish 
Model’,  combines the above factors with the vertical political reproduction of 
chapter 5 to explain how the AKP’s passive revolution and maintenance of 
neoliberalism became a ‘model’, having a ‘demonstrative effect’ on other 
Muslim majority nations. The concept of ‘The Turkish Model’ is then de-
constructed in light of the political structures, functions and agents discussed 
in the chapter.  
 209 
 
6.2 Neo-Ottoman Statecraft as a Response to the Double-
Security Dilemma of the New Century  
To comprehend the horizontal political reproduction undertaken by the AKP 
from 2002 onwards, the transformation of Turkey’s foreign relations has to be 
placed in historical and political context. Therefore, the starting point of this 
analysis is the decline in US power, and the post-Islamist strategy contrived 
by Davutoğlu to make Turkey the regional political powerhouse as a 
response. This was achieved by attempting to nest the complex identities of 
the Middle East under one post-Ottoman identity through expanding the 
AKP’s passive revolution. This was achieved through soft power and allying 
with neighbours- in the hope of consolidating the model of Islamic 
neoliberalism.  
US power in the Middle East has been on the decline since it was clear that 
the Iraq war was not a hasty remedy to reinforcing American hegemony. By 
2005, the American military became heavily embroiled in the conflict, opening 
up space for smaller state polities to compete for power in the region (Bank 
and Karadag 2012). Turkey, as a non-Arab state polity, not tied to either the 
pro-Saudi or pro-Iran axis, had a unique position to employ independent 
political action and mediation, providing the government with a powerful 
domestic narrative of Turkey as the new regional leader.  
“At a time when a new regional public sphere has been in the 
making… (there has been)..growing acceptance of and support for 
Turkey as a regional actor whose approach differs radically from that 
of global and other rival regional actors in their attempts to become 
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dominant. Neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia can credibly act as defenders 
of the Muslim voice as the AKP has done domestically.”  
(Bank and Karadag 2012: 18)  
The AKP post-Islamist’s passive revolution accompanied by their success at 
defeating the secular Kemalist authoritarian regime on the domestic front 
gave Turkey increased legitimacy whilst dealing with Muslim nations (Tuğal 
2016). The emerging ‘moral power’ on the international front, in turn, 
reinforced the AKP’s authority at home (Nye 2004).  
Birdal (Akça, Bekmen and Özden 2013: 92) explains that Turkey faced a new 
double-security dilemma in the increasingly neo-liberal international space. 
The AKP had to simultaneously re-articulate domestic social and 
international political relations ensuring Turkey’s standing in the capitalist 
word economy.  Central to this was maintaining the authority of the state in 
an increasingly competitive region and protecting capital accumulation 
domestically and internationally of the hegemonic class of the post-Islamist 
petit-bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie. States have two options for maintaining 
power across and through political space, they extract resources from their 
own society and from abroad either co-operatively or coercively (Lindberg 
2001).  
States extract resources then uphold themselves through war, defence, 
propaganda, social benefits and patronage. Historically this has happened in 
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the international sphere through imperialism, trade, intergovernmental aid 
and loans63 (Lindberg 2001).  The state also has to continually bargain for 
authority within the international community and the ever more trans-border 
nature of political society. Then the resources are used to maintain authority 
through either blocking or mobilizing social groups through maintaining polity 
loyalty (Lindberg 2001). Waltz, (1979: 56) has explained that alliances are 
the tools states use to ensure a balance of power and survival within the 
state system. Combining their capabilities with those of other states through 
alliances is a method of external balancing. 
Statecraft is the “use of policy instruments to satisfy the core-objectives of 
nation states in the international system” (Mastanduno 1998: 826). The 
conceptual framework of statecraft broadened with the ‘third great debate in 
international relations’. Previously restricted to use of economic, diplomatic 
and military means to achieve power, influence and security; scholarship on 
statecraft now encompasses notions of soft power64, low politics, culture and 
                                                     
63  Lindberg (2001: 181) refers to the point that “Historically… absolutism was necessary to 
extract resources without consent.” Yet, as social relations and the nature of political society 
changed, it became more efficient for the state to make the population pay for war 
“voluntarily” through taxes normalizing bargaining and consent as the maintenance of power 
of political authorities. It is at this point in history that loyalty and issues became particularly 
important in civilian-government relations.   
64 The power of a polity to co-opt, persuade and attract through culture, economy, tourism or 
other “soft” means, internationally.   
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identity-formation65. With regards to Turkey, the literature examines soft 
power during the AKP government (Oǧuzlu 2007; Anas 2011; Alpaydin 
2010); Turkey’s role as a regional power (Kirişci 2011) and middle power 
(Nye 2004; Barlas 2005), the concept of Turkey’s regional human security 
agenda (Natil 2013, 2016, 2017) and the role of religion, culture and identity 
formation in Turkish statecraft (Bozdaglioglu 2003). In the first sections of this 
chapter, Turkey’s soft power is contextualized in relation to the AKP’s 
alliance-building political reproduction driven by the double-security dilemma 
faced at the beginning of the 20th century as neoliberalism ensued. As a 
historical realist enquiry, despite the central role of identity and loyalty; this 
study also builds and expands on the Gramscian idea of ‘historic bloc 
formation’ and highlights the centrality of economic competition in the state’s 
threat determination (threat from rivals) which will be further explored at the 
end of the chapter (Femia 1991).  
Yalvaç (2016:12) explains how the modern state “serves as the locus of 
accumulation and the construction of the political order of capital.” To 
understand the state’s extraction and bargaining in the international sphere, 
                                                     
65 Hall (1999: 116)  “for instance, (it would)  seem difficult or prohibitively costly for a state to 
be alliance-building if there is a discrepancy in the ideological convictions permeating society 
and the state, as in Visigothic Spain. Conversely, a state might actively create myths, for 
instance, in attempts at becoming alliance-building, as in free Germany during the Roman 
Empire.”  
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one has to appreciate the role of foreign policy as a hegemonic initiative66 
driven ideologically and physically by the elite class to maintain their political 
authority over both domestic and international civil and political society. 
Yalvaç (2016:8) explains that:  
“..through the hegemonic bloc concept (Gramsci) demonstrates how a 
temporary alliance between social classes is established around a set 
of hegemonic ideas or ‘dominant ideology’. (In this case, neo-
ottomanism and post-Islamism.)” 
When the ‘red threat’ of 20th century communism had disintegrated, policy-
makers began to reshape Turkish foreign policy according to the new 
economic opportunities and alliances that presented in the 21st century. 
AKP’s ex-foreign and prime minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, is the creator of the 
Strategic Depth Doctrine (Stratejik Derinlik) which he sets out in an academic 
literary format (Davutoğlu 2001)67. In his book, Davutoğlu states that Turkey 
should utilize its alliance-building potential based on historical and cultural 
ties within its geopolitical sphere, as well as promoting democracy and free 
markets, ergo shedding its fortifying 20th century reputation, the ‘so-called 
Kemalist foreign policy tradition’ (Tansel 2015). 
                                                     
66 Yalvaç (2016: 16) explains that “the concept of a hegemonic project- developed by Jessop 
(1990) denotes the agential moment of structural change, in which agency transforms pre-
existing structures, while simultaneously being enabled and constrained by those structures.” 
67 The focus here on Davutoğlu is not without reason. As Falk (2014) has stated, “Long 
before Davutoğlu became foreign minister in 2009, he was widely respected in Turkey as the 
creative force behind its energetic and effective foreign policy, which was causing a stir in 
the region and around the world.” (Falk 2014) 
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During the Cold War, Turkey’s political reproduction within the international 
system was blocking and fortifying, particularly within the Middle East where 
the Treaty of Lausanne had left a fractured legacy. The political processes at 
the time meant that policy-makers perceived multiple international alliances 
as a threat to Turkish sovereignty as any loosening of Kemalist militarism 
could offer space to plant the seed of Communism within Turkish territory. 
International loyalties lied solely with NATO and Israel (Hale 2012). When the 
Soviet Union dissolved, the newly independent states of Eastern Europe and 
the Caucasus, and the liberalizing of economic markets opened up space for 
new alliances to be formed and Turkey’s political reproduction in the 
international sphere became alliance-building and based on consent and 
cultural solidarity (Hale 2012).  
Davutoğlu’s radical vision of international alliances is based on a new 
regional geographic imagination grounded around the legacy of the Ottoman 
Empire, thus it was termed by commentators as “neo-ottoman”: 
“It was argued that the AKP’s policies, far from being new, were ‘neo-
Ottoman’, implying a reversion to pre-republican practices. The 
principle of cultural pluralism was used to address the Kurdish 
question, and could be adopted as the basis of more liberal, less 
ardently nationalist, foreign policies.”  
(Hale 2012: 255) 
Under the AKP, pax-ottomana and the revival of Turkey’s Islamic and 
Ottoman heritage swept through layers of the intelligentsia and popular 
culture across the Islamic world. There was a renewed sense of pride in 
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Turkey’s history and a renewed energy for regional co-operation (Hale 2012). 
Tuğal (2012: Online) states, “A nostalgia for all things ottomanesque has 
swept through even secular Turkey, leading to record ratings for a soap 
opera about (Ottoman) Sultan Süleyman.” 
The architects of transnational post-Islamism, the intellectual wing of the AKP 
leadership, had generated a pax-ottomana renaissance intending to shake 
the foundations of the Eurocentric epistemology that the international system 
had grown accustomed to68; as they believed great powers could only be 
born ideologically and combining Turkey’s Ottoman legacy with its 
geopolitical and economic weight as a middle state were central to this 
(Davutoğlu 2001). 
Davutoğlu’s conception of Islam in politics was largely influenced by the 
sociologist Ziya Gokalp, who theorized the notion of Turkish nationalism with 
an Ottoman character as opposed to Western laicism. This would build the 
loyalty and consent of the Anatolia religious majority (Bayat 2013). His ideas 
                                                     
68 Adiong (2013) in his seminal work ‘International Relations and Islam’ which puts forward 
an argument for the marrying of Islamic studies and IR, states it is important to note that 
there is an inequality perpetuated by Western IR schools on the role of Islam in international 
relations, which could account for the criticism of Davutoglu’s strategic doctrine. Scholarship 
on Islam has increasingly framed it as a unanimous concept rather than studying its pluralist 
manifestation, and as an existential threat to the security of the Eurocentric Westphalian 
model of human rights and democracy stemming from Christendom, leading to wide 
orientalist perspectives across the academy which frame Muslim as “other”. Adiong (2013) 
argues that just as the English school drew upon Christian values to conceptualize a 
desirable state system, scholars from the global South can reclaim back the intellectual 
space and use frameworks drawing on Islamic values. 
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became popular during the 1970s, when Islamic activism was suppressed by 
a string of militarist secular governments. In the 1990s the RP promoted the 
idea of traditional Ottoman-Islamic civilization being Turkey’s true national 
culture (Bayat 2013). In turn, the business classes and old elites would see 
benefits of the marriage of Ottoman Islamic ideology with the growing 
economic opportunities that trade liberalization across the Middle East 
offered in the post-Cold War period (Adiong: 2013). 
Davutoğlu declared that Turkey should recapitalize on its heritage to become 
a leader in intercivilizational and inter-religious dialogue between the new 
global economic powerhouses (Grigoriadis 2010). He describes a ‘zero-
problems with neighbours’ policy where efforts should be on peace-building, 
conflict resolution and mediation within the Middle Eastern neighbourhood. 
Yet, Davutoğlu’s zero-problems policy rejects the idea of Turkey bridging the 
West and Islam, as he believes it is a regional multi-ethnic power with its own 
strategic weight (Grigoriadis 2010).  
The ‘zero-problems with neighbours’ philosophy’s translation into Turkey’s 
central active policy consideration can be readily grasped on the website of 
Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
“Turkey attaches special importance to seeing its positive outcomes in 
her immediate vicinity, that is to say, in her relations with neighbours. 
In this context, the discourse of “zero problem with neighbours” is a 
slogan summarizing Turkey’s expectations with regards to her 
relations with neighbouring countries. Turkey wants to eliminate all the 
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problems from her relations with neighbours or at least to minimize 
them as much as possible.” 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011) 
Davutoğlu’s understanding was that long-term strategic planning meant that 
resources could effectively be turned into power. His avocation of a long run 
alliance-building strategy was an attempt to mitigate the double-security 
dilemma by pro-active penetration (Hall 1999). 
In his book, Davutoğlu (2001) argues that a deficiency of strategic thought 
had mired 20th century Turkish foreign policy. This was due both to 
underinvestment and the defensive Sèvres Syndrome69 under a number of 
Kemalist governments. Fortifying political reproduction had been the norm in 
the 20th century, which meant that Turkey had a lack of a sphere of influence 
in the region and the world. For Davutoğlu (2001), Kemalist political leaders 
lacked political will, leading to a reactive foreign policy dependent on 
conjectural changes, rather than an intelligent proactive and assertive foreign 
policy. Langan (2016: 1403) links this to the more recent concept of 
ontological security of the Turkish elite who felt out of control of their 
hegemonic projects and failed to reach consent amongst the masses and 
civil society, something that Davutoğlu believed the AKP were capable of.   
                                                     
69 A popular Turkish conspiracy theory that the West or the Arab region are trying to 
sabotage the future of the Turkish Republic. 
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Davutoğlu believed that the AKP could mitigate the double-security dilemma 
by following a simple power equation:  
Power = sum of fixed data (history, geography, population and culture) + 
potential data (economic capacity, technological capacity, military capacity) X 
(strategic mentality, strategic planning and political will) 
He explains that fixed data cannot be changed in the short and medium term 
no matter how much political will those in charge may have. Whilst, potential 
data can be changed in both the short and medium run (Davutoğlu 2001). To 
politically reproduce in order to maintain authority, those governing need 
strategic mentality and planning. No state can rely on fixed data or potential 
data alone to mitigate the double-security dilemma (Davutoğlu 2001).  
For the benefit of this study, it can be understood that potential data is a form 
of hard power and the tool of the more fortifying state. On the other hand, a 
more alliance-building state takes advantage of the fixed data through 
strategic mentality and planning to be able to maintain authority when 
embedded in a neoliberal international system. 
The new foreign policy of Davutoğlu has also been described as being 
Kantian, as opposed to the Hobbesian approach popular since the founding 
of the republic (Park 2012). Davutoğlu’s peers have argued that rather than a 
radical approach, he borrowed the cooperative security community idea from 
Europe, based on neoliberal peace-building ideas of cooperation through 
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trade and economic ties, desirable for national peace and security.  Turkey’s 
neo-ottomanism is thus comparable to the relationship other former imperial 
powers such as France and Britain have with their ex-colonies (Yalvaç 2016).  
Park (2012) frames Turkey’s political reproduction under AKP as based on 
soft power, yet not discounting that its foreign policy initiatives are very much 
in line with its expanding economic interests. Yalvaç (2016) elaborates that it 
is not possible to consider Turkey’s strategic depth as separate from the 
aspired neoliberal depth of the capitalist world and the geopolitical dynamics 
associated with it. Therefore, the emergence of Strategic Depth Doctrine 
should be linked to a process of hegemonic depth defined as the increasing 
embeddedness of the bourgeoisie class in Turkish society and its increasing 
links with international and the transnational capital (Yalvaç, 2016: 16).  
Yalvaç (2016:15), also elaborates on the importance of the AKP ’s expanding 
economic interests (or the ‘potential data’ in Davutoğlu’s power equation in 
their relationship with the outside world):  
“The use of a Muslim identity in foreign policy is also the outcome of 
the increasing hegemonic depth of the JDP (AKP) creating 
congruence between its economic and popular ideology. The image of 
a moderate Islamic state fitted both to the hegemonic aspirations of 
the US and the accumulation strategies of the “neo-national 
bourgeoisie” in search of export markets in the Middle Eastern 
countries. Therefore, the use of a Muslim identity and Turkey being 
considered as a “model Muslim democracy” both internally and 
externally helped JDP (AKP) consolidate its ties with other Muslim 
countries. Thus ideological depth and hegemonic depth have 
consolidated and mutually overdetermined each other, leading to 
attempts at increasing the hegemonic depth externally.” 
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Section 6.2 has examined how the AKP planned to mitigate the double-
security dilemma through taking advantage of Turkey’s shared identities and 
alliance-building potential, whilst maintaining hard power. The focus was on 
the role of Davutoğlu’s Strategic Depth Doctrine and the birth of neo-
ottomanism as a political tool to build loyalty.  The next section will explain 
how this strategic planning translated into solid action, through the use of 
morality, culture and religion to ensure Turkey’s visibility and power as a 
middle-state in the ever-more competitive international system.   
 
 6.3 Between Middle-state and Greatness: Turkey’s Horizontal 
Alliance-building, Moral Power, and Functional Consent in 
the Middle East and Beyond 
At the core of the AKP’s horizontal alliance-building was its penetration of 
international political and civil society through post-Islamist moralism. The 
AKP used a combination of both traditional and radical middle state activism 
to ensure Turkey could out-compete other state polities vying for influence 
and power in the semi-periphery and periphery. The failure of pan-Arab 
nationalism let down peripheral nations like Palestine and Somalia and it was 
these nations that would be central to Erdoğan’s statesmanship. The 
Palestinian issue, an issue that domestically was popular with the Anatolian 
heartlands and internationally was popular with the Arab masses, would take 
central stage in foreign policy discourse (Natil 2013). Tools of soft power 
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such as culture and religion would accompany this to ensure Turkey’s 
‘virtuous power’ touched the peripheral masses of the globe (Nye 2004).   
When examining the world system, it is clear that the best place to situate 
Turkey is as a “middle/intermediate-power’ state70. According to Chapnick 
(1999), middle power foreign policies are usually multilateralist, bridge-
building, and concerned with the promotion of norms. The importance for 
middle-powers is to demonstrate to the world that despite not being 
empirically on par with the great powers, they can manoeuvre with just as 
much credence (Chapnick 1999). Middle states commonly use 
multilateralism and conflict management in their foreign policy behaviour as 
the most effective means of ensuring soft power. Discourse around Turkey’s 
middle state status has been contextualized by policy-makers and academics 
as being part of the emerging regional powers of Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria 
and Turkey, ‘MINT status71’ as US power is on the decline (Langan 2017).  
Culture is one of the three resources that Nye (2004) uses to account for how 
middle states such as Turkey increase their power of attraction. Nye and 
                                                     
70 Ranking states along empirical lines is an insufficient way to understand how middle 
powers act within the international system. Rather, domestic and international perceptions of 
capacity have a leading role to play in understanding these phenomena. Due to the 
importance for middle-powers of demonstrating to the world that despite not being 
empirically on par with the great powers, they can manoeuvre with just as much credence, 
much of the scholarship around them is constructivist. However, to what extent this 
manoeuvring is independent of the great powers is disputed (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 
1991) coined the term “followership” to describe how middle powers generally actively follow 
the great powers.  
71 (An acronym referring to the economies of Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey) 
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other scholars such as (Oǧuzlu 2007; Commuri 2012) frame the shift away 
from more fortifyingism to more alliance-building neo-ottomanism within 
Turkey’s foreign policy as a loosening of hard power and the turning point to 
the emergence of the soft power concept in Turkish foreign policy. Nye 
(2004) defines soft power in the international system as getting others to 
desire the outcomes you want.  
Under AKP rule, Turkey has been an increasingly prominent player in the 
imagination of the Islamic street gaining a lot of air time on TV and attention 
from scholars. Erdoğan’s liberalized policies gained increasing popularity in 
the first decade of the 21st century within the masses of the Middle East who 
were governed by authoritarian regimes:  
 “The advent of AKP rule aroused the curiosity of the Arab world: 
Turkey’s Kemalist tradition was customarily portrayed as atheistic and 
anti-Arab, but AKP leaders were demonstratively pious and, in 
Erdoğan’s case, had the popular touch. Thus, as police brutality, 
poverty, inequality and unemployment intensified under authoritarian 
neoliberal Arab regimes, Turkey re-emerged in the Arab popular 
imagination as an ambivalent entity. The Erdoğan government 
became a symbol of Muslim strength, but it also evoked uneasiness 
about Turks’ imperial arrogance.” 
 (Tuǧal 2012: Online) 
(Anas 2011: 368) affirms that Turkey stands far ahead of its Arab and Muslim 
neighbours in having improved its political and cultural institutions, human 
resources and cultural landscape. Turkey has more than 200 TV channels 
and nearly 1,000 radio channels which make it vastly different to one decade 
ago (Anas 2011). A huge measurable success of the Turkish Ottoman 
 223 
 
branding project within the Islamic world was the Turkish soap opera Noor. It 
projected a Turkish liberal model of Islam with characters celebrating 
Ramadan but still including more secular traditions such as drinking and 
kissing on screen. “So much so was the Noor mania that its popularity 
sparked reaction from Iranian columnists calling it an effort to counter Shia 
influence in the Arab world.” (Anas 2011: 382) The Ottoman cultural revival 
through Turkish soaps, media outlets and religious discourse led to growing 
popularity of Turkey on the Arab street (Oǧuzlu 2007). Kirişci (2011) explains 
how Turkey’s soft power activities have had a ‘demonstrative effect’ across 
the Middle East.  
Turkey’s use of soft power has generated the appeal of the ‘Turkish Model’ 
(political Islam compatible with neo-liberal democracy). This had sway in the 
early days of the Arab Spring, where discussions took place around the 
applicability of the model for new democracies. An example of this is a BBC 
Arabic TV show that was broadcast in 2011 ‘The Turkish Model’ (BBC 
Arabic- YouTube 2011). This was in debate form and examined issues such 
as why Turkey became a model despite the fear of secularists and alawis of 
Turkey’s creeping authoritarianism. An argument brought to the fore was that 
due to the past 40 years of corruption and repressive governments in the 
Arab region, the Arab masses felt held back. Turkey has been perceived as a 
state all citizens had a stake in. Turkey previously had been a repressive 
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regime, and the AKP had led the country away from repression. The Arab 
peoples saw hope that their countries could follow this path.  
As middle powers lack in standalone military might, international perceptions 
of agency and capacity take the leading role in increasing their global 
influence, also known as the behaviour model, or construction of the soft 
power of attraction (Chapnick 1999). Central to this is a middle states 
expressed desire for greater international status, “Hallmark events, sports 
and cultural industries are perceived as useful means for semi-peripheral 
societies to attract a ‘CNN presence’ and, concomitantly, tourism, capital, 
students and similar multiplier effects.”(Black and Westhuizen 2004: 1204) 
On the other hand, soft power propagandizing cannot always conceal the 
reality of the human cost of repression and hard power (Samaan 2013). This 
can be demonstrated by another issue addressed by the programme which 
was the lack of success of the ‘Iranian model’. Despite the Iranian 
government’s soft power efforts, it was deemed that the Iranian model was 
not popular with the Arab street as it was not largely different from their 
repressive regimes. The programme concluded by suggesting that the failure 
of the ‘Turkish Model’ may lie in the continued repression of the media and 
the lack of media freedom in the country, with AKP sympathetic broadcasters 
and broadsheets monopolizing 80% of the market (BBC Arabic- YouTube 
2011). 
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Another example is the 2010 book published by AlJazeera (Werghi: 2010). 
Werghi (2010) explains how the ‘Turkish model’ is a historic opportunity to 
help redraw the tense relationship between the Arab ruling secular elites and 
monarchies on the one hand, and the lack of the consolidation of democracy 
on the other. This ties into Tuğal’s (2016) concept of ‘passive revolution’- 
where revolutionary currents calling for peoples democracy can be appeased 
through top-down reforms of repressive regimes. Nonetheless, Keyman and 
Gumuscu (2014) note that caution has to be taken when theorizing 
democracy in the Middle Eastern context. They explain that secularism must 
not be conflated with democracy. Thus, a 'post-Islamist' party elected into 
power operating within a 'secular framework', is no guarantee for democratic 
consolidation. In this situation, the 'Turkish Model' of democratization is 
therefore having a negative demonstrative effect in the Arab region.  
Political values are vital to soft power promotion and effective soft power 
behaviour for a middle state is constructing itself as an international moral 
power (Chapnick 1999). Crucial to the application of the neo-Ottoman Islamic 
discourse in its geopolitical sphere is Turkey’s re-emergence in the Arab 
popular imagination as an ambivalent entity (Tuğal  2012: Online). Central to 
this is both the pious public imagery of Turkish leaders and Turkish state 
power being framed as a symbol of Muslim strength to counteract the 
injustices across the Middle East (Tuǧal 2012: Online). A measure of the 
success of this was an opinion poll on the popularity of countries, taken by 
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the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Türkiye Ekonomik ve 
Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı, TESEV) in 2010, of 2006 respondents by telephone in 
seven Arab countries, it was revealed that Turkey received the second 
highest score out of eight countries (the highest score was given to Saudi) 
(Akgün, Perçinoğlu, and Gündoğar 2010) . 
With the failure of pan-Arab nationalism, the dominant discourse around the 
Palestinian issue is one of Islam and morality against injustice, a discourse 
the AKP subscribed to. A determining parameter in the shift of Arab general 
public opinion in favour of Turkey despite decades of icy relations took place 
due to Turkey's tough stand against Israeli violations of international law and 
solidarity with the Palestinian people (Natil 2013). So much so, that the 
Palestinian TİKA office was opened by Prime Minister Erdoğan and TİKA is 
one of the most active aid providers in Palestine: 
“The (Palestinian) Office of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination 
Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon İdaresi Başkanlığı, TİKA) was 
opened on 02 May 2005 by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 
TİKA is providing schools, hospital and clinic constructions, clean 
water access, restoration projects, education in landscaping and urban 
infrastructure and expert training. President of Turkish Cooperation 
and Coordination Agency Serdar Çam went to Palestine on 7 March 
2012. Serdar Çam and his delegation are expected to visit the 
Jerusalem Program Coordination Office and examine the TİKA 
projects on site.”  
(TİKA 2012) [translated from Turkish by the author] 
During his prime ministerial rule Erdoğan became known across the region 
for his speeches in favour of the Palestinian people.  In the 2009 Davos 
Summit Erdoğan walked off stage after an angry exchange with the then 
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Israeli President Shimon Peres over Israeli policy in Gaza (Natil 2013). In 
May 2010 a Turkish Aid ship, Mavi Marmara, organized by the İHH, an AKP 
sympathetic charity was ambushed by the Israeli Defence Force in 
international waters72. Mahmut Tural, Captain of the Ship, described events: 
“The Israelis did not warn us before attacking. They kept trying to 
intimidate us and force us into their territorial waters. I did not allow it. I 
did not let them change our route. Nobody agreed to be drawn into 
Ashdod Port. Israel could have used a number of methods, but the 
Israeli method was to kill 9 people.” 
(İHH İnsani Yardım Vakfı 2010) [translated from Turkish by author] 
After decades of the failure of the Arab nations to act on the Palestinian 
cause and take a tough stand against Israel, Erdoğan's soap box speeches 
became an effective soft power tool to increase Turkey's influence with the 
Arab public (Natil 2013). This led to Palestinian elected Prime Minister in 
exile, Hamas’ Ismail Haniyeh commenting on Palestinian public television 
that the Turkish aid workers who had been killed by Israel were ‘martyrs’, and 
that their sacrifice would never be forgotten (Palestine TV- YouTube 2010).   
Later, due to continual diplomatic pressure from Turkey, Israel was forced to 
apologize. Erdoğan comments on the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu’s apology for the Mavi Marmara incident are revealing with 
regards to confirming the centrality of the strategic depth doctrine in the 
                                                     
72 Nine Turkish aid workers lost their lives. 
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Turkish foreign policy discourse of the time. Speaking in the Turkish 
parliament, Erdoğan commented on Israel’s apology:  
“We are at the beginning of a process of elevating Turkey to a position 
so that it will again have a say, initiative and power, as it did in the 
past."  
(Reuters 2013)  
He later also made the remark: 
“The point we have arrived at as a result of our consultations with all 
our brothers in Palestine and peripheral countries is increasing our 
responsibility with regard to solving the Palestinian question and this is 
bringing about a new equation,” 
 (Hurriyet Daily News 2013) 
The first quote mentions Turkey’s powerful past, which for Erdoğan is the 
Ottoman period when Turkey administered Islamic rule over its empire. The 
second quote which mentions “brothers in Palestine and peripheral countries 
is increasing our responsibility”  is a reference to brotherhood in Islam across 
the Middle East and Turkey’s moral responsibility to protect its Muslim kin. 
The common theme is Turkey’s power and responsibility to the Islamic world, 
its Islamic heritage and its manoeuvre back to this moral religious position as 
a power broker. Here religious undertones are playing a dominant discursive 
role in the construction of Turkey’s relations with the Middle East. 
Nonetheless, from a realist foreign policy perspective, common Muslim 
heritage cannot solve arduous alien threats and international disputes. For 
example, common Islamic heritage did not protect Turkey from Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorism, and peace-building with Syria has been a complete 
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failure for Turkish diplomacy (Waldman and Caliskan 2017). Strategically, 
Turkey also has been alliance-building with non-Muslim states to mitigate its 
internal and international threats from fundamentalists and others. Aside from 
its NATO commitments, Turkey signed up as a dialogue partner to the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a security nexus between Russia, China 
and other states in the Caucuses (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). 
As Falk (2014: 158) explains, 
“Turkey did its utmost to bring greater stability and prosperity to the 
region, through diplomacy, cultural exchanges, and trade/investment 
relations. Beyond this, Davutgolu and Erdoğan were innovative in 
encouraging diplomatic and economic relations with Africa and Latin 
America, regions Turkey had previously ignored.” 
Other major components of Turkey’s internationalist alliance-building activity 
have been the increased role of Turkey in the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC), the election of a Turkish General Secretary, Ekmeleddin 
İhsanoğlu, within the organization (Sadik 2012) and Turkey’s initiatives in 
conflict management. Efforts in conflict management included mediation 
between Israel and Syria73, efforts to achieve Sunni-Shiite reconciliation in 
                                                     
73 Turkish-Syrian relations have often been suspicious and tense, but after narrowly avoiding 
an all-out war in 1998 the two countries were forced to co-operate. This new-found co-
operation led to the flourishing of economic opportunities and liberalization between the two 
countries under the AKP, plus the management of water and border disputes. Mutual 
interests such as disagreement with the Iraq War and suppression of Kurdish self-
determination decreased the hostility between them. Cross-border trade and tourism thrived 
as visa restrictions were removed (Altunisik 2013; Hinnebusch and Tür 2013). Prior to 
Operation Cast Lead, Israel’s attack on Gaza in late December 2008, indirect talks between 
Syrian and Israeli diplomats were held in Istanbul hosted by Davutoğlu (Hale: 2012). 
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Iraq, attempts at rapprochement with Armenia, reconciliation efforts in 
Lebanon and Palestine between Hamas and Fatah74, the Serbia-Bosnia 
reconciliation in the Balkans, the dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan 
and post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Darfur and Somalia (Hale 2012). 
Aside from this, AKP leaders congratulated President Ahmedinejad on his 
controversial re-election in June 2009. Turkey’s signed in May 2010, along 
with Brazil, an agreement committing Iran to ship out low-enriched uranium in 
return for research reactor fuel rods for medical purposes, and pushed 
against additional sanctions on Iran, winning the 9 June 2010 vote in the 
Security Council against additional sanctions (Hale 2012). 
Conflict management, diplomacy and development were also central to 
Turkey’s alliance-building neo-ottoman expansionism in Africa and across the 
developing world (Cavdar 2013). The below graph shows the mass increase 
in official development assistance under the AKP government:   
 
 
 
 
                                                     
74 For more information on this see Natil 2013 “Turkey’s Human Security Agenda in the Gaza 
Strip.” 
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Figure 6.1 Turkey’s Official Development Assistance since 1990 in USD 
millions 
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Source: OECD Data (OECD.org 2018) 
Largely due to Turkey’s aid contributions to Africa, the country was awarded 
the position of ‘strategic partner’ by the African Union in 2008.  Cavdar (2017) 
states that AKP’s Africa policy had two calculated outcomes from the 
beginning, the expansion of the capital of the emerging Turkish AKP 
sympathetic SMEs and reinforcing Turkey’s international role as a middle 
power. The beginning of the strategic partnership took place as early as 
2002, when Ankara were involved in African Union conferences as an 
external observer. Some key events in the political partnership included: the 
visit of AU President Professor Alpha Oumar Konare to Ankara in November 
2005, Tayyip Erdoğan’s state visit to Ethiopia in January 2007, the Istanbul 
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Turkish-African Partnership Summits in August 2008 and October 2013, and 
the opening of 19 Turkish embassies across the African continent after 2009 
(Cavdar 2013). 
Multi-track diplomacy between Turkey and Africa played a large role in the 
strengthening of economic relations between them (Cavdar 2013). Significant 
measures included: the 2008 Turkish-African Business Forum organized by 
AKP sympathetic business lobbyists the Foreign Economic Relations Board 
(Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu, DEİK) and the Turkish Confederation of 
Businessmen and Industrialists (Türkiye İşadamları ve Sanayiciler 
Konfederasyonu, TUSKON), the increase in foreign trade between Turkey 
and sub-Saharan Africa by 72% from 2000 to 2011- reaching $7.5 billion 
(Langan 2017), and the aid budget from Turkey to Africa reaching $1 billion 
in 2011 (Cavdar 2013)75.  
Somalia has been a large focus of AKP’s Africa drive. Publicity on the TİKA 
website explains the success of Turkey’s multi-track assistance to Somalia: 
“In Somalia, we cannot let human deaths be just statistical data, the 
work of our country (Turkey) was not limited to emergency 
humanitarian aid. Turkey has launched activities to strengthen the 
social and technical infrastructure of the region. As a result of the 
campaigns, life tended to improve in the country; Child mortality has 
diminished,  and vitality has been gained in the capital Mogadishu.” 
(TİKA 2012)  
                                                     
75 Growth in Turkish international aid and development projects over the last decade have 
been facilitated by Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TİKA), the government’s 
official aid agency which AKP established in 2001.  
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[Translated from Turkish by the author] 
Langan (2016) explains that this multi-track diplomacy was constructed in the 
context of Turkey’s moral power, which he terms ‘virtuous power’. 
Humanitarian interventions in sub-Saharan Africa were framed as an 
alternative to the EU’s neo-colonialism, ‘reinterpreting Ottoman history as 
one of benevolent hegemony’. This can be evidenced by quotes from 
President Gül (Langan 2016: 7):  
“We (Turks) have never run after only our own interests. We know that 
states, which only looked after their own interests in the past 
engendered major damage to Africa. The international community 
should know that we could only be equal partners in Africa.”  
“We are different from Europeans. We do not take away your raw 
materials. We invest and also bring along technology and qualified 
workforce. We have done so in other African countries. We have 
already begun to do so in Ghana as well.”   
(Speaking to Ghanaian officials) 
Despite countries like Somalia endorsing the AKP as a ‘virtuous power’ and 
Turkey as a model country, concerns have been raised by some 
development practitioners and scholars around Turkey’s Africa activism 
(Andrikopoulos 2015, Cavdar 2013, Marks 2013, Mason 2017, Langan 
2016). Langan (2016:10) raises the issue over industrial clashes between 
Somalian workers and Turkish managers, such as the disputes over the 
privatization of Somalia’s ports. He also raises worries regarding Turkey’s 
eye on Somalia’s oil and Turkish arms sales to sub-Saharan Africa which 
have amounted to $650 million. Despite the Turkish governments ‘anti-
imperialist’ rhetoric, the same inequalities of ‘Western’ neoliberal “free” trade 
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exist with regards to African business access to Turkish markets, and the 
lubrication of corrupt local patronage networks by Turkish officials (Langan 
2016).  
Keyman and Gumuscu (2014) bring to light the problems of Turkey being 
viewed as a model country by developing nations, the worry being that 
Turkey ‘may end up preaching effective governance as an outcome of power 
fusion. Turkey may …export the idea of effective governance as a by-product 
of consequentialism and monopolization of power.’ They note a particular 
shift in aid policy, noting that before the Arab Spring aid was distributed 
without normative conditions, nonetheless as the double-security dilemma 
shifted, post-Arab spring aid policy has had conditionality and state reform at 
the centre (Keyman and Gumuscu 2014). This shift will be analysed more in 
the next chapter.  
Despite the virtuous rhetoric, Turkey is far from being guided into a moral 
Islamic mission by the AKP; rather the AKP have been using Islamic rhetoric 
to “play an important role in the …policies of the USA and Atlantic axis.” 
(Erdem 2012: 440) Tuğal (2007) argues that Turkish foreign policy in the 
2002-2011 period was based more on the Washington’s Greater Middle East 
Initiative than ‘Strategic Depth’. Closer relations with Islamic and African 
countries was simply a chance to reap the economic and political benefits of 
the assertion of US control. He describes this is an ‘Islamized 
Americanization’.  “The AKP launches ‘Islamic’ foreign policy salvoes, but an 
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attentive reading reveals that these are usually voicing Washington’s 
demands in Muslim phraseology.” (Tuğal 2007: Online) 
For example, Ankara’s relationship with Hamas was used to convey the 
West’s message of disarmament rather than religious brotherhood and 
solidarity (Tuğal 2012). The AKP have also used their “Islamic” brand to 
justify the use of military force for NATO and Israeli interests, “in 2006, when 
the Turkish population almost unanimously condemned Israel’s invasion of 
Lebanon and bombardment of South Beirut, Erdoğan insisted on Turkish 
participation in the UN force sent to contain Hezbollah, which the IDF had 
signally failed to do, on the grounds of ‘coming to the aid’ of suffering 
Lebanese.” (Tuğal 2012: Online) 
 Zalewski (2010: 102) explains that:  
“By suggesting that Turkey is “turning from the West”, the current 
debate- dressed as it is in Cold War terminology-fails to do justice to 
the breadth and depth of the nation’s foreign policy revolution. 
Regardless of what the AKP’s critics might argue, Turkey has not 
parted ways with the West simply by rediscovering the East. Although 
the EU negotiating process has slowed to a crawl, Turkey remains 
committed to the objective of EU accession. Although it has improved 
relations with Muslim countries, including Iran and Syria, it has also 
reached out to non-Muslims nations such as Armenia and Russia. And 
although  it has clashed with the United States on the Iranian issue, 
Turkey provides military support in Afghanistan and remains a 
member of NATO and an invaluable intermediary between Syria and 
Iraq.”  
(Zalewski 2010: 102)   
The AKP’s “zero problems with neighbours” policy was motivated 
substantially by economic considerations (Tuğal 2012) driven by the search 
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for international profits by the growing Anatolian post-Islamist middle-class. 
Turkey’s zero-problem initiative reflects the enormous increase of trade 
linkages, rendering Turkey a new trading state (Kirişci 2011: 33-35). Between 
2002 and 2010, Turkish trade increased threefold with Syria, nearly fourfold 
with Maghreb countries, fivefold with the Gulf countries and Yemen, and 
sevenfold with Egypt (Kirişci 2011). The waiving of visa requirements for 
nationals of several Arab countries also contributed to the increase in the 
number of Arab visitors to Turkey, from 332,000 in 1991 to almost 1.9 million 
in 2010 (Kirişci, 2011).  In fact, due to the success of Turkey’s marketing 
power as a desirable tourist destination, as seen in the graph below the 
number of foreign visitors greatly increased under the AKP, from 13,450,127 
in 2001 to 36,776,645 in 2012 bringing in a tourism income of $29.3 billion. 
This meant an increase of more than double the tourist revenue in the AKP’s 
first ten-year tenure.   
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Figure 6.2 Tourism Revenue in Turkey, 2001-2012 (Average spend c. $800 
per visitor) 
Source: (Turkstat 2013) 
Another tool of Turkey’s nation branding was the state’s use of popular 
culture to encourage business ties. The Turkish government announced that 
it would give prizes and financial awards to support producers and directors 
to create media products that help Turkey’s image (Bank and Karadag 2012). 
The reverse effect was also in play: Turkish businessmen and professionals 
involved in economic projects abroad contributed to the unified message of 
the national brand. On his 2011 “Arab Spring” tour, Erdoğan was 
accompanied by 250 Turkish businessmen (Tuğal 2016). 
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Bank and Karadag (2012) explain that part of the necessity of using 
branding, culture and other means of marketing was Turkey’s heavy reliance 
on the export of consumables. Unlike other Middle Eastern states, Turkey 
lacks natural resources, specifically energy resources. Despite this they note 
that, Turkey had to renew its image in order to balance its Eastern-oriented 
foreign policy with its military alliances. To the West Turkey would be a 
“mediator”, to the global South a “soft-power” plus a leading exporter to 
challenge both the West and China. However, they could not hope to be a 
“soft-power” in the Middle East region without at least seeming to side with 
their "Muslim brothers and sisters" (Bank and Karadag 2012). This was a 
large part of a cultural capitalism project (where buying Turkish did not just 
mean buying a Turkish product, you were buying into AKP ethics- neo-
ottoman, anti-Israel, Islam with a human face. The Mavi Marmara incident, 
the Davos summit, Turkish Ottoman soaps, Turkish cinema, Turkish fashion 
can all be framed in this way (Bank and Karadag 2012). 
The notion of a turn in foreign policy towards Islamic nations either way is a 
misconception of the very role of the semi-peripheral state in the international 
system. Religion, and in this case Islam, is being misused as a globalised 
form of social and cultural capital that increases the brand loyalty and 
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desirability of “Muslim” Turkey to the periphery76 (Fox and Sandler 2004). 
However, these dynamics can also lead to aggressive practices if one state 
uses a common religious background to justify taking over another, or if 
countries with varied religious backgrounds cannot co-operate due to 
differing religious ideologies (Snyder 2011). Religion is a unique 
phenomenon in its capability to unite people and organizations across 
borders and globalization has enabled transnational networks of religious 
actors who can influence policy-making across a wide range of geopolitical 
settings (Snyder 2011).  
Through this channel, the Western capitalists are using Turkey’s semi-
peripheral power to put a friendly Turkish and Islamic face onto neo-liberal 
policies. Hegemony involves the expansion of a discourse of “norms, values, 
views and perceptions through persuasive redescription of the world (Torfing 
1999: 302).” Since 
 “any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of 
discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre; a 
perpetual discursive struggle is being waged between different 
hegemonic projects to be understood not just as one possible project 
                                                     
76 “Religion is a double-edged sword as an American soft-power resource, and how it cuts 
depends on who is wielding it” (Nye 2004: 59). When soft power rests on notions of foreign 
policy activism, cultural attraction and political values (Nye 2004) a fixed religious ideology 
and identity although popular with some, can also pose limitations when building bridges with 
others. Fox and Sandler hypothesise that a common religious heritage between states can 
lead to common norms being practiced that then facilitates peace-building through alliances 
and international treaties (Fox and Sandler 2004) 
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among many alternatives, but as the only possible social order- thus to 
hegemonize is to construct the dominant social meaning.” 
 (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 112).  
Although Turkey likes to brand its influence in this regard as a form of “soft” 
power, it becomes very apparent that viewing religion in the terms of 
social/cultural capital through a world systems lens; there is no real 
separation between hard and soft power. They are both forms of structural 
violence which elevate the destructive policies of the hegemon. The next 
section will delve deeper into the notion of hard power, which on many levels 
seemed relatively unchanged to that of the Kemalist period.   
 
6.4 The Two Faces of Turkey: The AKP’s Maintenance of Hard 
Power during the Alliance-building Period  
Defence cooperation with Israel was one of the cornerstones of the Kemalist 
fortifying regime, and contrary to popular belief expounded by the AKP’s 
Islamic rhetoric; the military alliance with Israel was also a key source of the 
AKP’s political authority. Defence politics and hard power are vital to both 
alliance-building and fortifying polities; the difference simply lies in the scope. 
State polities have a monopoly of violence, and that is the foundation of the 
state, yet despite using hard power, alliance-building regimes are more likely 
to also use soft power in maintaining their rule. 
In line with their international diplomatic efforts, an increase in trade with non-
Muslim nations demonstrates that alliance-building horizontal relations were 
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not reserved for majority Muslim countries. As evidenced in the graph below, 
the volume of trade between Turkey and Israel steadily increased under the 
AKP. The trade volume between the two countries almost reached $6 billion 
in 2014 (TRT World 2017). More surprisingly, when the figures are matched 
with the political turmoil between the two countries, it seems that trade is not 
impacted by the cold rhetoric between the states rulers. For example, in 
2011, imports from Israel reached $2 billion; up from $1.360 billion the 
previous year, while the exports amounted to $2.4 billion, up from $2 billion in 
2010. That is the same year in which the Mavi Marmara, carrying 
humanitarian aid to Gaza, was raided and diplomatic tensions ensued 
between the two countries.   
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 Figure 6.3 Trade Volume between Israel and Turkey  
Source: TRT World with statistics from the Ministry of Economy, Turkey (TRT 
World 2017) 
A large amount of the trade with Israel was based around defence. In order 
to bolster air defence capabilities, the republic of Turkey has been funding 
the Peace Eagle Project. As part of this the country chose to purchase four 
Boeing 737-700-based AWAC aircraft for USD1.5 billion in 2002. The AWAC 
use Israeli-made electronics such as Elta's electronic support measures 
(ESM) that need to be continually updated. In 2013, despite the political rift 
between the two countries, the Elta systems were delivered (Space Daily 
2013). During August of 2013 Israeli specialized vehicle manufacturer 
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Hatehof won a bid of 60 million Shekel from the Turkish company BMC, 
producing and supplying aircraft refuellers and armoured vehicles77 (Israel 
Defence 2013).   
Turkish automotive company, Otokar, has been working in collaboration with 
Israel's Rafael arms company to produce armoured vehicles which were sold 
to the IDF and others from 2008 onwards. The OTOKAR AKREP, COBRA, 
and YAVUZ are all used by the IDF in Gaza, to commit crimes that the AKP 
leadership continually condemn (Otokar 2008). Another Turkish company, 
Hidromek, supply the Israeli Army with backhoe loaders and excavators 
similar to Caterpillar which are used to demolish Palestinian homes. 
Machinery manufactured by the company was used in the demolition of 
Palestinian houses in the occupied Jordan Valley and in the Palestinian 
neighbourhood of Beit Hanina in East Jerusalem. Hidromek equipment was 
also documented during the demolition of cisterns in the South Hebron Hills 
(Who Profits 2014). 
Bank Pozitif is the Turkish branch of Israeli Bank Hapoalim. Due to being an 
online/retail bank its visual presence does not reflect its economic power as 
one of the largest banks in the sector. Despite its relatively small asset size 
Bank Pozitif’s name appeared among multinational banks in major projects 
                                                     
77 Including: armoured vehicles for military use developed with Rafael for the Israeli army 
(wolf, Typhoon, Xream), riot control trucks and special vehicles for military purposes. 
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like Istanbul international airport privatization, Istanbul Hilton Hotel acquisition 
financing, a large cement factory financing and other projects involving major 
exporters (Bank Pozitif 2014).  
During Turkey’s alliance-building period Israel was continually keen on 
political reconciliation with Turkey. Reconciliation would have reopened 
Turkish airspace to Israeli aircraft, allowing the Israeli Air Force to carry out 
long-distance flight training (Al-awsat 2014). It was also hoped that 
reconciliation would also speed up the implementation of the Turkish–Israeli 
energy corridor with the aim of the transfer of Israeli natural gas through 
Turkey to Europe. On the Turkish side it was hoped that this would reduce 
Ankara’s own reliance on Russia and Iran for gas, a matter that was regularly 
up for debate amongst the AKP’s business supporters who were keen on 
Turkey becoming a regional energy hub (Al-awsat 2014). 
It is important to note that there have been some efforts by the Turkish 
government to curb Israeli collaborations within NATO (for example with 
Operation Active Endeavour). However, there has been no similar process 
with regards to the arms trade (Al-awsat 2014). There is also a 
misconception that Israel is the greater ally to Washington. During Turkey’s 
alliance-building period it was central to Washington's defence and imperial 
interests and had far more bargaining power than the Israeli state. Israel was 
increasingly being shunned away from international institutions and their 
importance to NATO was diminishing, they had become an increasing 
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burden to the Obama administration whilst Turkey was playing a central role 
in policing the Middle East (Al-awsat 2014). 
NATO has regularly used Turkey’s membership as a tool to expand its own 
alliance-building project. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue was initiated in 
1994 by the North Atlantic Council. Turkey’s membership has been key in 
getting non-NATO majority Muslim state polities to join the Dialogue, 
including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia (NATO 
2012). Another NATO initiative, in which Turkey has played a key role, has 
been the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Launched at the Alliance's Summit 
in June 2004, it aims to contribute to long-term global and regional security 
by offering countries of the broader Middle East region78 practical bilateral 
security cooperation with NATO (NATO 2012).  
Chossudovsky (2016) explains how state polity allies Israel, Turkey and the 
USA worked together to influence the power dynamics within weaker state 
polities across the Middle East, through the guise of an alliance-building 
project. This was a form of internationalized political reproduction to build 
horizontal consent of neoliberal hegemony through soft power whilst 
reinforcing hard power. Chozzudovsky (2016: Online) gives the example of a 
meeting in Brussels between the powers to convey this, 
                                                     
78 including Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan. Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia 
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“The member countries met in Brussels in November 2004. Senior 
Israeli IDF officers held discussions, under NATO auspices, with the 
top military brass of six members of the Mediterranean basin nations. 
The hidden agenda of this meeting was essentially to set the stage for 
a full-fledged NATO-Israel partnership, with the tacit consent of the 
front-line Arab States…The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) 
neutralizes Israel’s potential adversaries in the Arab World. It 
essentially grants a green light to Israel and its indefectible Turkish 
ally. It ensures that other member States (front-line Arab States) of the 
NATO sponsored, will not intervene in a Middle East conflict instigated 
by Israel. This is the main purpose of the Istanbul Cooperation 
Initiative: paralyse the Arab States at the diplomatic and military levels, 
to ensure that they will not act in any meaningful way against US-
Israeli interests in the Middle East.” 
Even though the Turkish government has been vocal against Israel, 
especially with their solidarity for the besieged Gaza Strip, the AKP has close 
relations with the Israeli state. The reality is Turkey is complicit in and 
profiteering from the crimes of the Israeli occupation. Despite a brief cooling 
of relations in the 1980s, full diplomatic ties and cooperation on all levels 
were instituted in 1991 and have been strengthening ever since. Despite 
Turkish neo-ottoman rhetoric around cutting off military ties after the Mavi 
Marmara incident and 2008 Gaza war, a $165-million agreement on airborne 
imagery intelligence was signed on the eve of the 2008 Gaza bombardment. 
The Israeli Air Force continues to conduct training missions at Turkey’s 
training base in Konya. Turkey also participated with Israel and the USA in 
the annual joint exercise Reliant Mermaid in August 2009.  
In 2010, the year of the brutal murder of Turkish aid workers on the Mavi 
Marmara ship, bilateral trade between Israel and Turkey reached $2 billion. It 
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has been increasing rapidly since then, and was over $5 billion in 2013, and 
is set to increase even more this year. 
Yet these hard power facts were not enough to undo the soft power rhetoric 
of the AKP, and with the onset of the Arab Spring, Turkey had succeeded in 
its ‘demonstrative effect’ across the Arab region and had become a ‘model’. 
The rise of the ‘Turkish Model’ was directly linked to changes in the global 
economy, as the USA and other Western powers were no longer the worlds 
unquestionable leaders of economic growth (Tuğal 2016). This, accompanied 
by a crisis of US hegemony as wars and torture prevailed in the Global South 
meant the world has been becoming increasingly ungovernable. The ‘Turkish 
Model’, with Turkey’s perceived economic success under the AKP, was an 
engine for re-framing America’s involvement in the Middle East. The ‘Arab 
Spring’ was the perfect opening for the imitation of Turkey’s Atlanticist path. 
However,  
“the Islamic movements and organizations in the region learnt 
selectively from Turkey’s success, engaging in multiple and shifting 
coalitions with regional powers—not all of them in line with global 
hegemony, let alone with Turkey’s specific interests.” 
(Tuğal 2016: 24) 
As consent for the ‘Turkish Model’ waned, the hegemon increasingly turned 
to violence, coercion and realpolitik.  
As Western power is in decline, the conceptually ambiguous ‘Turkish Model’ 
was used as a neo-liberal tool of state ‘model promotion’ to counterbalance 
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the power of Iran, Russia and other emerging powers. Turkey was being 
used as an ‘order setting’ agent (Akkoyunlu 2013). Two dimensions of ‘the 
Turkish model’ are evident here again- internal actors shaping the domestic 
infrastructure of the state and external actors trying to employ hegemonic 
control over the Arab peoples. This is a classic alliance of control by the 
imperialists and the bourgeoisies and petit-bourgeoisie as Western capital 
interest’s shift in response to the changing nature of the increasingly volatile 
double-security dilemma as international capitalism reaches its parasitic 
stage (Akkoyunlu 2013).  
Nonetheless, Akkoyunlu (2013) states that the success or failure of this 
project is based on a key factor. He observes that,  
“Turkey’s regional leadership role may also come into conflict with its 
renewed commitment to the US-led western security establishment. 
As we already noted, one of the main contributors to Turkey’s rising 
popularity in the Middle East had been the perception that, on the 
basis of the AKP’s new-found economic dynamism and political 
confidence, it had stopped acting as a US client in the region, 
especially in relation to Israel. Without a meaningful breakthrough in 
the Israeli – Palestinian conflict and dramatic changes in popular 
perspectives towards the US and Israel in the Middle East, the long-
standing dynamics of the region are unlikely to allow any country to 
emerge as its leader while being perceived as a US client.” 
 
 
6.5 A Deconstruction of the ‘Turkish Model’  
Stevens (2012) states the ‘Turkish Model’ idiom was more a tool of discursive 
power than a foreseeable development in international politics. Rather than a 
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straightforward analysis of the ‘Turkish Model’ as a viable statecraft toolbox 
to emulate, the ‘Turkish Model’ has to be researched as a metaphor to truly 
de-construct how reality is being shaped by different actors from both within 
and outside the Arab region. The idea of a ‘Turkish Model’ stressed Turkish 
exceptionalism and asserted the necessity of Turkey’s significant role in the 
region. It also appeared in Western rhetoric because of Western aspirations 
to have a friendly ally in the Muslim world79. “By advancing the ‘Turkish 
Model’ American observers can capitalize on the existing relationship with 
Turkey, support democratic transitions, and argue that any Arab Spring state 
can emulate Turkish secularism and diplomacy.” (Stevens 2012: Online) 
There is a wealth of literature about Turkey during the period being far from a 
liberal democracy, and many argued that under the AKP the state apparatus 
has become increasingly authoritarian. For example, some convey the flaws 
of Turkey’s democratic institutions such as having the most unrepresentative 
electoral system in Europe where minorities such as Kurds are grossly under 
represented (Taspinar 2012).  Other flaws include the growing concerns over 
the makeup of the new constitution in which AKP have failed to consult the 
opposition, Turkey’s poor civil and human rights records, and growing 
suppression of media freedom (Taspinar 2012). 
                                                     
79 George Bush himself suggested that Turkey ‘provided Muslims around the world with a 
hopeful model of a modern and secular democracy’ (Park 2013). 
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Taspinar (2012) states that domestic shortcomings were also to blame for the 
waning of Turkey's ‘demonstrative effect’ as it moved away from its ‘zero 
problems’ policy to playing a much more confrontational and assertive role. 
This was accompanied by a growing despondency in the Arab world towards 
the AKP as it became increasingly authoritarian,  
 "By 2012, however, the AKP had also exposed serious democratic 
shortcomings. It increasingly cracked down on its critics, especially 
those in the media. After a decade in power, Erdoğan had also failed 
to follow through on promises of a new constitution and reforms that 
would address pivotal issues facing the country—the Kurdish 
question, human rights, and freedom of expression."  
(Taspinar 2012) 
Keyman and Gumuscu (2014) elaborate this further by explaining the three 
critical points which characterize Turkey's democratization experience so far, 
that have to be understood in the context of electoral hegemony, power 
fusion and effective governance: 1) Turkey moved from power sharing to 
power fusion gradually, 2) during the gradual shift the government sustained 
economic growth and stability 3) even so, the evolution to power fusion has 
caused problems and Turkey has become a crisis prone society (Keyman 
and Gumuscu 2014)⁠. 
Unlike Taspinar (2012) they explain that, despite these negative factors, the 
multi-dimensional identities of the Turkish political system have made it an 
aspiration to Arab and Muslim populations, and beyond. These include: the 
ability to achieve secular and parliamentary democracy within a society with 
a predominantly Muslim population, its combination of hard and soft power, 
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and its mix of modernity, democracy, security and economic dynamism 
(Keyman and Gumuscu 2014). 
Aras (2012) focuses more on the role of Turkey’s international, rather than 
domestic politics. Within the Arab media, there was growing suspicion of 
Ankara’s relations with Washington as they became more politically aligned 
on Syria from around 2012. Turkey, along with the US, Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, Jordan and Qatar, began to be increasingly viewed as manipulating 
and toying with the region to counter the influence of Iran, Syria and 
Hezbollah (Aras 2012). This shift in the AKP’s approach toward Damascus 
has also been framed as an Ottoman Islamist one, with some allegations of 
Turkey using Syria as a proxy to counter the Shia influence of Iran (Aras 
2012). Erdoğan uses the same Islamic rhetoric when talking about the Syrian 
casualties as he does the Palestinians. He lauds the massacred rebels as 
martyrs. Aras (2012) attributes this to Turkey’s desire for the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood to gain power, and there is mutual support between the parties 
as evidenced by Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leader Muhammad Riad al-
Shaqfa’s declaration that Syrians would accept Turkish military intervention in 
Syria (Aras 2012). 
Jean Paul Samaan (2013) explained that post-Arab ‘Spring’ commentary 
amongst Arab intellectuals, despite Erdoğan’s warm reception in Cairo in the 
early days of the Egyptian revolution, begun to frame neo-ottomanism as a 
colonial project started by the Sultans at Topkapi and reinvigorated by 
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Erdoğan and his diplomats. This was the dominant discourse stemming from 
the more Syrian/Hezbollah sympathetic Al-mayadeen, Al-Manar, As Safir, Al-
Akhbar, and Al-Jadeed. He states that even for Arab thinkers who support 
the revolution against Bashar Al-Assad,  
“Turkey’s assertiveness has been progressively seen as ill-advised 
and perilous, leading to an escalation of the conflict. In particular, 
Turkey’s support for the rebels, including the fringes identified as 
extremist (e.g. Jabhat al Nusra), has led many to wonder what exactly 
Ankara’s political objective is in the Syrian civil war.” 
 (Samaan 2013) 
Also, a poll released by TESEV in December 2013 provided evidence of a 
decline in Turkish soft power in the Middle East region at the time. The 
positive view of Turkey amongst the Middle Eastern participants declined by 
19% after the ‘Arab Spring’, with 38% of the participants holding the opinion 
that Turkey has been following sectarian policies (TESEV 2013).  
In the next chapter it will become evident how social cohesion and sovereign 
territoriality became weaker than ever in the Middle East after the ‘Arab 
Spring’, which altered the double-security dilemma Turkey faced. Turkey 
managed to mitigate the double-security dilemma during the early years of 
AKP incumbency through alliance-building with civil society and ethnic and 
religious minorities domestically and across borders. Nonetheless, in the next 
chapter an analysis of why this alliance-building model of political 
reproduction failed to take hold in the Arab region and shifted within Turkey 
itself will examine how state polities alter their patterns of authority. 
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Chapter Seven: The Unravelling of the ‘Turkish 
Model’: The Arab ‘Spring’, the AKP’s Evolving 
Double-Security Dilemma and their Transition from 
Alliance-building to Fortifying Political Reproduction 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter focused on how the AKP maintained the functional 
dimension of sovereignty of the Turkish state. In the first 11-13 years of AKP 
rule, Turkey competed for power horizontally through co-opting potential 
rivals and becoming increasingly alliance-building80 to mitigate the threats 
from other state polities and non-polities vying for political authority and 
sovereignty across international space. Focusing on the AKP’s rule from 
2011 onwards, this chapter explains how the AKP’s double-security dilemma 
evolved due to unforeseen regional pandemonium and the implications of 
this for the Turkish alliance-building model. The 2011 Arab ‘Spring’ and its 
repercussions represented a crisis of hegemony in the region, as consent for 
power-wielders waned. Therefore, this chapter explains how the AKP’s policy 
formation went from ‘zero problems’ to zero options. This resulted in 
increasingly blocking behaviour from the Turkish state both horizontally and 
vertically, as regional disorder dominoed into Turkey, altering the pattern of 
                                                     
80 It is important to note that alliance-building and fortifying political reproduction are not 
positivist concepts, a state is either becoming more one or the other at any given time, but 
always displays some behaviours of either. 
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the political authority of the AKP away from the ‘Turkish Model’ of the 
alliance-building period. 
This chapter is divided into two parts and focuses on the post-2011 period. 
Firstly, ‘7.2 Turkey’s horizontal security dilemma’, examines the AKP’s 
changing capacity to respond to growing horizontal challenges and their 
foreign policy shift away from broad alliance-building. It is divided into three 
sections. The first section of 7.2, ‘Theoretical and Methodological 
Considerations’ re-examines the chapter relevant literature on a state’s fluid 
double-security dilemma, constitutive environment and possible behaviour. 
The second section of part one, ‘Turkey’s Post-Arab ‘Spring’ Souring 
Horizontal Relations in North Africa’, explains the impact of the Arab ‘Spring’ 
on Turkey’s horizontal relations with Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The third 
section of 7.2, ‘Turkey’s Post-Arab ‘Spring’, Souring Horizontal Relations with 
Syria and the Prevarication of Neo-Ottomanism’ examines the impact of the 
Syrian civil war on the AKP’s domestic, regional and global power.  
The next part, ‘7.3 Domestic Consent in Decline’, examines Turkey’s vertical 
security dilemma, due in many parts to the second-image reversed problem 
faced by states, as rival polities became emboldened by the Arab ‘Spring’. 
Part two also analyses the AKP’s changing capacity to respond to said 
dilemma and their growing authoritarianism as a result.  The first section of 
7.3, ‘The AKP’s Monopolization of Turkey’s Institutions’ will examine how the 
AKP fortified the structure of the state and its institutions in favour of 
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President Erdoğan. The next section of 7.3, ‘Winners and Losers of 
Capstone Turkey’ describes the new winners and losers that emerged under 
this new shape of regime.  The third section of part two, ‘State-Society 
Relations in the Securitized Period’ examines the new relationship between 
the Turkish state and Turkish society that emerged after the ‘Arab Spring’.  
 
 7.2 Turkey’s New Horizontal Security Dilemma 
 
 
 
Theoretical and Methodological Considerations 
 
Through re-examining the theoretical literature on a polity’s political 
reproduction and the double-security dilemma, this section explains the core 
concepts and tools that can be used to explain the departure of Turkey from 
its alliance-building political reproduction. These concepts include the post-
international nature of the political system, the AKP’s threat perception and 
use of threats to maintain hegemonic power, and the horizontal and vertical 
aspects of the double-security dilemma which impacted both the functional 
and constitutional dimensions of the AKP’s power and relations with Turkish 
institutions and society. Reconsidering the theoretical literature serves as a 
base contextualization of the events examined further on in the chapter. 
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The highly embedded, hybrid and liminal environment that the Turkish state 
polity is geopolitically situated within, makes it particularly vulnerable to the 
volatile characteristics of the modern international system. These 
characteristics include: 
“declining territoriality; the declining capacity or at least significant 
transformation of states; the erosion of barriers between internal and 
external political arenas of states; the central role of culture, and 
especially identities, in global politics; the growing importance of a 
galaxy of political communities and actors such as corporations, 
terrorist groups, and non-governmental organisations; the declining 
role of sovereignty in international law and the growth of a global law 
of ‘persons’; and the decline of interstate war along with the spread of 
intra- and trans-state violence.”  
(from Rousenau in Ferguson and Mansbach 1996: 372) 
 
Through analysing Turkey’s engagement with the ‘Arab Spring’ this chapter 
will bring to light the highly interdependent, porous nature of Turkey’s 
sovereignty and its impact on domestic authority patterns (Ferguson and 
Mansbach 1996: 372). This volatility meant that as the AKP’s threat 
perception aggrandized, the government moved away from an international 
security policy to a national security policy. Additionally, the threats that 
emerged were a useful way for the AKP to maintain its hegemony through 
expounding fear and maintaining political coherence through framing threats 
to their power as threats to national security itself. As Buzan (1991: 338) 
states, a level of threat can be an effective tool for a state polity to suppress 
dissent and build unity. However, centring the Gramscian idea of hegemony, 
Femia (1981: 39) states that to build that unity  “there must be a substratum 
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of agreement so powerful that it can counteract the division and the 
disruptive forces arising from conflicting interests”- this was unsustainable in 
the Turkish case as the shape of the double-security dilemma shifted, 
evoking a new and more fortifying response from Turkey’s power wielders 
who began to push internationalism and cosmopolitanism outside the policy 
agenda. The manipulation of threat perception is what enables a state to 
maintain power. Threats are a matter of perception and not empirically 
measurable. Therefore, they have become a discursive tool of policy makers 
(Buzan 1991).  
Thus, if national security is a ‘relative’81 end, then the ontological frame of 
the rise and fall of the ‘Turkish Model’ of the AKP’s post-Islamic neoliberalism 
becomes void when studying the ability of the model to combat the double-
security dilemma of the Turkish state (Buzan 1991). In the short run, the 
‘Turkish Model’ was indeed a relative success, and the hegemony of the AKP 
was sustained for around 14 years through passive revolution, alliance-
building; and absorbing those engines of society who may have had the 
capacity to destabilize the status quo. These engines included the Kurds, 
                                                     
81 Buzan (1991: 331) states that “Relative security is a permanently unsatisfactory condition. 
It can always be criticized as imperfect, because on logical grounds it must be so. It can 
never serve as a stable resting place, because the factors which define a satisfactory relative 
level at any given moment are themselves ephemeral. The structure of the system and its 
interaction dynamics complete this dilemma by ensuring that any attempt to acquire, or even 
move towards, complete security by any actor will stimulate reactions which raise the level of 
threat in proportion to the measures taken.”  
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liberal civil society and the Anatolian peasantry and working class. The model 
however, was relatively unsuccessful in the long run as horizontal instability 
and economic discontent grew, leading to a weakening of consent for the 
hegemony of the AKP, and a new destabilized era of a war of position. To 
sustain its hegemony the AKP had to alter its pattern of authority. To combat 
the new security threats that had emerged they abandoned the ‘Turkish 
Model’ (embossed by alliance-building) of the turn of the century, moving to a 
form of fortifying reactive political reproduction. 
The trend in the shifting nature of polity behaviour has been demonstrated by 
the extensive historical research on state polities by Ferguson and Mansbach 
(1996). Ferguson and Mansbach (1996: 263) have noted that as polities 
recurrently evolve, their horizontal and vertical relations evolve too. Hall 
(1999) has explained that this also works inversely. Ferguson and Mansbach 
(1996: 44) note that this evolution is due very much to the “pulling and 
hauling of competition among authorities”; or what has been termed here as 
the double-security dilemma. Changes to the polity that may occur are the 
“expansion or retrenchment”, or fission or fusion of the polities domain of 
authority (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996: 44). If consent has begun to wane, 
the polity may also alter its pattern of authority, “by utilizing, adapting, or 
restructuring existing institutions that are set up to extract and use state 
resources in a particular manner.” (Lindberg 2001: 184)  
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How the polity does this, i.e. the way it responds to the double-security 
dilemma, through either fortifying or alliance-building affects both: 
Horizontal Politics 
-the states external relations with the environment consisting of other 
states and international organizations 
 
And… 
 
Vertical Politics  
-the structure of the state and its institutions 
-the structure of society as stakeholders and winners and losers shift 
(vertical relations) 
-the relationship between the state and its society and how society 
interacts with the states institutions (Lindberg 2001: 184) 
Lindberg (2001) states that all these institutions, or structural layers of the 
state, must continuously ‘be defended’ in terms of re-articulation, adaptation 
to changing conditions or restructuring” (Lindberg 2001: 184). If the chosen 
method does not succeed the state polity will lose its authority and fail to 
exist.  
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This part of chapter 7 analyses horizontal politics, focusing on how alliance-
building altered Turkey's external relations, making the country more 
vulnerable and embedded within its external environment which put it at great 
risk during the ‘Arab Spring’. This then led to Turkey becoming fortifying, both 
vertically and horizontally, which induced the altering of the structure of the 
state and its institutions. This created new winners and losers in society, and 
a more hostile interaction between society and state.  
 
Turkey’s Post-Arab ‘Spring’ Souring Horizontal Relations in North Africa 
 
Turkey’s relationship with North Africa during the alliance-building period had 
been much defined by economic considerations, neo-ottomanism due to the 
regions post-Ottoman status, and security co-operation within the Union for 
the Mediterranean and NATO/Mediterranean Dialogue. The ‘zero-problems’ 
policy had led to large sums of Turkish FDI in the MENA region, and the 
Muslims of North Africa were attracted to Turkish soft power, with Turkish 
broadcasting and consumables popular with many (Cavdar 2017). 
Nonetheless, horizontal relations between Turkey and the states within the 
region radically shifted with the onset of the ‘Arab Spring’. Through analysing 
the shifting diplomatic relations between Turkey and the countries which 
underwent mass power shifts during the revolt (Tunisia, Egypt and Libya), 
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this section will examine how this limited Turkey’s foreign policy formation, 
bringing an end to their push for liberal peace in the region82.     
On the 17th of December 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, 
set himself on fire in response to the humiliation he had received by his local 
municipality. This act would spark what became known as the Arab ‘Spring’, 
a region wide revolt against state authoritarianism and a shaking off of 
repression (Tuğal 2016). As political leaders fell like dominoes throughout the 
Arab region, Middle Eastern polities faced an unprepared for security 
dilemma as power vacuums replaced the authorities that had once been. 
This new security dilemma, unforeseen by Turkey’s foreign policy 
intellectuals and practitioners, led to the end of the horizontal zero-problems 
with neighbours alliance-building strategy architected by Davutoğlu. As the 
regional security dilemma embroiled, the AKP found that new vertical threats 
emerged, and the passive revolution had to change its shape- to that of 
fortifying political reproduction- for the AKP post-Islamist neoliberal order to 
survive (Tuğal 2016).  
Tunisia is perhaps the state where the Islamic neoliberal pattern of authority, 
marketed as the ‘Turkish Model’, had the most success.  Tuğal (2016: 176) 
                                                     
82 This section focuses on Tunisia, Egypt and Libya as the countries which did not 
experience the Arab “Spring” did not directly cause such an overhaul of Turkey’s 
international politicking. That is not to say, however, that Turkey’s relations with other North 
African states were static. 
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notes that this was in part due to the weight of the international drive behind 
the ‘Turkish Model’ in Tunisia, which the global hegemony felt was the 
easiest way to ensure the nesting of neoliberalism in any new order that may 
emerge in the Middle East. The international support behind a Tunisian 
‘Turkish Model’ was instrumental in the marginalization of other Tunisian 
polity formations (Tuğal 2016).  Nonetheless, as the AKP began to 
increasingly monopolize power; due to the threats posed by regional 
disarray, their Tunisian patrons followed suit (Keyman and Gumuscu 2014).  
This encouraged a new regional pattern/form of post-Islamist power 
reproduction- that of coercion.  
Despite the international drive behind the ‘Turkish model’ in Tunisia, at the 
start of the revolution, the AKP government stayed mute on the situation, in 
line with their ‘zero-problems’ policy, and in dissimilarity to other regional 
actors such as Qatar, Iran and Hezbollah (Tuğal 2016). As the continued 
authority of the ultra-secular Ben Ali regime seemed untenable, the 
international community pushed for a Tunisian post-Islamist passive 
revolution in Tunisia (Tuğal 2016). At this point, Tunisia’s Islamists began 
their own discussions on their role in the future of the country, feeling that 
they could make use of the “Western/global push for moderate Islam.” (Tuğal 
2016: 178)   
Post-Islamism seemed attractive to Tunisians who after years of corruption, 
religious repression, and economic inequality were searching for a form of 
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governance that incorporated religious freedom, economic opportunity and 
globalism- features all seen within the ‘Turkish Model’ (Göksel 2014). A 
political force that against all odds seemed to be the only agent able to 
establish said polity was Ennahdha83, periodically banned and repressed by 
the Ben Ali regime, Ennahda still had an established base in rural areas, 
prisons and support from other Islamic groups such as the Salafis (Tuğal 
2016). Rashid Ghannouchi, head of the conservative Ennahda party, noted 
that Ennahda was 
“taking lessons from Turkey”: “Turkey is a model country for us in 
terms of democracy. There are very good relations between Turkey 
and Tunisia, and I hope there will be a proper environment in the 
future where we could foster those relations.” 
 (Ghannouchi in Göksel 2014: 477) 
On the 14th of January 2011, President Ben Ali fled Tunisia, and on the 23rd 
of October 2011, the first free elections for a constituent assembly were held 
in the history of the country. Ennahdha won with 37.04% of the vote, the 
opposition received only 8% (Tuğal 2016). The fall of Ben Ali and the election 
of Ennahdha led to the expansion of Islamic practices that had been banned 
by the ultra-secular regime of Ben Ali, in a similar way that the election of the 
AKP government had done in Turkey at the peak of the Turkish-Islamic 
synthesis (Tuğal 2016).  
                                                     
83  Moderate Tunisian Muslim Brotherhood party meaning ‘awakening’ and led by Rached 
Ghannouchi.  
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Between 2011 and 2014 relations between the AKP and Ennahda flourished. 
Tunisian policy-makers and civil servants regularly attended courses in 
Turkey to optimize the organizational management of the health, education, 
welfare and financial sector (Tuğal 2016). In January 2012, the first official 
state visit of the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rafik Abdessalem, was to 
Turkey (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012). On meeting his Turkish 
counterpart, the “2012 Turkey - Tunisia Action Plan for Bilateral Cooperation” 
was contracted by the Ministers. The plan intended to set the foundation of a 
special relationship between the two states, with the “organization of high-
level meetings with participation of related institutions; more cooperation and 
solidarity in the framework of regional and global forums.” (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2012)  
Yet, due to post-revolution instability and the massive polarization between 
Tunisia’s Islamists and secularists, Ennahda did not end up following the 
alliance-building model of the AKP’s first terms. Ennahda were accused by 
the secularists of a clandestine plot to form a sharia-based caliphate in 
Tunisia (Göksel 2014). Indeed, as Tuğal (2016) notes, unlike the AKP’s first 
tenure, the new Tunisian government faced waves of mass protests by the 
radical Islamists and the secularists. Their inability to strike the right balance 
between the two, meant they were unable to form a hegemony. In October 
2014, Ennahda were unseated from government by a liberal-secularist 
coalition.  
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This Tunisian power shift was detrimental to Turkey’s foreign relations with 
the country, as the AKP had laid all their eggs in the Ennahda basket. Also, 
the Gezi protests of 2013 were heavily covered by the Tunisian press, which 
for the first time revealed the weaknesses of the ‘Turkish Model’ to the 
Tunisian public who also had begun to blame Turkey for Ennahda’s failings 
(Marks 2013). Turkey’s horizontal influence over Tunisia became increasingly 
limited with the rise of the secularist Nidaa Tounes party who held both 
parliamentary and executive power from 2014 onwards. Nidaa Tounes’ 
politics and ideology, routed in Arab nationalism and secularism, are very 
distant from that of the AKP. A notable point of division between the two is 
over the war in Syria, with Nidaa Tounes sympathetic toward the Assad 
regime (Reidy 2015). The political divisions between the two governing 
parties has also been demonstrated by a large decrease in the balance of 
trade between the two countries which decreased from $1864 million in 2014 
to $676 million in 2015 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015).  
Tunisian-Turkish relations is just one example of the failure of Turkey’s 
alliance-building foreign policy after the shake-up of the ‘Arab Spring’. 
Turkey’s relationship with the whole of North Africa, and in fact the entire 
MENA region, also began to experience increasing challenges, not just to 
Turkey’s power as a regional hegemon, but to the spread of the post-Islamist 
‘Turkish Model’ itself. One of the most notable cases of this happening aside 
from the Tunisian case, is that of Egypt, where Turkey’s miscalculation of 
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emerging security dilemmas severely limited its influence not only in Egypt, 
but in the entire Arab world (Tuğal 2016).    
On the 25th of January 2011, the Arab “Spring” spread to Egypt. The slogan 
of the protesters was ‘bread, social justice, freedom and dignity’. Tuğal 
(2016: 158) notes how the protesters in the main square in Cairo, Tahrir, 
were largely middle class, and more working class in Mahalla and Tanta. A 
key rival polity to the regime at the time was the ‘Turkish Model’ sympathetic 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) who were guided by the same stream of Hanefi 
Islam as the Turkish RP and Erdoğan himself. At this point in time, although 
being against the Mubarak regime in Egypt, the MB’s guidance bureau did 
not advise its supporters to attend the protests. Nonetheless, many MB 
supporters did attend the protests, which led the guidance bureau to then 
change their minds (Tuğal 2016).  
On the 1st February 2011, the first cracks in the AKP’s alliance-building 
strategy towards Mubarak’s Egypt emerged. On that date, Erdoğan made a 
television address to Mubarak to ‘meet the people’s desire for change’ 
(Erdoğan in Tuğal, 2016: 179). On the 10th February 2011 a general strike 
led to President Hosni Mubarak quitting office the following day. At this point, 
the MB’s guidance bureau demanded protesters to leave the streets and 
abide by the authority of the military, in order to ensure that a fully-fledged 
revolution did not take place, and rather instil a ‘Turkish Model’ of passive 
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revolution where conservatism, neoliberalism and hegemonic interests were 
key (Tuğal 2016).    
Throughout 2011, the MB continually represented the counter-revolution in 
Egypt, yet failed to consolidate a Turkish style passive revolution. The MB 
nonetheless, monopolized power through the violent suppression of anti-
military and workers resistance with the aid of the Turkish state (Keyman and 
Gumuscu 2014). One example of this support was that the AKP’s political 
marketing team had counselled MB activists during the electoral drive of the 
MB’s Freedom and Justice Party (Isıksal and Örmeci 2015). There is also 
evidence of the ‘Turkish Model’ being used as a tool by the MB in order to 
demonize anti-MB protesters as being anti-Islamic and anti-modernist84. Yet, 
the conservative structure of Egyptian society made the implementation of a 
modernist liberal ‘Turkish Model’ difficult, and Islamic and liberal political 
society once united against Mubarak began to further diverge (Tuğal 2016).  
Due to this ideological strain, cracks did surface in the MB-AKP alliance. In 
September 2011, Erdoğan’s speech in Cairo included a passage about the 
universality of rights afforded by the secular state model being beneficial to 
those of pious beliefs. This caused discontent amongst the MB ranks, 
                                                     
84 This was also supported by the international community, “ The Western supporters of the 
‘Turkish Model’ (in Egypt) became the global proponents of the MB’s framing of…events. 
They pictured the protestors as saboteurs out on the hunt for Islamic democrats.” (Tuğal 
2016: 171-172) 
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particularly amongst the Salafis and the Jamaa, who the guidance bureau 
pacified by distancing itself from the comments made by the Turkish PM 
(Champion and Bradley 2011). The inability of Turkey to influence events in 
Egypt despite the strong alliance between the MB and AKP was also 
demonstrated with the MB President’s first state visit. The new Egyptian MB 
President Morsi’s first state visit was to Riyadh and not Ankara, a rejection of 
Turkey and the AKP who had provided unyielding solidarity to the MB 
throughout the Egyptian upheaval (Tuğal 2016).  
Riyadh won out again and managed to employ greater influence on Cairo 
than Ankara when pro-Gulf General Sissi took over power from and arrested 
President Morsi in the July 2013 coup (Tuğal 2016). Turkey, highly critical of 
the coup and having offered relentless solidarity to the MB, lost a large 
amount of influence in Egypt as a result (Mason 2017). Erdoğan has 
displayed support for the MB on many occasions, including through flashing 
the Rabia sign85 at his supporters and calling for Morsi to be released from 
jail. (Mason 2017: 137). The Rabia sign is a four-finger salute that emerged 
in summer 2013 after a four day sit in by MB supporters in Nasr City was met 
with extreme violence and resulted in hundreds of deaths at the hands of 
General Sissi’s security forces. It was quickly co-opted by other Hanefi 
Islamists as a symbol of solidarity of the oppressed Muslims against the 
                                                     
85 See images 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3  
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infidel and the imperialist. It gained traction amongst the AKP supporters and 
all MB supporters across the Middle East as the ‘Arab Spring’ turned into a 
salmagundi of sectarianism (Mason 2017).     
By November 2013, Sissi had expelled the Turkish ambassador and 
withdrawn his ambassador from Ankara, employed economic sanctions 
against Turkey, and took part in joint military exercises with Russia and 
Greek Cypriots (Mason 2017). Turkey retaliated by hosting the Egyptian MB 
and anti-Sissi opposition, who broadcasted banned information into Egypt 
(Çagaptay 2017). Hostilities were not just felt on a track one level, but on all 
levels of diplomacy86. An example of a track three break down was noted by 
Shadi Al-Idrees, the Communications Manager for the Turkish branch of the 
Open University of Cairo, who explained how registration for the University 
within Turkey hugely decreased in the year of the Sissi coup (Syria News 
2014).  
The Egyptian crisis also put immense strain on US-Turkish relationship and 
the Turkish-Israeli relationship too. Erdoğan put blame on the West and 
Israel for the coup in Egypt, and his words were officially condemned by a 
White House statement87 (Çagaptay 2017).  
                                                     
86  (Track one denoting official government diplomacy, track two unofficial and track three 
citizen to citizen exchanges and dialogue) 
87 Despite this, Turkey and the US maintained close military co-operation. As Çagaptay, 
(2017: 177) states: “A NATO radar facility in the Turkish town of Kurecik in the east-central 
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In recent years, no single foreign policy issue aside from Palestine has united 
Turkey’s political Islamists as much as General Sissi’s crackdown on the MB. 
The AKP may have lost their horizontal influence within post-coup Egypt, yet 
as a vertical consent building tool the Rabia movement reignited the neo-
ottoman discourse that had begun to abate. The evidence of this was far and 
wide across the class and ethnic spectrum:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
Anatolian Malatya Province, activated in 2012, is perhaps the best example of the symbiotic 
security cooperation between Ankara, the USA and NATO. The facility is part of NATOs 
Ballistic Missile Defence Shield, serving to protect alliances members against Russia and 
Iran.” 
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Image 7.1 Rabia Flag at Protest in Istanbul 
 
Rabia flags are sold to protesters at demonstration in solidarity for Gaza 
outside the Israeli Consulate in Levent, Istanbul. (Author’s own image from 
July 2014) 
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Image 7.2 Egyptian Flags at Palestine Protest in Istanbul 
 
The Egyptian flag is raised with Islamist flags by protesters at the same 
demonstration (Author’s own image from July 2014) 
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Image 7.3 Turkish Protestor Makes the Rabia Salute  
 
A protester raises the Rabia sign popularized by Erdoğan outside the Israeli 
Consulate (Author’s own image from July 2014) 
 
Mason (2017) notes that the Egyptian-Turkish rupture not only meant the end 
of the post-Islamist ‘Turkish model’ in Egypt, but it reignited the polarized 
identities that had become nested into the model in both countries -that of the 
Islamists and the secularists. The renewed divisions between the Islamists 
and secularists were not only apparent in Turkey and Egypt but within the 
region too (Mason 2017). A cause for concern was the divergent backing of 
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Turkey and Egypt for polar conflicting elements in post-revolution Libya 
where the ‘Turkish model’ also did not succeed (Tuğal 2016).  
The Libyan uprising was a key factor in the transformation of Turkey’s 
perception of regional security and said response, away from alliance-
building to increasingly aggressive behaviour. Prior to 2011, Turkish-Libyan 
relations had flourished with Turkish construction companies heavily 
investing in Gaddafi’s development projects (Tuğal 2016). Turkey’s 
investments in Libya were worth around $30 billion (Isıksal and Örmeci 
2015). Unsurprisingly, when the Libyan revolt began, this meant that Turkey’s 
priority was to protect said investments and ensure their stability and 
continuity. Thus, Ankara took a soft stand with Gaddafi, speaking publicly 
against any form of military intervention88 but urging him to transfer power. 
The Libyan rebels perceived this move with disdain, and protesters began to 
burn Turkish flags in Benghazi (Waldman and Caliskan 2016). Nonetheless, 
as Gaddafi refused to transfer power or stop his brutal crackdown on 
protesters, Ankara had no choice but to pull the full weight of the TSK behind 
the NATO intervention on the 25 of March 2011, marking a new 
interventionist period in Turkish foreign policy (Mason 2017).  
                                                     
88 On the 17th of March 2011, the international community/NATO implemented a no-fly zone 
in Libya against the best wishes of the AKP government in Turkey (Tuğal 2016)  
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Actions taken by the TSK and the Turkish government included the blockade 
of Libyan harbours, the designation of Izmir as the logistical centre of the 
NATO intervention, and legislation in parliament legalizing the intervention 
and the freeing up of further troops to join the operation if needed (Tuğal 
2016). This represented a major shift away from the AKP support for 
Gaddafi, and on July 2011, during his trip to meet the opposition in Benghazi, 
Davutoğlu declared the national transitional council as the legitimate 
leadership of the Libyan nation (Tuğal 2016). Turkey’s fortifying behaviour 
had restored its influence in Libya for the time being. In spring 2012, Libya’s 
national transitional council leader Mustafa Abdul Jalil stated,  
“Turkey’s democratic structure is an example for Libya and other 
countries that experienced the Arab Spring. Libya will take Turkey as a 
model for its own political and democratic structure. And our friendly 
relations will be much more powerful in the new era.” 
 (TurkishNY 2012) 
These sentiments were echoed by Abdulmagid El-Mansuri the Chairman of 
The Libyan Economic Development Consultancy Corp and founder of The 
Arab International School in Istanbul who framed the Libyan revolution as a 
window of opportunity for the Turkish-Libyan relationship to flourish for the 
good of societal innovation, education, technology and science. He continued 
by expressing that this relationship could form an example to the entire Arab 
region (El-Mansuri 2014). Yet, just a few months after this article, in August 
2014, the security situation in Libya rapidly deteriorated as questions 
emerged over the legitimacy of the government. This had an extremely 
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detrimental effect on Turkish-Libyan co-operation which completely seized to 
exist on a track one level (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016).  
The ‘Arab Spring’ left three North African countries with short to long term 
power gaps where dictators had once ruled. Neither Egypt, Tunisia, nor Libya 
were stabilized by the new institutions that had formed and many of the 
failures of the previous polities such as police violence, sectarianism and 
injustice survived. In the case of Turkey, the AKP’s neo-ottoman openness 
and embeddedness within North Africa’s economies and societies, as it 
hoped to expand Islamic neoliberalism within the area, left Turkey highly 
exposed when changes of governance and the reorganization of societies 
occurred due to the revolutions. Alliance-building political reproduction can 
make a polity’s sustenance susceptible to turmoil within its region, particularly 
in the case of the loss of consent for a shared model of governance or 
ideology. Alliance-building encourages the idea of liberal peace. Yet, if the 
security of a polity is reliant on the restraint of other polities with regard to 
threats, that security is vulnerable to the whims of said polities (Buzan 1991: 
335). Thus, the AKP were left with no option but to change their horizontal 
pattern of authority. Therefore, the AKP moved away from an ‘international 
security strategy’ to a ‘national security strategy’.  
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Turkey’s Post-Arab ‘Spring’ Souring Horizontal Relations with Syria and the 
Prevarication of Neo-ottomanism 
 
 
“The implosion of Syria has left Turkey’s ‘zero-problems with 
neighbours’ policy in tatters. The Arab Spring in Syria and spread of 
Da’esh in Syria and Iraq illustrates that events can often outstrip 
foreign policy conceptions, formulations and responses.”  
(Mason 2017: 147) 
 
Ankara’s relationship with North Africa had a knock-on effect with regards to 
its relationship with the rest of the MENA region. The Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) states became increasingly disgruntled by Turkey’s 
relationship with hanefi Islamist polities such as the MB in Egypt and Syria. 
Yet, economic interests between the GCC and Turkey were prioritized when 
it came to the revolutions in Yemen and Bahrain. Due to its reliance on GCC 
energy imports and an aspect of sectarianism, the AKP’s solidarity for the 
Arab uprisings was not echoed when it came to the revolutions in Bahrain or 
Yemen (Mason 2017).  Plus, when its derisory offer to mediate the Bahrain 
crises fell on deaf ears, Turkey looked less like a regional power and more 
like a peripheral state in the shadow of the GCC (Waldman & Caliskan 2016: 
220).  Unsurprisingly, due to its geographical proximity and the sovereign 
threat of the Kurdish issue, the uprising that had the most profound effect on 
Turkey’s double-security dilemma was the Syrian revolution. Işıksal and 
Örmeci (2015) state that it was indeed the Syrian crisis which was the 
Achilles heel of the Davutoğlu Doctrine. 
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By the year 2011, Turkish business had over $223 million of FDI in the Syrian 
cement, fishing, agricultural and metal industries (Mason 2017: 139). 
Turkey’s full stake in Syria was worth at least $2.4 billion (Waldman and 
Caliskan 2016: 221).  This may explain why despite the Syrian uprising 
beginning in March 2011, it was not until August of the same year that 
Ankara pushed for a transition of power. The Syrian uprising began when the 
Bashar Al-Assad regime’s security forces opened live fire on non-violent 
protesters in Deraa- who were protesting in solidarity with the Arab 
revolutions. The uprising rapidly escalated into a full-blown conflict between 
those who supported Assad and those who wanted to see an end to his 
regime (Isıksal and Örmeci 2015).  
In the summer of 2011, the AKP permitted thousands of refugees safe 
passage into Hatay and allowed for the head of the armed wing of Syria’s 
Muslim Brotherhood to give a press conference in Istanbul (Tuğal 2016)89. In 
June 2011, Prime Minister Erdoğan branded the Assad regime as ‘savage’ 
and pressed Assad to instigate a democratic reform process. This coincided 
with a Turkish arranged summit of the MB-sympathetic Syrian opposition, the 
founding of the armed wing of the opposition in Hatay (the Free Syrian Army, 
with the assistance of US logistics and Saudi finance and weaponry), and the 
                                                     
89 Erdogan stated that he “wish (ed) there to be no painful events (in Syria) as occurred in 
Libya” (Tuğal 2016: 182). By urging Assad of Turkey’s unwillingness for violence and military 
intervention, the Turkish foreign office hoped to find a reformist approach that would prevent 
such an outcome. 
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security of Free Syrian Army leaders ensured by Turkish constabularies 
(Tuğal 2016; Mason 2017). Turkey also turned a blind eye to arms smuggling 
to the opposition across the Syrian border (Waldman and Caliskan 2016: 
222).  
Erdoğan’s words of caution were unheeded by Assad. Therefore, in August 
2011 Ankara threatened Damascus with an even harsher stance. FM 
Davutoğlu stated, 
“This is our final word to the Syrian authorities: Our first expectation is 
that operations stop immediately and unconditionally. If the operations 
do not end there would be nothing more to discuss than steps that 
would be taken.”  
(Davutoğlu in Işıksal and Örmeci, 2015: 79)  
After a Turkish fighter jet was shot down in international airspace by the 
Syrian army in June 2012 and evidence of the Syrian regime using chemical 
weapons against civilians over 200 times emerged, the AKP became 
increasingly pro-intervention in Syria (Andrikopoulos 2015)90. From the 
summer of 2012, the Turkish government continually urged the UN Security 
Council to act on Syria, in October 2012 Davutoğlu pushed for both collective 
non-direct and direct humanitarian intervention in Syria91- claiming the Free 
Syrian Army had a right to self-defence and were a legitimate force 
                                                     
90 The Syrian regime deny that the jet was shot down in international airspace.  
91 This included a push for a no-fly zone similar to that enforced in Libya (Andrikopoulos 
2015). 
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(Andrikopoulos 2015: 79). Framing the Free Syrian Army as a viable 
alternative ruling polity to the Syrian regime, the Turkish government began 
pushing for a transitional government (Andrikopoulos 2015).  
Yet, Turkey’s cries for support from the international community were 
disregarded. Thus, left to its own devices, divides began to mire the Syrian 
opposition; with moderates wanting to replace the Syrian regime with a 
‘Turkish Model’92 and conservatives pushing for a sharia Saudi-type system. 
The AKP argue that the lack of support for a ‘Turkish Model’ in Syria by the 
international community was a key factor which led to the rise of Da’esh (also 
known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), an extreme “Islamist” group 
calling for a sharia state (Mason 2017). After the threat of hostage taking of 
Turkish citizens by Da’esh emerged, Turkey joined the US-led alliance 
against the group in September 2014 (Mason 2017)93. However, Tuğal (2016) 
states that bombardments from the TSK against ISIS were few and far 
between compared with those against the PKK.  
                                                     
92 Tuğal (2016: 195) refers to the statement of the Syrian MB leader: “Ali al-Bayanouni the 
leader of the Syrian MB from 1996 to 2010 said in 2011 that Turkey’s balance between 
secularism and freedom of religion made it an ideal model for Syria.”  
93 In July 2014 46 Turks were kidnapped by ISIS. A prisoner exchange between the Turkish 
government and ISIS resulted in their freedom (Waldman and Caliskan 2016).  
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Domestically, the lack of support from the USA and the international 
community94 meant an increasing burden of the Syrian crisis on Turkish 
society- as Turkey’s “open door” policy for Syrian refugees meant a 
population influx of 2.7 million plus by 201295 (Andrikopoulos 2015). Turkey’s 
blind eye to foreign fighters also exacerbated its domestic terrorism problem96 
(Mason 2017). Public opinion was 70% against war with Syria (Mason 2017). 
Turkish civilians also suffered from cross border shelling. This was eventually 
halted by the installation of six batteries of NATO Patriot missiles on Turkey’s 
southern border (Mason 2017). 
In 2011, another problem arose for Turkey across the Syrian border, the 
Syrian branch of the PKK, the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya 
Demokrat PYD), enlightened by the Syrian uprising, became an organized 
armed force wanting to push for Kurdish sovereignty within the Syrian state 
(Çagaptay 2017). Support for Ocalan and the PKK was rife amongst Syrian 
Kurds as the PKK’s popularity had been allowed to grow under the 
government of Hafez Al Assad who provided asylum to Ocalan and used the 
                                                     
94 Cracks began to emerge at this point between the Obama and Erdoğan administrations, 
Erdoğan stating that the US was not pulling its weight with Syria. Further tensions emerged 
in the Turkish-US relationship when in 2014 Ankara purchased air defence systems from 
China in a snub to the Pentagon (Çagaptay 2017). 
95 Andrikopoulos (2015: 79) has stated that, “The AKP government promised full protection 
in Turkey for Syrian citizens escaping the conflict in April 2012, when evidence emerged of 
the Syrian army using live fire against Syrian refugees attempting to flee the violence.”  
96 The 11th of May 2013 represented a turning point in Turkey as the terror spread to 
Reyhanli in Turkey, where two bombs killed 51 (Andrikopoulos 2015). 
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PKK as a proxy against Turkey (Çagaptay 2017). In response to Turkey’s 
support for the Syrian opposition, the Assad regime halted joint intelligence 
sharing on the PKK with Turkey and pledged Syrian citizenship to Syrian 
Kurds97 (Çagaptay 2017).  In July 2012, the Assad regime struck a deal with 
the PYD, handing over autonomy of Ayn Al Arab/Kobane, 
Qamishli/Qamishlo, Erfin and Amude, in return for an end of hostilities 
(Çagaptay 2017). This led to the establishment of Rojava, Western 
Kurdistan, between 2013 and 2014. Tuğal (2016) has observed that “growing 
Kurdish autonomy” was one of the key factors that ended the ‘Turkish Model’. 
An analysis of the impact of Kurdish autonomy on the AKP’s political 
reproduction will be examined later in this chapter. 
The harsher stance of Turkey towards the Syrian regime also began to upset 
its friendly neighbourhood policy with Iran98. Due to Iran’s support for the 
Alawi Syrian regime, past enmities between nationalist ‘Persian’ and 
‘Ottoman’ ideologues re-emerged which led to some AKP supporters pushing 
for Turkey to fortify against the Shia axis (Tuğal 2016). Iran and Turkey both 
also had a unique and divergent perspective of the Arab uprisings, Iran 
viewing them as a follow-on from the 1979 Iranian Revolution and Turkey 
                                                     
97 Or Rojava Kurds as known by Kurdish nationalists. 10-20% of Syrians are of Kurdish 
origin (Çagaptay 2017).  
98 Trade between Iran and Turkey was $10 billion in 2008. Turkey had been a key actor in 
encouraging non-proliferation negotiations with Iran (Mason 2017)  
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viewing them as potential dominoes of the ‘Turkish Model’, putting both 
models on a “collision course” (Işıksal and Örmeci 2015: 57). The collision 
course played into international and regional rivalries. A NATO missile 
defence system was built on the Turkey-Iran border, and the US, Saudi and 
Israel pressurized Turkey to play a bigger role against the ‘Shia crescent’ and 
perceived threat of Iran’s nuclear capabilities (Tuğal 2016).  
Despite the chilling of relations with Iran, there is an argument that the AKP’s 
‘zero-problems’ policy was being ‘reset’ when in 2013 President Gül invited 
Iranian President Rouhani to Turkey and there were several meetings 
between Davutoğlu and his Iranian counterpart (Mason 2017). Turkey also 
made a tougher public stand against Al-Qaeda, differentiating them with Al-
Nusra99, a move welcomed by the Iranians. Yet, Turkey’s relations with 
another pro-Assad regional power became complicated by the Syrian war, 
that with Russia, who like Iran, had maintained support for the Syrian regime 
(Mason 2017).  
Dealings between Russia and Turkey became antagonistic when in 
November 2015 Russia levied sanctions against Turkey for downing a 
Russian fighter jet on the Syria-Turkey border (Mason 2017). Russia also 
positioned a S-400 missile defence system in Syria, a move which firmly 
limited Turkey’s defence policies towards Da’esh and the Syrian regime- a 
                                                     
99 A militant Salafi Islamist group in Syria 
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problem exacerbated by the spread of Da’esh terrorism into Turkey (Mason 
2017)100. Furthermore, unlike Iran, Russia fully supported Kurdish autonomy 
in Northern Syria. The robust role of Iran and Russia in Syria began to make 
the AKP look powerless on not just an international front, but on the domestic 
front too.  In an example of the double-security dilemma faced by the AKP 
2012, as international unrest was met with internal destabilization; anger 
against Russia for its perceived support of Assad boiled onto the street within 
Turkey and protests regularly took place against Russia’s Syria policy mostly 
by the Sunni Anatolian working and middle class, pushed by AKP 
sympathetic organizations such as İHH:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
100 Çagaptay (2017: 170) refers to Putin’s threat, “that Russia would shoot down any Turkish 
planes or troops who made their way into Syria (jeopardizing any of Turkey’s logistical 
support for the rebels). Putin also imposed economic sanctions on Turkey and deployed 
extra troops to Armenia, Russian troops now surrounded Turkey on 3 sides- Crimea, Syria, 
Armenia.“ 
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Image 7.4 Protest against Syria and Russia in Istanbul  
 
Turkish protesters burn an effigy of Bashar-Al Assad outside the Russian 
Consulate on Istiklal Street, Istanbul (Author’s own image from June 2012) 
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Image 7.5 Protest against Syria and Russia in Istanbul (2) 
  
Turkish protesters pin protest placards onto the Russian Consulates plaque 
on Istiklal Street, Istanbul. The placards read, “Free Syria. Resistance is 
coming.” “Victory from God, the opening is near.” (Author’s own image from 
June 2012) 
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The balance of power between the EU and Turkey has also altered thanks to 
the war in Syria, as Mason (2017: 146) states, “Turkey’s bargaining position 
vis-a-vis the EU is intimately connected to the continuation of the Syrian 
conflict in general and continuation of the migrant crisis in Europe.” Despite 
Turkey’s changing relations with the EU, Syria, Iran, the PYD and Russia, 
Turkey continued its alliance-building behaviour with the Kurdistan Regional 
Government in Iraq (Mason 2017).  
This alliance was important for Turkey to block the emerging threats from the 
Syrian crisis and ensure the stability of energy imports that were at peril due 
to the Russia crisis (Isıksal and Örmeci 2015). The Iraqi Kurdistan Regional 
Government began to play a mediating role between Kurdish groups in North 
Syria- and tried to impose a passive revolution there- a role that had been 
dominated by Turkey in the region during its alliance-building period. 
Turkey’s evolving double-security dilemma and threats to its sovereignty from 
Kurdish autonomy had severely limited its ability to act as the engine of 
passive revolution or mediation within the region, particularly in areas where 
Kurds were involved101 (Andrikopoulos 2015). The encouragement of a 
passive revolution within Rojava by the Kurdistan Regional Government 
(KRG) also ensured the KRG was favourably looked upon by Turkey 
                                                     
101 A key moment that represents Turkish weakness is the Suleyman Shah incident, when 
Turkish troops abandoned its Ottoman Sultans tomb in Syria (Waldman and Caliskan 2016: 
39). 
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(Andrikopoulos 2015). Additionally, the KRG-Turkey alliance has been vital in 
the countries fight against the PKK, with the KRG blocking PKK cross-border 
operations into Anatolia (Mason 2017).  A 50-year oil and gas agreement 
was renewed by Turkey and the KRG in June 2014 (Andrikopoulos 2015). 
Thus, Turkey continues to be the KRG’s biggest trading partner, and a 
leading consumer of oil from the KRG region (Çagaptay 2017). 
Isıksal and Örmeci (2015) further analyze the routes of the importance of the 
AKP-KRG alliance. Firstly, it makes the Turks seem like rational impartial 
actors in the face of PKK terrorism. Secondly, the AKP have gained support 
for the rights and freedoms of the Turkmen in Iraqi Kurdish areas by the KRG 
leaders.  Yet, the KRG-Turkish alliance is a unique case of unfavourable 
tolerance on both sides as “overall the AKP’s foreign policy under Erdoğan 
has left the country with few allies.” (Çagaptay 2017: 177) By 2014, the 
Syrian civil war had left “three sides of a deadly triangle”- Da’esh, the PYD 
and the Syrian regime on Turkey’s border (Waldman and Caliskan 2016: 
189). This deadly triangle represented a profound amount of weight on 
Turkey’s double-security dilemma.  
Kurdish autonomy was a direct threat to both the constitutive and functional 
dimensions of Turkish sovereignty- as it threatened to untangle the 
democratic opening and renew calls for devolution in Kurdish areas. The 
AKP’s hostilities towards the Assad Ba’ath regime in Syria altered its 
horizontal relations within the region and beyond, as many states were 
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displeased by Turkey’s sympathies with the MB. Additionally, Turkey’s 
staunch support for the MB during the early days of the ‘Arab Spring’ was a 
grave miscalculation, as the MB became side-lined in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya 
and Syria. ISIS were not only a security threat to Turkey’s civilian population, 
but the reigniting of Islamic fascism was a problem for the spread of the 
‘Turkish Model’ and the ideology of post-Islamism itself.  
The crisis of hegemony within the Middle East due to the ‘Arab Spring’ limited 
the capacity for passive revolution as violence and power struggles became 
normalized (Tuğal 2016). This represented an end for Turkey’s zero-
problems alliance-building in the region. As (Mason 2017: 147) states, “The 
myriad of competitors for loyalty in the region has been explosive for regional 
and international alliances, with peer polities and hegemonic powers all 
competing for influence.” The hegemonic powers such as Turkey increasingly 
“de-legitimized themselves through sectarianism and by picking sides” based 
on loyalties and identities rather than universal human rights (Tuğal 2016: 
194).  
Turkey’s horizontal alliance-building was a miscalculated and ill-prepared 
foreign policy agenda that left it highly dependent on international security 
within one of the most unstable regions on the planet. 
 “Turkey as of today, is stuck between national security concerns 
which have to be reorganized within the framework of realism and 
could put regional isolation back on the agenda, and the expansionist 
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foreign policy approach it has pursued in the period after the 
millennium.” 
 (Andrikopoulos 2015: 79)  
Thus, with a heightened double-security dilemma in its stead, the AKP chose 
to fortify the Turkish state and its institutions to protect its sovereignty from 
Kurdish separatism and national security from ISIS and the Syrian civil war. 
The next part of this chapter will focus on the vertical threats to the AKP’s 
authority that emerged from rival polities and non-polities. The chapter will 
also examine the way in which the AKP moved away from alliance-building 
political reproduction to fortifying political reproduction to mitigate the 
collapse of the state. Central to this was the notion that the survival of the 
state was only possible within the capable hands of President Erdoğan and 
he began to not only block rival polities, but those within the AKP itself who 
had pushed for a more open agenda. 
 
 
7.3 Domestic Consent in Decline 
 
The AKP’s Expansion and Monopolization of the Turkish state and its 
Institutions  
 
Part 7.3, ‘Domestic consent in decline’ examines the way the AKP responded 
to the neoteric double-security dilemma brought about by the ‘Arab Spring’ 
through fortifying its vertical relations and altering both the culture and the 
structure of the state to block spill over threats. This led to a more fortifying 
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mode of political reproduction overall within Turkey, which had a profound 
effect as the winners and losers of Turkish society shifted, and the 
relationship of the society to the state became increasingly hostile within 
some segments. Due to the nature of the threats emerging from other 
polities, some which had historically been nested in Turkey and other 
countries in the region, the AKP altered its form of power reproduction by 
shifting from consent generation to coercion. 
As a response to threats to the AKP’s power consolidation, the state 
apparatus became an engine for increased authoritarianism through blocking 
alternative polities; rather than power sharing, openness and ‘justice and 
development’ as had been the norm in the early 2000’s. To maintain the 
securitisation of the Turkish state, which the AKP framed as dependent on 
their rule of it, the AKP squeezed the life out of democratic and civil society. 
As (Çagaptay 2017: 125-126) explains,  
“Erdoğan’s illiberal policies strengthened once he was able to 
eliminate three key checks and balances: one undemocratic (the 
TSK), and two democratic (the high courts and the media). His 
successful intimidation of the business community and civil society 
also neutralized potential forces of opposition, and Erdoğan became 
brazen in his disregard for democratic institutions.” 
 
Erdoğan’s increased paranoia was not without reason. As part 7.2 has 
demonstrated, by 2013, the ‘Arab Spring’ weakened Turkey’s role as a 
regional power in the Middle East and put an end to the “zero problems with 
neighbours” doctrine. Turkey also became a regional hub for millions of 
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Syrian refugees, causing significant strain on the social system as well as 
undercutting peripheral employment. Furthermore, by 2014, ISIS had 
launched a number of brutal attacks against civilians in Ankara, Istanbul and 
the Kurdish region. Aside from the spread of fear this also greatly harmed the 
level of FDI and the tourist industry (Çagaptay 2017).  
The ISIS siege of the Kurdish Syria-Turkey border town of Kobane from 
September 2014 to January 2015 had led to the deaths of thousands and 
caused immense material destruction. The AKP were accused of turning a 
blind-eye to events unfolding in Kobane, angering Kurds in Turkey who 
began to protest in solidarity with Kobane. On 20 July 2015, 33 Kobane-
sympathetic activists from Turkey were killed in a bombing in Suruç carried 
out by a Turkish citizen (Çagaptay 2017). In retaliation, the PKK 
assassinated two Turkish police officers whom they accused of colluding in 
the ISIS attack. The killing of the police officers was the government’s official 
excuse for the vast acceleration of state violence and reigniting of the war 
with the PKK in the summer of 2015. Through the ruse of security, the AKP 
now allied with MHP and the far right and gave the green light to the Turkish 
military to invade and launch curfews in Eastern and South-eastern 
Anatolia (ESA), and arrest Kurdish and leftist activists (Araj and Savran 
2017).  
In stark contrast to the AKP’s first and second terms, Turkey’s AKP third term 
evoked a reactive political culture, rather than proactive. The first element 
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targeted for blocking from political authority was of course the Erdoğan critics 
and liberals from within the party. From 2010, parliamentary party members 
on the centre/left were side-lined and then were further purged in the AKP’s 
September 2012 party congress (Çagaptay 2017). It has seemed that the 
fortifying and blocking behaviour of the AKP has worked, and despite a 
number of scandals, corruption allegations, increasing amounts of street 
protests (including Gezi park), and their fallout with the Gülen movement they 
managed to maintain their authority.  
The AKP managed to secure a 52% majority in August 2014 for the election 
of President Erdoğan, and a majority in the re-run of the November 2015 
elections (Çagaptay 2017). Alliance-building political reproduction had ended, 
but Erdoğan and his supporters were far from finished. Instead, the AKP 
turned to a re-articulation and adaptation of their political authority, to 
maintain power in an increasingly hostile and competitive environment. The 
first step in doing this was to alter the structure of the state, including its 
scope, and its institutions (Çagaptay 2017).  
From 2012 onwards, Erdoğan and his supporters within the party began to 
widen the scope of state interference into the daily life of its citizens within 
Turkey, a move which ended the absorption of the liberal society into the 
‘Turkish Model’ (Waldman and Caliskan 2016).  During the alliance-building 
period the AKP had widened its legislation around basic freedoms, however, 
from 2012 the AKP started to tighten such legislation, limiting basic freedoms 
 294 
 
(Andrikopoulos 2015: 83). One of the most unpopular laws was that 
restricting the sale of alcohol. In May 2013, the Turkish parliament voted to 
ban the sale of alcohol after 11pm in shops and completely ban the sale of 
alcohol within a 100m of mosques and schools (Waldman and Caliskan 
2016).    
Yet, it was not just through legislature that the AKP tried to control public life, 
but also through controlling and dominating the public discourse with 
conservative salvoes, an action that many argued was beyond their role as 
politicians. A June 2013 poll by Today’s Zaman represented this with 49.9% 
of Turks frustrated with the growing authoritarianism of the government 
(Waldman and Caliskan 2016: 55).  Many public commentators started 
arguing that the state had become a nanny state. For example, Richard Falk 
stated,  
“These is no doubt that Erdoğan irresponsibly fans the flames of 
discontent in Turkey by refusal to keep his conservative personal 
preferences to himself, undermining his identity as the elected leader 
of a diverse, modern nation. As we should all know by 2013, the 
personal is political.” (Falk 2014: 184) 
 
Some examples of these salvoes were the notion that women should refrain 
from laughter in public stated by deputy PM Bulent Arinc, the call of Erdoğan 
for each family to have at least three children, his speeches against 
unmarried couples co-habiting and the AKP’s conservative notion that red 
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lipstick worn by the staff of Turkish Airlines was haram102 (Falk 2014; 
Andrikopoulos 2015). Pro-life proclamations on abortion from Erdoğan and 
other AKP ministers were met with demonstrations and online articles by pro-
choice women’s rights groups (Korkut and Eslen-Ziya 2017). 
Worries about abuse of state power in Turkey by the AKP were of concern 
during the 7 June 2015 Parliamentary elections, as highlighted by the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) election 
observation mission:  
“ 
1. Media freedom is an area of serious concern; media and 
journalists critical of the ruling party were subject to pressure 
and intimidation during the campaign. 
2. There were isolated cases of cancellation or restrictions of 
rallies of the opposition parties in favour of events organized for 
the President or the Prime Minister. Two criminal court orders 
for removal of certain opposition posters deemed to be insulting 
to the President were issued. 
3. Media critical of the ruling party faced increasing pressure and 
intimidation by public figures and political actors during the 
election period. The Radio and Television Supreme Council 
(RTSC), is responsible to oversee compliance of broadcast 
media with the regulations. The seemingly partisan functioning 
of the RTSC raised concerns over its transparency and 
independence” 
(OSCE 2015) 
 
                                                     
102 Forbidden by Islam  
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Despite their abuse of state power during the elections, the AKP were short 
of a majority by 18 seats. A leading factor in their defeat was the rise of the 
Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP) a progressive 
alliance of the left and Kurdish groups, who were the first Kurdish party to 
pass the 10% threshold in the elections (Waldman and Caliskan 2016). The 
AKP needed to arrange a coalition government to push through the 
constitutional reforms they envisaged. For the AKP, forming a coalition with 
either the CHP or HDP was untenable and they chose to hold new elections 
instead (Waldman and Caliskan 2016). The new elections were held in 
November 2015 and the AKP won 51% of the vote, enough to form a majority 
government. This victory was largely down to the AKP’s crackdown on the 
opposition, framing HDP supporters as terrorists and CHP supporters as 
Islamophobic (Waldman and Caliskan 2016).  
Aside from increased interference of the state in daily life; othering of Kurds, 
women and any opponents; lack of electoral freedom and the reigniting of 
violence in the Southeast; the AKP also managed to fortify the judiciary and 
military to the party’s advantage. By 2014, 11 new members had been 
assigned to the constitutional court to restrict the militaries influence over the 
judiciary (Waldman and Caliskan 2016). After Erdoğan’s election as 
President in 2014, many high-ranking military officers resigned, concerned at 
his growing monopolization of power. They felt "it was all but clear that 
Erdoğan was acting as the puppet master controlling the AKP government of 
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the new Prime Minister Davutoğlu.” (Waldman and Caliskan 2016: 78)   2014 
was a key year in the changing shape of the party and the regime. Many old 
allies of Erdoğan were pushed out and side-lined, including Abdullah Gül and 
other ex-RP heavyweights. The regime began to take the form of a 
“politburo-like structure” controlled by “Erdoğan loyalists” (Çagaptay 2017: 
125).     
Despite earlier moves to quash the influence of the military during the 
alliance-building period, once all his rivals from the military had been 
removed, Erdoğan began to militarise Turkish society from 2014 (Waldman 
and Caliskan 2016). He reignited his ties with the TSK and began using 
militarist rhetoric to gain popular support for his crackdown against Kurdish 
separatists and the Gülen   movement.  In a show of military might Erdoğan 
instilled his own military guard at the presidential palace, consisting of 478 
soldiers in Ottoman attire (Waldman and Caliskan 2016)103. 
To consolidate the new politburo shape of the state with Erdoğan at the top, 
purging all state institutions from Gülen influence was crucial. Although the 
polity lead by Fethullah Gülen had been a vital AKP partner during the 
alliance-building period, their increased power and number of loyal followers 
became to be viewed as a threat to the AKP’s control of the state (Çagaptay 
                                                     
103 The Presidential Palace (Ak Saray) or white palace was built by Erdoğan as a symbol of 
his strength to a cost of $615 million (Waldman and Caliskan 2016).  
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2017). The Gülen movement had been accused of clandestine interference 
within the judiciary and military to mould the state institutions in their favour, 
rather than in the favour of the AKP (Çagaptay 2017).   
On September 2012, 330 military officers were convicted and incarcerated 
for participation in the Balyoz/Sledgehammer plot, a 2003 plan to launch a 
military coup against the AKP (Waldman and Caliskan 2016). Yet, the verdict 
was reversed by the Constitutional Court because of inconsistencies104. This 
led some Turks to believe that the whole trial had been down to Gülenist 
theatrics, a play by the Hizmet, to rid the judiciary and police of non-Gülenists 
(Waldman and Caliskan 2016). 
The struggle for the judiciary and military between the Gülenists, the AKP, 
and the Kemalist establishment was won by the AKP. The AKP had 
monopolized power and moulded the state and its institutions in its favour, 
purging those who had once been crucial to its rise to power. In the next 
section, the winners and losers of the new fortifying model will be explored. 
Many of the losers being those who had in fact, like the Gülen, been crucial 
to building loyalty and consent amongst the polarized Turkish and Kurdish 
masses during the alliance-building period.   
 
                                                     
104 One example highlighted by Waldman and Caliskan (2016: 36) is that, “a document 
purportedly from 2002 mentioned a group called the Turkish Youth Union, who had not been 
established until 2003.”  
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Winners and Losers of Capstone Turkey 
 
The deliberate uprooting of rival polities was not limited to the Gülen 
movement but became a nationwide process. Central to the AKP’s 
maintenance of power during the fortifying period has been the systematic 
suppression of any form of dissent.  On the national level, this systematic 
suppression has been characterised by two streams of coercive activity. The 
first has been the targeted nation-wide suppression of activists, journalists 
and educators suspected of support for the Gülen movement through arrests 
and purges. The second stream of coercive activity has been the attack on 
the peace movement, leftists, feminists, LGBTQ activists, Alawis and Kurds 
who represented a viable counterhegemony against the ‘Turkish model’. This 
broad umbrella of organisations and citizens have become recipients of 
collective punishment as the AKP builds a new pattern of authority based on 
fear, rather than consent.  
Those who benefited from the AKP’s new fortified pattern of authority were 
the nested establishment, the far-right and Kemalists who once suspicious of 
the AKP’s democratic opening, began to favour Erdoğan’s increasingly 
militarist and nationalist rhetoric and hardened stance on Kurdish rights and 
the left. Parties such as the CHP and MHP, had not been able to “present a 
responsible political platform that could give the Turkish people a positive 
alternative, so the prospect of mounting an electoral challenge remained 
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poor.” (Falk 2014: 189) Nonetheless, they managed to effectively lobby the 
AKP to concede to militarism and nationalism.  
The Gülen movement were the greatest losers of post alliance-building 
Turkey and were subject to suspicion and conspiracies.  Relations between 
Gülen and AKP had begun to sour, in part because of the Gülen movements 
discontent with the AKP’s solidarity with Palestine and the Kurdish opening 
(Waldman and Caliskan 2016). The AKP were unhappy with the large power-
base of the Gülen movement that they felt could be a threat to their authority. 
The AKP therefore began to accelerate their crackdown on the Gülen 
(Waldman and Caliskan 2016).  
In November 2013 Gülen dershane were banned by the AKP and shut-down 
(Waldman and Caliskan 2016)105. The AKP’s election victories despite the 
corruption allegations106 enabled them to accelerate their purge of the Gülen   
movement. During 2013 and 2014 Erdoğan downgraded and sacked many 
Gülen security personnel and judges and then declared the Gülen movement 
a terrorist organization. He subsequently had more than two dozen 
journalists and media personnel arrested from the Gülen owned Zaman and 
Today’s Zaman (Çagaptay 2017).  
                                                     
105  A multi-million-dollar industry, the dershane were aimed at underprivileged youth, helping 
them to prepare for and access further education (Çagaptay 2017). 
106 Waldman and Caliskan (2016: 85) refer to the rank of Turkey in the 2011 Transparency 
International Corruption Index: “61 out of 183.” 
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Although the Gülen-AKP fallout had a profound impact on Turkish society, 
nothing ripped at the helms of the cohesion of the Turkish state more than 
the ending of the PKK-AKP peace process. The greatest loser of fortifying 
Turkey was the Kurds and of course those who lost their lives through 
renewed violence (Waldman and Caliskan 2016). In June 2011, fighting 
between the TSK and the PKK resurfaced. The PKK blamed the Turkish 
military claiming that the armed forces were continuing attacks despite the 
ceasefire- after the renewed clashes Erdoğan refused to sign any more 
negotiations agreements. Yet talks continued underground despite a re-
emergence of hostilities (Waldman and Caliskan 2016). 
In 2012 the peace process continued to stall, and violence between the PKK 
and the Turkish state claimed over 1000 lives despite a continued push for 
talks by the broader Kurdish peace movement (Waldman and Caliskan 
2016). Actions taken by the movement included a mass hunger strike by 
Kurdish political prisoners and the meeting of renowned Kurdish political 
activist Leyla Zana with Erdoğan in July 2012. Hostilities continued into 2013 
when three prominent female Kurdish activists were murdered in Paris. 
Worried about the increase of suffering amongst the Kurdish people, Ocalan 
pushed for a ceasefire in March of the same year (Waldman and Caliskan 
2016).  
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The AKP decided to offer a new package of proposed policy changes107 but 
these fell far below Kurdish expectations as they did not mention the freeing 
of political prisoners, the relaxing of anti-terror legislation or universalize the 
use of Kurdish language. One of the reasons for this weak offer is that as 
Erdoğan augmented his moves to the presidency, it became clear that 
Kurdish liberation would be more a hindrance than a help108 (Çagaptay 2017). 
To win votes he needed a strong militarist stance against the PKK (Çagaptay 
2017). The AKP also felt like the Kurds shunning of their offers were a stab in 
the back, as they had seen themselves as the generous protectors of Kurdish 
rights during the Kurdish opening (Çagaptay 2017). In the tradition of Ataturk, 
Erdoğan declared war on the Kurds to win the support of the nationalists and 
become president (Çagaptay 2017:142).  
Despite the passing of a new law authorizing official peace negotiations in 
July 2014, the lack of aid to the Kurds of Syria from the Turkish government 
destroyed any possibility of a better future for the Kurds of the region, or at 
least by the will of the AKP (Çagaptay 2017). As discontent against the 
AKP’s policy towards the ISIS-blockaded Kurds of Northern Syria grew, 
protests spread across the ESA. The protests were met with a brutal 
                                                     
107  Including: potentially easing the 10% parliamentary election threshold and language 
rights for Kurds (Waldman and Caliskan 2016). 
108 An example of this is when HDP leader Demirtas popularized the twitter hashtag 
#wewillnotmakeyoupresident to combat Erdoğan’s hopes of consolidating executive power 
(Çagaptay 2017).  
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crackdown by Turkish security forces leaving 22 protesters dead and curfew 
and internet shut-downs in six majority Kurdish provinces by October 2014 
(Waldman and Caliskan 2016). 
The TSK also began an aerial bombing campaign within the ESA against 
PKK sites causing even more casualties. In February 2015 Ocalan again 
tried to mitigate further violence, publishing an HDP endorsed statement 
listing strategies the government could take to reinstate a ceasefire. Yet, the 
government responded by blocking his wishes (Waldman and Caliskan 
2016). Tensions were further exacerbated when an increase in terrorist 
attacks targeting Kurds and leftists occurred with accusations of lack of 
protection from the Turkish security services (Tuğal 2016). Following this, in 
November 2015 eight JITEM (gendarmerie) affiliates were cleared of 
massacres of Kurds and Alawis committed in Cizre between 1993 and 1995.  
In addition, the death of Tahir Elci- the head of Diyarbakir Bar Association 
(and a lead investigator into massacres committed against Kurds and leftists) 
in crossfire meant the alliance-building with Kurdish groups was truly over 
(Tuğal 2016). 
The renewal of violence also put the health sector and health professionals of 
the ESA at risk. The Turkish Medical Association reported an increase of 
state violations of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions in ESA due to the 
reigniting of the PKK-Turkish conflict (Vatansever et al. 2015). As explained 
by Araj and Savran (2017: 16):   
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“These violations have included direct assaults on health 
professionals, institutions and ambulances. Incidents noted were the 
loss of life of three health workers, the closure of pharmacies and 
hospitals due to curfew and increased violence, the entrance of armed 
security personnel and vehicles into spaces where emergency 
healthcare was being provided, the arrest/kidnapping of medics, and 
acts of physical violence by police forces on nurses and doctors.” 
In the eyes of the AKP and the political establishment, Kurdish polities had 
gained too much power through the opening of the political system during the 
alliance-building period. The final failure for the absorption of Kurdish groups 
into the passive revolution was the rise of the HDP. The AKP felt it was time 
to block the perceived threat to Turkish sovereignty, neoliberalism and post-
Islamism that was the Kurdish/leftist party which had thrashed the 10% 
electoral threshold in June 2015 (Çagaptay 2017)109.  
Through winning 13% of the vote in the June 2015 election (80 out of 550 
seats) and 10.8% in the November re-election of the same year (59 votes out 
of 550) the HDP not only represented a threat to the AKP hierarchy, but to 
nationalism, fascism and neoliberalism in Turkey itself (Çagaptay 2017: 149). 
Çagaptay (2017) credits a number of factors for the HDP’s success: the rise 
of Kurdish nationalism during the ‘Arab Spring’, the gains of autonomy in 
Rojava by the PYD, Kurdish defeats of ISIS such as breaking the siege of 
Kobane and growing international support for Kurdish rights. As Falk (2014: 
                                                     
109 Çagaptay (2017: 148) explains the importance of the struggle between the HDP and the 
AKP in the ESA: “Politics in ESA is a two-way rivalry between the HDP and AKP- combined 
they received more than 93% of the vote in the 12-majority south-eastern Kurdish majority 
provinces in the November 2015 general election.” 
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177) explains, “there is also the strong possibility that elements of the 
Kurdish resistance see the fluidity of the regional situation as a window of 
opportunity to achieve national self-determination.”  
The militarist Turkish elite who had become the stakeholders of the AKP’s 
fortifying re-articulation embraced the renewed skirmishes and felt it was also 
an opportunity to crush the HDP and the left (Çagaptay 2017). Tuğal (2016: 
193) explains that the attacks had a profound impact on the basic rights of 
Kurds and in some areas, such as Cizre, ordinary citizens began digging 
barricades to keep out the TSK. In twelve cities in the South East, HDP local 
authorities declared autonomy from Ankara. Thus, the renewed clashes 
meant the incarceration of five mayors of Kurdish districts, created 355,000 
internally displaced people, and resulted in the deaths of 250 innocents 
(Tuğal 2016). The AKP’s new form of fortifying form of political reproduction 
seemed to have worked as in the parliamentary elections of November 2015, 
the AKP received 49.5%, due to their pandering to the nationalists and 
blocking of the Kurdish opposition (Çagaptay 2017).  
The pattern of alliance-building authority towards the Kurds from the 
government was truly over. Fearing the weight of the threats to the 
sovereignty of the Turkish state by the Kurdish movement for peace and 
autonomy, the AKP reverted the political scene to the traditional form of 
blocking and capstone behaviour towards minority groups that was favoured 
by the Kemalist establishment in the 80s and 90s (Waldman and Caliskan 
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2016). Therefore, parties such as the MHP and CHP plus the military 
establishment became increasingly nested into the regime as others such as 
the Gülen and the Kurds were blocked out.  
As a polity responds to the double-security dilemma through either becoming 
more fortifying or more alliance-building, the numbers of stakeholders in the 
survival of the polity also alter. In the situation where the polity moves 
towards a fortifying form of political reproduction, consent wanes and the 
number of stakeholders therefore decreases. For this process to occur there 
will be an adaptation of how the state and society relate to each other.  
After 2013, the restructuring of state-society relations in Erdoğan’s Turkey 
became that of coercion, punishment and fear rather than consent. Society 
began to engage with the state through protests, occupations, debate and 
collective organization through social media. The resulting reaction from the 
state was to crackdown on the freedom to protest, the freedom to organize, 
and the freedom of speech and the media. This process will be further 
analysed below.    
 
State-Society Relations in the Securitized Period 
 
This section examines the new relationship between the Turkish state and 
Turkish society that emerged after the ‘Arab Spring’. Here the focus is on 
rival polities that were not part of the traditional parliamentary opposition to 
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the political Islamists. Those that were a more tenable opposition were the 
street protesters of Gezi Park and the new social media activists that 
emerged which together began to transform the visibility of subaltern and 
peripheral society to the state. 
Soon after the 2011 election, AKP was alienating many Turks. There was 
widespread dissatisfaction with not only urban policies but a range of other 
policies and discourses targeting the marginalised (Araj and Savran 2017). 
Perhaps the first immediate provocation of the working class which led to 
was the excessive use of force by the security services against the May Day 
demonstrations in 2013 (Waldman and Caliskan 2016).  
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Image 7.6 May Day Protest 2013, Beşiktaş, Istanbul   
 
The May Day protests were pushed out of Taksim Square by the police into 
suburban areas such as Beşiktaş were they were further met with water 
cannons and police violence (Author’s own image from May 2013) 
However, it was not until the Gezi protests of May 2013 that millions of 
people came together on the streets and social media throughout Turkey to 
express their rage against increasing authoritarian, interventionist, and 
destructive Islamic-conservative neoliberal forces (Tuğal 2016). 
The Gezi uprising began when a protest by environmentalists, community 
activists and architects against the demolishing of Gezi park was met with a 
violent response by police which included close range shots to the head with 
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tear gas cannisters. The activists had been peacefully campaigning for 
months against the building of a mosque in place of the popular Istanbul park 
in the historically significant area of Taksim110.  The crackdown was swiftly 
broadcast over social media and traditional media platforms which was met 
by pure rage by the Turkish public (Araj and Savran 2017). The anger spread 
onto the street and,  
“soon enough the protest quickly turned into a trans-class uprising by 
different subaltern groups in alliance against neoliberal economic, 
political, cultural and ideological domination by the AKP and Erdoğan. 
The Gezi protests brought together such groups as workers, lower 
middle class, students, the unemployed, artists, intellectuals, radical 
leftists, Kurds, environmentalists, feminists, LGBTQs, anti-capitalist 
Muslims and ordinary people with no experience in political protest… 
As they were protesting against the government’s increasingly 
undemocratic and unequal policies, a serious counter-hegemonic 
challenge emerged.  The Gezi protests spread from Istanbul to various 
cities in the country but gradually subsided in mid-June and ultimately 
failed to institutionalise itself, a crucial step for a counter-hegemony’s 
success.”  
 
(Araj and Savran, 2017: 7-8) 
The images below show the real extent of the discord and unrest on the 
streets of Istanbul111. Inspired by the transnational ‘Occupy’ movement 
protestors occupied Gezi Park and Taksim square112. Symbols of the state 
                                                     
110 Taksim Meydanı (Taksim Square) is an area  particularly revered by Turkish leftists 
due to it being the sight of the massacre of 36 leftist protestors murdered by fascist 
militia during the May day protests of 1977. 
 
111 The information provided is based on observations by the author.  
112 The ‘Occupy Movement’ started in 2011 with a mass mobilization of people against vast 
economic inequality in the US and spread to other nations. 
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such as police cars were attacked by some segments of the demonstrators, 
and barricades were put up around the park to liberate the area from the 
control of the AKP and the state. Once the square area was under the control 
of the people, a carnival atmosphere of unity and solidarity quickly spread. 
For the first time in Turkish history, Kurds, Armenians, liberal Kemalists, 
leftist Syrians and Palestinians, feminists and anti-imperialist Islamists 
danced, debated and sang together.  
Image 7.7 Gezi Park Protestors Vandalize Police Vehicle 
 
Symbols of the state and AKP’s power were the main targets of many 
protestors anger. A particular reason for this was the lethal disproportionate 
use of force by the police. (Author’s own image from June 2013) 
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Image 7.8 Gezi Park Protestors Occupy Taksim Square  
 
Protestors reclaim the Square from the state. This resulted in violent clashes 
between them and the police who pushed protestors back to the Park and 
Cihangir and Tarlabaşı. (Author’s own image from June 2013) 
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Image 7.9 Armenians make their Presence Known in Gezi Park 
 
Protestors came from a diverse range of marginal backgrounds and 
minorities. This Armenian placard reads “You captured our graveyards, but 
you can’t capture our park! Armenians from Turkey.” This placard is from the 
Nor Zartonk (New Awakening) movement in Turkey that came about after the 
assassination of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink. This group represents 
Armenians and pushes for a leftist agenda. They would later become part of 
the HDP umbrella movement. (Author’s own image from June 2013) 
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Image 7.10 Barricades around Gezi Park 
 
Youth who had never been to protests in their lives began digging up the 
pavements and building barricades following the guidance of seasoned 
communists and Kurdish activists. (Author’s own image from June 2013) 
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Image 7.11 A Carnival Atmosphere at the Gezi Occupation  
 
The unified spirit during the Gezi protests represented a new vision of society 
away from the control of the media or the inequalities of neoliberalism. 
Activists built a self-sustainable community, with doctors and health 
professionals treating the wounded, restaurants donating food and even 
media activists set up a cinema with a projector in the park. As the state and 
corporate media had largely ignored what was happening, the park had hubs 
of alternative media where social media strategy was discussed and press 
releases were typed up. (Author’s own image from June 2013) 
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Image 7.12 Stand-off between Protestors and the Police 
  
Here the disproportionate amount of police who marched around Istanbul in 
their droves can be seen in a stand-off with protestors. (Authors own image 
from June 2013) 
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Image 7.13 Gezi Activists join Anti-Capitalists Muslims in Reclaiming Iftar on 
Istiklal Street  
 
In a rejection of the AKP’s monopolization of Islamic thought and practice, 
protestors broke fast together on the ground of significant sights such as 
Istiklal Street. This was a significant symbolic rejection of AKP soft power as 
AKP municipalities regularly provided public Iftar to increase their support 
and unite their supporters. (Author’s own image from June 2013) 
 
The Gezi movement was not just based in Istanbul but was countrywide. As 
AKP supporters worried about the emergence of counterhegemonic power 
they took matters into their own hands and began organizing street militias to 
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patrol the streets beating up protestors. Soon it became clear to the Gezi-
sympathetic counterhegemony113 that to truly challenge the power of the 
AKP, they had to form a viable polity and increase their visibility and support 
base (Araj and Savran 2017). The first step to this was regular 
neighbourhood forums in public parks all over Turkey to discuss future 
actions and tactics to dismantle the AKP. Eventually, it was decided that a 
political party would be a necessity to challenge the AKP’s electoral 
hegemony. The new counterhegemony formed the HDP (the Peoples’ 
Democratic Party) who would eventually challenge the AKP’s monopolization 
of power when they passed the 10% electoral threshold and became a 
source of street opposition in Parliament in 2015 (Araj and Savran 2017).  
As a response to this challenge to the AKP’s authority, the party began to 
fortify and block their opponents, ending the alliance-building that had once 
been between state and society:  
 “Central to the AKP’s maintenance of power after HDP challenges to 
their electoral hegemony, the Gülen fallout, the regional overspill of 
violence and the reignition of the Turkey-PKK conflict of July 2015 has 
been the systematic suppression of any form of dissent.  On the 
national level, this systematic suppression has been characterised by 
two streams of coercive activity. The first has been the targeted 
nation-wide suppression of key counter-hegemonic activists or those 
suspected of support for the Gulen movement through arrests and 
purges. The second stream of coercive activity has been the structural 
war against (the media, educators and unions and associations)…. 
This broad umbrella of organisations and citizens have become 
                                                     
113 A movement, or a rival polity/polities/possible polity with the potential to form a viable 
alternative to the hegemonic power that be. 
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recipients of the AKP’s determined de-institutionalisation and 
externalisation as a form of collective punishment as the AKP builds a 
new pattern of authority based on fear, rather than consent.” 
(Araj and Savran, 2017: 13-14)  
A chief target of the AKP’s fortification of politics was the internet and media. 
Key measures have included the incarceration of journalists114, the purging of 
opposition media staff from their positions (lending to the recent commonality 
of self-censorship within the media profession), gag orders115, intimidation of 
reporters, and laws restricting digital rights and internet freedom (Nisbet et al. 
2015). The AKP also altered the regulatory practices within the media 
enabling their supporters to buy many media outlets: 
“Just after the AKP rose to power in 2002, pro-government business 
owned less than a quarter of Turkish media, by 2011, pro-AKP 
businesses owned about 50%, today the vast majority of the Turkish 
media is in the hands of pro Erdoğan businesses.” 
 (Çagaptay, 2017: 123) 
The state-owned media was also incredibly bias towards the AKP, from the 
4th to the 6th of July 2014 533 minutes of broadcast time was devoted to 
Erdoğan, with just under 4 minutes given to the opposition leaders (Çagaptay 
2017; Waldman and Caliskan 2016). 
                                                     
114 Bulent Kenes, the ex-editor in chief of Today’s Zaman was charged for offending Erdoğan 
(Waldman and Caliskan 2016).  
 
115 In 2013 media censorship on Haber TV against opposition politicians was ordered by 
Erdoğan Haber TV (Waldman and Caliskan 2016). 
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The internet has been another target of the AKP’s blocking of the free flow of 
information. Waldman and Caliskan (2016) state how internet use by Turks is 
by proportion one of the most digitized in the world, with 26% of Turks having 
Facebook accounts (Nisbet et al. 2015). This is much related to the socio-
economic development practices of the AKP during the alliance-building 
period where a large sum of investment was targeted to both technology and 
education. Nevertheless, internet censorship has been a controversial issue 
in Turkey since 2007 when legislation was passed by parliament to ‘clean’ up 
the internet:  
“The legislation not only targeted pornographic websites and 
downloading hosts but also websites like YouTube and Blogger for 
reasons such as promoting insults to the founder of the Republic of 
Turkey and attacking political leaders. With approximately 80,000 
domain names blocked since the advent of this law, the government 
has made its position towards “dangerous” content circulating online 
clear and put Turkey in the limelight with respect to Internet 
censorship.” 
(Nisbet et al. 2015: 5) 
Since the Gezi protests, social media has regularly been used by citizens as 
a forum for debate and activism. For example, within one day in June 2013 
there were at least 2 million tweets related to Gezi from Turkey. Social media 
however was not just used by the counterhegemony, but it was also popular 
with AKP supporters who also volunteered in their thousands to defend the 
party-line on the internet (Waldman and Caliskan, 2016).  
This online polarization has been displayed in a survey report on Turkey’s 
contested internet, produced by the Center for Global Communication 
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Studies (Nisbet et al 2015). The survey results show the stark difference in 
attitudes towards internet freedom between AKP and non-AKP supporters.                                                        
 
Figure 7.1 Support for Recent Government Restrictions on Internet by Party 
Support (percentage of total respondents, single response) 2015 
 
(Nisbet et al. 2015: 19) 
38% of AKP supporters strongly agreed with the internet restrictions imposed 
by the government as opposed to an average of 11.75% of those who did not 
support the AKP. This also shows the tendency of a significant amount of 
AKP supporters in the 2015 period towards a more authoritarian society.  
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With its support base behind it the AKP indeed managed to accelerate its 
attack on digital rights116. Amendments to the 2007 law which came into 
effect in 2014 have also severely limited online freedoms. An example of this 
was the authorization of the Telecommunications Communication Presidency 
(TIB) to “implement blocking orders in four hours, obliged Internet service 
providers (ISPs) to retain users’ online activity information up to two years 
and required these ISPs to provide this data to authorities upon request.” 
(Nisbet et al. 2015: 5) Aside from this, Twitter and YouTube were blocked 
both before the March 2014 local elections and along with 166 other websites 
in April 2015 due to the dissemination of a controversial image of a 
prosecutor’s hostage situation (Nisbet et al. 2015). Aside from the violation of 
digital rights, there is also an issue of ethnic discrimination regarding the 
internet freedom violations, particularly with the Kurdish minority. For 
example, in August 2012, 70% of bloggers and media activists incarcerated 
for their political opinions were Kurdish (Waldman and Caliskan 2016).  
However, no amount of internet restrictions could suppress the emergence of 
the security dilemma to the AKP represented by growing Kurdish autonomy. 
As the environmental and social costs of Islamic neoliberalism began to 
effect larger numbers of society, inspired by the ‘Arab Spring’ a new 
counterhegemony emerged to challenge the lack of democracy and 
                                                     
116 In the first two quarters of 2015, 92% of court orders for Twitter content removal came 
from Turkish governmental and municipal institutions (Nisbet et al. 2015). 
 322 
 
transparency in the AKP’s project (Araj and Savran 2017). Under the guise of 
protecting national security, the AKP responded to the protests and renewed 
confidence of the opposition with violence and suppression (Araj and Savran 
2017).  
Despite the state’s crackdown on dissent; the overcoming of the electoral 
threshold by the HDP and civil unrest calling for Kurdish and human rights 
continued to pose a security dilemma to the AKP’s authority. In order to 
monopolize power and win this ‘war of position’ (or struggle for hegemony); 
the AKP launched a deliberate strategy of fortification. This was done to 
ensure the subordinate social positions of the marginalized remained 
unmoved. The new mode of political reproduction in Turkey was based on 
the prevention of any social mobility within Kurdish and Armenian areas and 
suppression of the exchange of social capital, debates or organization 
around alternative economic teleology. This was done with the support of the 
international community, to maintain the power of the AKP, the interests of 
foreign capital, and the continuation of Islamic neoliberalism at any human 
cost.  
However, the unfortunate quagmire is that despite the existence of a strong 
state tradition and its tradition of regime breakdown, Turkey through its long 
and ongoing democratization process, has become the most successful 
example of a secular constitutional democracy in a majority Muslim society, 
and is arguably the most likely Muslim democracy to become consolidated. 
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Yet, for this consolidation it is important that the AKP alter their current path 
of authoritarianism. Keyman and Gumuscu (2014) explain that  
 “In order for Turkey to sustain its 'model' role, the political actors, the 
state elites, and societal actors should internalize democracy, 
demonstrate their political and normative commitment to democracy 
and its consolidation, and accept the plural and multicultural nature of 
the state.”  
(Keyman and Gumuscu 2014: 31)⁠ 
 
 
 
7.4 Concluding Remarks  
For a state to survive the double-security dilemma, its structural layers must 
re-articulate and adapt to changing conditions. During the AKP’s first 11-13 
years of power they underwent an alliance-building mode of political 
reproduction which firmly embedded Turkey into its external environment 
socially and economically. The AKP also built alliances internally to be able 
to socially construct as broad consent as possible.  
When the Arab uprisings ensued, Turkish policy-makers saw it as an 
opportunity to spread the passive revolution and Islamic neoliberalism in 
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria. Yet, the passive revolution failed to domino 
and Turkey’s dependence on its external environment put it at great risk 
when regional turmoil occurred due to the failure of the ‘Arab Spring’ to bring 
about democratic regime change, security or stability. One such risk was the 
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territorial proximity of Syria, lending to three enemies aboding on Turkey’s 
border- Da’esh, the PYD and the Syrian regime. 
Consent for its internal alliance-building measures had also began to wane 
by 2013 due to domestic inequalities as new stakeholders emerged during 
the passive revolution.  Also, distrust in Turkey’s foreign policies as the state 
began to move away from its ‘zero-problems’ policy caused citizens with 
domestic trans-national identities such as Kurdish or Alawi identities to shift 
their loyalties away from that to the Turkish state. This led to protests, 
occupations and unrest in Kurdish majority areas where renewed calls for 
devolution and democratic autonomy proliferated. 
To respond to this change in the double-security dilemma, the AKP moved to 
a fortifying mode of political reproduction both vertically and horizontally 
representing the end of the ‘Turkish Model’ that had become popularized by 
the passive revolution. It did this vertically by altering the structure of the 
state and its institutions, creating new winners and losers, and building a 
more coercive relationship between society and the state than had been the 
norm in the alliance-building period. Central to this was the idea that only 
President Erdoğan could secure the endurance of the Republic through the 
emergent chaos. Thus, civil society was marginalized, and authoritarianism 
became synonymous with security. The AKP fortified the state horizontally by 
militarizing its territory, directly intervening in other states through sanctions 
and military intervention. This caused rifts amongst Turkey’s international 
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alliances both with the West, Russia and Iran due to Turkey’s hard-line 
support for the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Despite these rifts, it has seemed that the fortifying and blocking behaviour of 
the AKP has been successful. Although there have been regional wars, 
several scandals, corruption allegations, increasing amounts of street 
protests (including Gezi park), and a conflict with Gülen members; the 
sovereignty, authority and control of the Turkish state over its citizens has 
been maintained. In the next chapter, Chapter 8: Thesis Conclusions, the 
inferences of this thesis on how the AKP state polity has successfully 
reproduced to mitigate the double-security dilemma will be examined.  
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Chapter Eight: Thesis Conclusions 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This concluding chapter will begin by reviewing the findings of the research 
interrogation posed at the beginning of the thesis. Then, Section 8.2, 
‘Research Outcome and Contribution to Knowledge’, will explain how through 
a constructivist historical realist methodology, this study has enriched 
previous empirical studies on the AKP, Turkey, the ‘Turkish Model’ and 
illuminated significant contributions to the existing theoretical literature on 
state ruler’s behaviour and their inverse relationship to both the world politic 
and domestic struggles. Following this, Section 8.3, ‘Scope for Further 
Research’, will examine the benefits of the study to both policy-makers and 
academics, suggesting possible implications for future research and policy-
making.  
This study investigated the political reproduction of the Turkish state polity 
under the rule of the AKP. Through this case study, unique theoretical 
contributions were made to the existing literature on how states politically 
reproduce to mitigate the double-security dilemma. This has been 
accompanied by some empirical contributions through the selection and 
analysis of a wide scope of research and sources on the ‘Turkish Model’.  
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The case study showed how the AKP effectively maintained authority and 
managed to mitigate the double-security dilemma posed by threats to 
Turkey’s institutional and sovereign stability from 2002 until 2015. To explain 
how this operated, both the functional dimension and constitutive dimension 
of Turkey’s sovereignty were addressed through a unique historical realist 
methodology inspired by the work of Hall (1999). The empirical evidence 
pointed to how the AKP successfully built a post-Islamist hegemony through 
framing themselves as the only polity with the capacity to ensure the political 
and economic stability of the Turkish state.  
Through analysing data on the AKP’s building of alliances and absorbing 
potential rivals to power, the thesis has shown how the AKP maintained 
authority and became synonymous with the state, the government and the 
regime. The AKP’s consolidation of power within Turkey through an Islamic 
neoliberal pattern of authority became known as the ‘Turkish Model’, an 
alliance-building model of political reproduction framed as appropriate for 
other Muslim-majority countries to follow as a form of passive revolution to 
maintain the interests of capitalists and nullify the revolutionary currents 
stemming from 1979 Iran. 
The thesis has also explored the way in which the AKP horizontally built a 
pluralist trajectory of neo-ottomanism which enabled them to navigate 
through the functions and structures of the international political system 
through diplomacy, mediation, aid, development and trade in their first 
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decade of power. This policy was the basis of the AKP’s maintenance of 
functional sovereignty until the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’ completely transformed 
the shape of the AKP’s domestic and regional threats. 
The case study then reveals how a new regional double-security dilemma 
and power vacuums emerged through the ‘Arab Spring’. This, accompanied 
by the failure of the Arab masses to consolidate democratic change, not only 
threatened the existence of post-Islamism within Turkey, but the existence of 
the ‘Turkish Model’ itself. It is argued that this represented the end of the 
Turkish alliance-building form of political reproduction as the AKP moved 
towards a fortifying pattern of authority to shield themselves and the Turkish 
Republic from the changing scope of horizontal and vertical threats.  
 
8.2 Research Outcome and Contribution to Knowledge 
This thesis has demonstrated how state polities politically reproduce to 
mitigate the double-security dilemma through the case study of the ‘Turkish 
Model’. This was achieved by addressing the meaning of the ‘Turkish Model’ 
in the context of state political reproduction; exploring the elements of the 
Turkish state and political society that shaped the ‘Turkish Model’ of 2002-
2011; the elements of the regional and international system relevant to the 
‘Turkish Model’ were also analyzed; additionally, the thesis examined how 
and why Tukey’s evolving double-security dilemma altered its mode of 
political reproduction under the AKP. The thesis thus provides implications 
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for the existing theoretical literature and further studies of Middle Eastern 
state polities. Consequently, the outcomes of the study are addressed below: 
 
i. The meaning of the ‘Turkish Model’ in the context of state 
political reproduction and the double-security dilemma.   
The thesis used a theoretical framework of political reproduction outlining that 
rival state polities compete over revenue, identity, loyalty and ideology. The 
double-security dilemma is based around the threat posed to the authority of 
the state polity by two differing groups. The first is those groups who threaten 
the sovereignty of the state polity and the second is those who would 
threaten the institutional foundations of the state polity. Polities can politically 
reproduce in two ways, through becoming alliance-building- connecting to 
groups to increase their own resources, or through becoming fortifying- by 
blocking other would be rulers from building up power bases. The double-
security dilemma that the AKP faced between 2002 and 2011 included fixed 
factors such as the trans-historical nature of Turkish hybridity and 
‘Europeanness’, the role of geo-strategic realpolitik in the formation of 
Turkey’s nationalist discourse that had become consolidated by the military, 
and ‘othering’ as a discursive strategy of ‘Turkishness’ through marginalizing 
minorities. The double-security dilemma also included new factors such as 
the embeddedness of the Turkish economy in the regional and international 
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economy, the threat of the spread of the 1979 Iranian revolution and threats 
to democracy by the Kemalist establishment and military. 
The ‘Turkish Model’ was an effort by the AKP to regulate, control and contain 
revolt at home and abroad through altering Turkey’s political reproduction to 
that of Islamic neoliberal alliance-building (Tuğal 2016). It was thus presented 
as a model for other Muslim majority nations to follow. Nonetheless, this 
thesis highlighted that this alliance-building mode of political reproduction 
was based on a very specific double-security dilemma with a unique 
constitutive environment. Therefore, its application to state polities with a 
different double-security dilemma and constitutive environment was bound to 
fail thus resulting in the “failure” of the spread of the ‘Turkish Model’. 
 
ii. How elements of the Turkish state and political society shaped 
the ‘Turkish Model’ of 2002-2011. 
This thesis has demonstrated how the alliance-building mode of political 
reproduction undergone by the AKP dramatically overhauled the legislative 
and institutional framework of the state through opening up the political 
system with increased religious and minority rights and reducing the power of 
the military to intervene in civilian affairs. The AKP’s savvy neoliberal 
economic policies, routed in those of their predecessors the RP, led to the 
emergence of and emancipation of a new bourgeoisie, traditionalists from the 
 331 
 
heartlands of Anatolia who were historically marginalized by the Kemalists. 
The ‘Turkish model’ thus mitigated revolutionary change from below through 
re-framing Islamic neoliberalism as social justice and opportunity. What 
emerged was the nesting of Islamic neoliberalism into the Turkish state 
polity, its absorption diverting rival polities. Nonetheless, this model was 
unsustainable, as despite the best efforts of the AKP to maintain consent, 
discontent grew amongst those who felt disenfranchised by the religiosity of 
the AKP, alongside those left behind by growing inequality.  
 
iii. How the AKP navigated elements of the regional and 
international system shaping the ‘Turkish Model’ of 2002-2011. 
This thesis has demonstrated how the AKP re-articulated and adapted to the 
changing conditions of the international system to maintain the sovereign and 
institutional foundations of the Turkish state. For the first 11-13 years of the 
AKP’s power they underwent an alliance-building mode of political 
reproduction which firmly embedded Turkey into its external environment 
socially and economically. The thesis demonstrates how this was achieved 
through a post-Islamist strategy contrived by Davutoğlu to make Turkey the 
regional political, cultural and economic powerhouse. This was achieved by 
attempting to nest the complex identities of the Middle East under one post-
Ottoman identity through expanding the AKP’s passive revolution. Turkey, as 
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a non-Arab state polity, not tied to either the pro-Saudi or pro-Iran axis, had a 
unique position to employ independent political action and mediation, 
providing the government with a powerful domestic narrative of Turkey as the 
new regional leader. The AKP success at defeating the secular Kemalist 
authoritarian regime on the domestic front gave Turkey increased legitimacy 
whilst dealing with Muslim nations. The emerging ‘moral power’ on the 
international front, in turn, reinforced the AKP’s authority at home. Yet, this 
became undermined by Turkey’s continued hard power considerations such 
as their defense alliances with Israel and NATO. 
 
iv. How and why Turkey’s evolving double-security dilemma altered 
its mode of political reproduction during the AKP’s tenure. 
The thesis has demonstrated how social cohesion and sovereign territoriality 
became weaker than ever in the Middle East after the ‘Arab Spring’ which 
altered the double-security dilemma Turkey faced. When the Arab uprisings 
ensued Turkish policy-makers saw it as a chance to spread Islamic 
neoliberalism throughout North Africa and the Middle East. Yet, the passive 
revolution failed to domino and Turkey’s dependence on its external relations 
put it at great risk when the ‘Arab Spring’ turned to winter. A particular 
security dilemma was the territorial proximity of a Syria mired by civil war, 
lending to three enemies aboding on Turkey’s border- Da’esh, the PYD and 
 333 
 
the Syrian regime. This was compounded by the increase of nationalist 
feeling amongst Kurds inspired by the PYD. To respond to this change in the 
double-security dilemma, the AKP transitioned to a more fortifying mode of 
political reproduction both vertically and horizontally. This represented the 
fortified transition of the alliance-building ‘Turkish Model’.  
The thesis has analyzed how the AKP vertically fortified the structure of the 
state and its institutions from 2013 onwards. This created new winners and 
losers and built a coercive relationship between society and the state. Key to 
this was President Erdoğan’s monopolization of power by synonymizing his 
authority with the endurance of the Republic through the emergent chaos. 
The AKP fortified the state horizontally by militarizing its territory and directly 
intervening in other states affairs through sanctions and military intervention; 
causing rifts with other countries such as Iran, Egypt and Russia. Yet, 
although there have been regional wars, several scandals, corruption 
allegations, increasing amounts of street protests, and a conflict with Gülen 
members; the sovereignty, authority and control of the Turkish state over its 
citizens and territory has been maintained by the continued political 
reproduction of the AKP.  
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8.3 Scope for Further Research 
This research project ends in 2015 but since completion there has been 
evidence of scope for further research into the AKP’s political reproduction 
and maintenance of power since then. Some of the challenges faced by the 
AKP have included the continued challenge of Kurdish autonomy, an 
attempted coup in July 2016, the election of President Donald Trump into the 
White House, and continued regional power struggles through the vacuums 
that emerged due to the failure of the ‘Arab Spring’. There is scope for 
studying how these new threats have affected the AKP’s authority patterns 
on both a national and international level. In addition to this, the 
methodological and theoretical supplementation to the existing literature on 
the double-security dilemma, provided by this PhD thesis, lends to a 
framework for further research into other state polities maintenance of 
authority through either alliance-building or fortifying. It is believed that 
inference from such studies can be useful to policy-makers tasked with the 
maintenance of the institutional and sovereign security of states. 
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